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EDITORIAL

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African migration has been a subject of interest to researchers and policy analysts from various disciplinary and institutional backgrounds for the last few decades. The three papers and poem in this issue join in that small but growing body of work, providing the reader with four different perspectives on African migration. In "The Promise and Perils of Diaspora Partnerships for Peace: The Case of The US-Based Liberian Diaspora", Osman Antwi-Boateng analyzes the role played by Liberians in the US in the political conflicts in their motherland. The author argues that Liberians in the US have contributed to both the conflict (i.e. Charles Taylor's activities while he was living in the US), and its resolution (for example, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf lived and worked in the US before returning to rebuild Liberia post-war). The author uses interview data to interrogate the on-going activities of Liberians in the US in the post-conflict peace-building work, particularly as they collaborate with international organizations through partnerships and lobbying. He narrates the challenges involved that undermine well-intentioned collaborations.

The paper, "Racial Differences in the Tempo of Assimilation for White and Black African-Born Men in the United States", by Stephanie J. Nawyn also considers Africans in the US, this time focusing on their earnings as a group in comparison to their US counterparts, and argues that the Black Africans are disadvantaged because of their race. The author uses a double-cohort method of analysis to figure out the role of race in the earnings of African immigrant men between 1990 and 2000. She finds that white African-born men's earnings

surpass those of their White US-born men over time, while Black African-born men continue to experience a disadvantage in earnings that suggest a racial disparity.

The third paper focuses not on immigrants in the US or the West, but on the impact of immigration on African sending countries in terms of brain drain. In "The political economy of forced migration n Nigeria: prospects and challenges in the new millennium", Shambhavi V. Murthy Gopalkrishna and Samuel Oloruntoba argue that, in spite of the benefits of remittances, African countries are losing more than they are gaining by losing their best brains – particularly professionals like physicians and others who could be contributing to nation building. They argue that African nations ought to make policy changes to mitigate the effects of forced migrations including changes to reduce the numbers of people migrating, as well as policies to better make use of the diaspora population's skills for national development.

As I read these articles and immersed myself in the theoretical explanations for migration and the social, political and economic factors that create the necessity for migration to the US and other western countries (Achanfuo-Yeboah, 1993; Adeyanju & Oriola, 2011; Hagopian, Thompson, Fordyce, Johnson, & Hart, 2004; Hatton & Williamson, 2003), I found myself looking inwards at my own story of leaving my motherland of Kenya and settling in the United States. Whereas I am now a permanent resident of these United States, I feel African, Kenyan to my very core. My own journey to the US was a search for further studies in programs that at that point, were not available in my motherland. Yet I never thought I would be here this long – 10 years now. I had planned to study then return to Kenya. But, as often happens with many others who came not because of chaos or conflict in their countries, but for educational purposes, the opportunities to gain work experience becomes a reason to stay a while. The search for permanent resident status came about to ease my ability to travel into and out of the country, and

of course makes it easier to work here without constantly having to search for a sponsor. Now I am one of those immigrant 'faculty of color' (Hernandez, Ngunjiri, & Chang, 2011), a peripheral positionality that is tedious at best (Robinson & Clardy, 2010). My changing positionality as not only immigrant faculty, but also marriage partner to an American citizen has complicated my plans and trajectory for return to the motherland. Now the US is, for all intents and purposes, home.

Stories like my own, complex stories that go beyond illustrating current theories to interrogate the lived experiences of African immigrants in the United States, need to be told. These stories need to be told for several purposes. First, these stories will help those in the motherland considering voluntary migration to get a better idea of what its really like to be an African in America or the West. Secondly, these stories need to be told to move us from looking at structural and macro-level analysis of migration (as these three papers did), to the individual level of analysis that can uncover the nuances of immigrant life. This, I believe is where we can learn strategies for success as immigrants living with multiple identities and navigating the racialized context of the United States. In other words, beyond the question of what it means to be an African immigrant in the West, are also questions of how African immigrants successfully navigate organizational and social culture, how they negotiate their multiple identities, and how they successfully participate in nation building in the motherlands.

Furthermore, these three articles had me thinking about the need for future studies at the macro level of analysis, focusing on country-level impacts of brain drain, best practices for Diasporas' involvement in their motherlands' institutional and national development, and African-born women's assimilation into the labor markets.

Finally, most African migration studies focus on the macro and micro perspectives of migration and immigration, often looking at those living outside of Africa or outside of their motherlands. I believe we should also focus our analytical lenses on those who return, because therein we can learn the personal, social, cultural, structural and political factors that enable a return. After all, our motherlands could use the skills, competencies and professional expertise of returnees in peace-building, national development and institutional growth. Stories of successful reintegration could also benefit those still in adopted homelands in making the decisions to return, by providing positive stories and examples as well as unraveling the negative media stories that tend to only focus on what is wrong in Africa.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr Ngunjiri is associate professor of leadership studies at Eastern University, located in the suburbs of Philadelphia, PA. She teaches courses in organizational leadership and research methods to graduate students. A graduate of Bowling Green State University (Ohio), Dr. Ngunjiri has also worked at Yale and Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne. She has served as an adjunct at Regent University, Indiana College of Technology, University of St. Francis (Fort Wayne) and George Fox Evangelical Seminary. Her research interests focus on African women and leadership as well as culturally responsive research approaches; her work has been published in various international journals including Journal of Educational Administration, Journal of Business Communication, Journal of Research Practice, and Global Media Journal. She is the author of Women's Spiritual Leadership in Africa (SUNY, 2010) and co-author of Collaborative Autoethnography (Left Coast Press, 2012).

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THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF DIASPORA PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE: THE CASE OF THE U.S-BASED LIBERIAN DIASPORA

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ABSTRACT

In seeking to contribute towards peace-building in Liberia, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora is building international partnerships with its liberal minded host country, liberal institutions such as the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations and private and corporate entities in the host land. There is a convergence of interests between moderate diaspora groups interested in post-conflict peace-building and liberal minded countries and international institutions seeking to promote the liberal peace. The convergence of such multiple actors offers better prospects for effective building in the homeland because collectively, they serve as counter-weights to the parochial foreign policy impulses of each peace-building stakeholder that might be inimical to peace-building. While there are opportunities for the U.S-based Liberian diaspora to forge international partnerships for peace-building, there are challenges that can undermine well intentioned collaborations. These include: logistical challenges in executing transnational projects; self-seeking Diaspora members, divided leadership and poor coordination, and lack of sustainability of international partnerships.

KEYWORDS: *Liberia, Diaspora, peace-building, Civil War, Africa, Conflict.*

INTRODUCTION

The dominant discourse about the link between Diasporas and conflict has been overwhelmingly negative and this is not without foundation. A seminal work by Collier et al. (1999) at the World Bank made two conclusions. First, the external resources provided by the Diaspora can generate conflict. Second, the Diaspora poses a greater risk for renewed conflict even when conflict has abated. Focusing on the Ethiopian case, Terrence Lyons (2004) posits that Diasporas have distinct attitudes towards the homeland and typically develop solidarity networks that emphasize identity and work to keep nationalist hopes alive from afar. Such Diasporas view homeland conflict as the cornerstone of their identity (Koser 2007, 240).

In the positive realm of the debate, Shain argues that Diasporas also play crucial roles in conflict resolution by citing the case of Jewish-American groups who served as intermediaries between Israel and countries that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel during the Oslo peace process. In addition, Jewish-American groups lobbied to end the Arab boycott by offering "carrots" to Arab and Islamic states that normalized relations with Israel while encouraging other states to follow suit (Shain 2002,126).

However, a more nuanced discourse has emerged that characterizes the Diaspora as capable of being peace wreckers as well as peace makers when it is opportune as captured in an edited volume by Smith and Stares (2007), with the following cases: the Armenian Diaspora-Tölölyan (2007); Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora-Fair (2007); the Croatian Diaspora-Skrbis (2007); Cuban Diaspora- Grugel and Kippin (2007); Jewish Diaspora in the Arab-Israeli conflict- Sheffer (2007); and Eriterian Diaspora-Koser, (2007).

Exploring the positive role of the Eritrean Diaspora in post-conflict peace-building without discounting the negative role of Diaspora in conflict, Koser observed that the Eritrean

Diaspora played a positive role in the post-conflict political transition in three ways: participating in the Executive Assembly of the Constitutional Commission, extensive engagement in the drafting of the constitution and ratification of the constitutions (Koser 2007, 237). In terms of economic contributions, Koser notes that the Eritrean Diaspora is required to pay two percent of its monthly income directly to the Eritrean government (Koser 2007, 245-246).

The African Diaspora is heterogeneous and unlike other Diasporas such as the Jewish or Armenian, that dominate the Diaspora literature, it is impossible to make generalizations based on any case about the conduct of the African Diaspora towards peace or war. Hence the best way to explore the activities of the diverse African Diaspora is via single case studies of specific Diasporas. Thus I seek to enrich the discourse on African Diaspora and peace-building by exploring how the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora seeks peace-building partnerships for the homeland after supporting conflict. I argue that through a coalition with diverse international peace-building partners, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora is able to have an ameliorative effect on peace-building in the homeland. This is because a broad coalition serves as a counterweight to potential stakeholder parochialism that may be inimical to peace-building. The Diaspora partnership falls under four categories: Alliances with liberal international organizations such as the UN; liberal states such as the host country – the United States; liberal Non-Governmental Organizations involved in advocacy and development assistance; and partnerships with private and corporate entities in the host country. These partnerships are fraught with challenges such as: logistical/communication and transportation problems in executing transnational projects; self-seeking Diaspora members who exploit Liberia's difficulties for personal gain, divided leadership and factionalism among the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora which is undermining coordination of efforts and unity of purpose and lack of sustainability of Diaspora peace-building

efforts. The effectiveness of Diaspora peace-building partnerships depends on how peace-building stakeholders manage the aforementioned challenges.

The research is organized as follows: the methodology of research, theoretical framework, the role of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora in the Civil War, determinants of Diaspora peace-building participation, and the challenges of Diaspora peace-building pursuit and implications for peace.

A PORTRAIT OF THE U.S-BASED LIBERIAN DIASPORA

A network of intense two-way migratory pattern has existed between the U.S. and Liberia for nearly two centuries. These strong social networks have led to the growth of the Liberian community in several metropolitan regions in the U.S. during the last twenty-five years of political turmoil in Liberia (Ellis 1996, Outram 1997). The Americo-Liberian settler community, long the privileged group in Liberia, has traditionally dominated migration to the U.S. throughout the 20th century by sending their children to the U.S to pursue higher education or business interests. From a transient and socio-economically privileged population of just a few hundred students, diplomats and business people who stayed in the U.S for a relatively short-term up to 1980, the Liberian community has now grown and diversified considerably reflecting the ethnic, economic, political and social diversity of the country (Lubkemann 2008).

In addition, while the majority of Liberians who sought asylum following the 1980 coup were Americo-Liberians, this changed dramatically after 1989 when the Liberian Diaspora in the U.S came to be dominated by indigenous Liberians following the political turbulence generated by the Civil War. Lubkemann argues that the latest Liberian refugee influx has reconstituted the

Liberian Diaspora in the U.S to reflect virtually every Liberian county and ethnic group (Lubkemann 2008).

Thus, the Liberian Diaspora in the U.S is also very heterogeneous with its composition reflecting the ever-changing political events at home such as the Civil War. For instance, successive political turbulence and violence have brought political rivals to the same shore. This created the situation whereby political victors of the 1980s became the political losers/victims of the 1990s finding themselves in exile with their victims. Ultimately, all factions, ethnicities and political interests are strongly represented in the U.S-based Diaspora with the attendant consequence of very contentious intra-Diaspora relations away from home (Lubkemann 2008).

For example in Minnesota, home to an estimated 25,000 Liberians, there have been serious tensions in the community along factional and political lines. In the heat of the second phase of the Civil War in 2003, the community became divided along supporters of the insurgent group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Charles Taylor supporters. There were accusations that some members of the community were fundraising for LURD thereby fueling the conflict in Liberia. It was widely known within the community that LURD officials often solicited funds in the Twin Cities. Those accused also argued that their accusers were only interested in preserving the status quo and that the fundraising was for humanitarian purposes such as the provision of medical supplies and food for Liberians displaced by the war. Nevertheless, there was general trepidations among the larger Liberian community in Minnesota about the possibility that people living in their midst could be underwriting the death of their relatives back home by fueling the war (Chadwick 2006).

Although members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora share a common aspiration towards rebuilding Liberia, they do not always speak with one voice. They are divided politically

and belong to several political parties in Liberia. The most prominent among them based on parliamentary representation are the Congress for Democratic Change, Liberty Party, Liberia Unification Party, Unity Party, United People's Party and the National Patriotic Party just to mention a few. In recognition of the political strength of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora, most of the political parties are represented in the U.S by Liberian Diaspora representatives (Wells 2010).

Economically and socially, the Liberian Diaspora today reflects a great deal of diversity. Whereas, a majority of Liberians who came to the U.S prior to the early 1990s came from the privileged Americo-Liberian group via student visas, the recent arrivals in the turn of the millennium came as a result of persecution at home or as refugees from various West African countries. They came from significantly diverse backgrounds reflective of the Liberian society and conflict at home (Lubkemann 2008).

METHODOLOGY

This research is based on empirical evidence gathered via in-depth interviews with a diverse group of about forty Liberian and non-Liberian peace-building advocates through a snow ball process. The Liberian Diaspora interviewees included the leadership of U.S-based Liberian Diaspora organizations such as the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) and some of its regional branches, County Associations, High School Alumni Associations, Christian and Muslim Associations, Professional Associations and returnee public office holders. The non-Liberian advocates included some of the leadership of Friends of Liberia (An Alumni group of about 3000 former Peace Corp Volunteers to Liberia), representatives of The Carter Center working on various peace-building programs in Liberia, experts from the United States Institute of Peace and the Metro-Atlanta Chapter of the National Coalition of 100 Black Women of

America. Non-Liberian interviewees helped contain any biases from Liberian interviewees. Interviews were supplemented with participatory observation via visits to regional chapter meetings of the Union of Liberian Associations in America (ULAA) and a major U.S-based Liberian Diaspora peace conference organized by the Carter Center. This was further supplemented with the monitoring of U.S-based Liberian Diaspora list-serves to gauge attitudes towards peace-building back home. Most interviewees requested confidentiality in order not be victimized or jeopardize relationships. As such, interviewees are assigned pseudonyms in this paper.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Pioneering work on the role of the Diaspora in international relations was conducted by Esman (1986) in his contribution to Sheffer's 1986 edited volume. This has spurned Contemporary work by scholars such as Shain (2002) and Shain and Barth (2003) from which this research borrows theoretically.

In a similar study regarding the Armenian and Jewish Diaspora, Shain and Barth (2003, 457) posit a constructivist and liberal International Relations theory as constituting a "theoretical space" in which to conduct a study of how the Diaspora impacts the homeland in IR. In this regard, constructivism's emphasis on identity complements liberalism, with its focus on domestic politics. The shared "theoretical space" should not come as a surprise because the two theoretical approaches share assumptions and claims. First, the constructivist approach claims that identities as well as interests are determined by social interaction in which domestic actors are participants. Second, both constructivism and liberalism take into consideration the preferences of states, regard states as embedded in a larger social context and recognize the

relevance of a variety of non-state actors. Thus, given that Diasporas are primarily identity-driven, exert influence on homelands mainly through domestic politics, are part of the international community and are non-state actors, this shared "theoretical space" provides a sound theoretical framework for the study of the Diaspora in International Relations (Shain and Barth 2003).

THE ROLE OF THE U.S-BASED LIBERIAN DIASPORA
IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

Two prominent and former members of the U.S- based Liberian Diaspora, Charles Taylor and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, represent the contradictory role of the Diaspora in fueling the country's Civil War and promoting peace. While Taylor was the main architect of the War, he was initially supported by Johnson Sirleaf before the latter severed ties with him and became a champion of peace-building. The emergence of the U.S. based Taylor as the main rebel leader of the Liberian Civil War is no coincidence. This is because there is hardly any domestic political resistance in most autocratic states; chances of the government being overthrown from within are very minimal to say the least. Indeed, it takes Diaspora dissidents who are able to organize beyond the reach of the homeland regime with some help from neighboring states. Buttressing this point, Shain (1993, 300) stresses that "the struggle of overseas communities to unseat authoritarian regimes in the home-country is led by political exiles and refugees who prior to their departure were engaged in anti-regime activity at home or were regarded by the home regime as troublemakers." One Diaspora group that played a pivotal role in mobilizing opposition against the Doe administration was the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora. Charles Taylor was one of its pioneer leaders leading the Union of Liberia Association of the Americas (ULAA) an umbrella body of Liberian Diaspora groups.

Pharm (2004, 94) notes that "During his tenure as chairman, Taylor turned the ULAA from a service organization in to a political group." Although prior to the outbreak of the Liberian Civil war, Liberians frequently traveled to the United States mainly for education and business purposes, the overthrow of Tolbert and the subsequent brutalities of the Doe regime swelled the ranks of the United States Liberian Diaspora. In the words of a prominent United States based Liberian dissident, Tonia King "we were moving in the shadows. A lot of people came and went" (Huband 1998, 47).

In addition, because the indigenous government led by Doe brutally targeted Americo-Liberians, Liberian dissidents in the United States were disproportionately Americo-Liberians and they mobilized themselves in order to raise the necessary resources to move against Doe. Clarence Simpson, who was the former treasurer of the True Whig Party, which had been overthrown by Doe, enthusiastically became the fundraiser-in-chief for the dissidents in the United States. At one meeting organized by the dissidents in New Jersey in 1986, an amount of $5000 was raised to lay the groundwork for the subsequent invasion against Doe (Huband 1998, 48).

DETERMINANTS OF U.S-BASED LIBERIAN DIASPORA PEACE-BUILDING

   PARTICIPATION

Dramatic changes in the international political architecture in the past two decades such as the end of the Cold War and 9/11 have led the U.S to be less tolerant of dictators and non-state actors such as Diaspora groups. Coupled with a "hurting-stalemate" in the homeland, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora was forced to channel its energies and resources towards a negotiated settlement and post-conflict peace-building. According to Paris (2004, 22), since the end of the

Cold War, many liberal institutions have become active and vocal advocates of liberal

democracy and market-oriented economics. This ideological predisposition is not only confined

to the United Nations and its allied special agencies, but also the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the

Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, national

development agencies and several NGOs engaged in relief and development work. Thus it is safe

to label the aforementioned liberal organizations and agencies as the quintessential practitioners

of peace-building

Esman (1986, 336) posits three factors that influence the capacity of the Diaspora to

affect international relations. These factors are: the resources and skills available to them; the

opportunity structures in the host country; and their inclination or motivation to maintain their

solidarity and exert group influence.

RESOURCES AND SKILLS AVAILABLE TO THE DIASPORA

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora is a significant asset when it comes to post-conflict

reconstruction in Liberia because members tend to be disproportionately better educated and

wealthier than their compatriots in other Liberian Diasporas. There are several township, clan,

district, and county organizations; alumni associations; professional groups; and religious bodies

from Liberia that are organized to promote the welfare of members in the United States and to

support the parent organization and community at home (Sawyer 2005, 78).

In addition, contemporary advancement in communication and means of international

transportation has given the Diaspora a boost in its organizational capacity, especially in an

economically advanced host-country such as the U.S where these resources are readily available

and accessible. Buttressing this point, Brinkerhoff (2009, 47) indicates that the internet serves as a mobilizing tool for the numerous Diaspora organizations that it supports through the facilitation of shared identity necessary for collective action. It also serves as an organizational tool for mobilizing and communicating among individuals and groups, provides information and referrals to other actors; helps frame issues and build confidence. The output of mobilization agendas can be posted and transmitted to inspire sustainable mobilization.

Among the African Diaspora, Tettey (2009, 144) has observed that there are several websites, internet TV and radio broadcasts, and other interactive media outlets dedicated to providing news and fora for discussing developments in various African countries. These avenues serve as the major sources of information and political engagements for the African Diaspora by helping to keep them abreast of events, issues, and conditions in their home countries while at the same time serving as a platform for civil interaction.

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora is aided by the fact that cell-phones have become an integral part of daily Liberian life. Cell phones serve as tools to combat crime through a popular radio show on Truth FM titled "Crime Watch" where crime victims call in to report crimes and look for police assistance. People have also called the FM station to request ambulance services for emergency health situations. Cell phones also provide direct economic advantages to people who charge fees or sell calling cards for usage thereby providing a source of income (Oye 2009). The widespread usage of cell phones enables easy communication between the Diaspora and the homeland.

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN THE HOST COUNTRY

Because the environment that exists for civil society under liberal democratic dispensations is conducive, a democratic homeland is susceptible to Diasporas' influence, in the same way as a democratic host country. Diaspora influence is greater in the homeland if the state is poor ideologically, materially, and lacks institutional resources as is common in failed states. In weak states where the governments are not fully democratic as in Liberia[1], the state relies heavily on Diaspora support for survival and the Diaspora is capable of offering such support at a cost. In sum, weak states attract Diaspora influence regardless of whether they are democratic or not (Shain and Barth 2003, 464).

The 2005 election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a former U.S-based Diaspora member has created a conducive environment for the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora to get actively involved in the peace-building process in Liberia. They feel welcome compared to the illiberal regime of Charles Taylor who viewed the Diaspora with suspicion. In addition, because many top members of the Sirleaf administration are former members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora who actively supported the President's 2005 election, there is little ideological difference between the two that could potentially generate conflict. Furthermore, Liberia needs invaluable Diaspora remittances and expertise needed to build crumbled institutions. According to estimates by Lubkemann, Liberian Diaspora remittances back home to family members in 2004, in the aftermath of the war, were between 19 million and 23 million USD in cash. An additional 10 to 13 million USD was sent to Liberian refugees living in neighboring countries. In order to put the significant contributions of the Liberian Diaspora into perspective, it is important to point out that while Liberia's 2002 national GDP was estimated at 562 million USD ($168 per capita), the annual budget of the government which is the largest employer was only

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[1] The Liberia example is mine and is used in place of Armenia.

$80 million. Thus financial contributions by the Liberian Diaspora are vital for the survival of Liberia's economy (Lubkemann 2008).

One of the advantages that any Diaspora in the United States has is the geographic proximity to the numerous international organizations that are headquartered in the United States: the United Nations and its agencies in New York and the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, The National Endowment for Democracy and a number of other important peace-building agencies in Washington D.C. and a plethora of known and little-known non-profit organizations. The proximity of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora to these liberal-leaning institutions provides the opportunity and access for mutual collaboration on peace-building.

In addition, many U.S-based Liberian refugees who fled the civil war benefited from a relatively favorable immigration designation by their host country as thousands were granted Temporary Protective Status (TPS) pending the resolution of the conflict. Many took advantage of this status to seek gainful employment and also to pursue education, which was made easier by the fact that Liberians are English speaking. This increased their financial capacity to assist the homeland after the end of the war. However, thousands of Liberian refugees on TPS face a legal limbo as their immigration status is subject to uncertain periodic review by the U.S government which no longer views Liberia as an unstable country.

MOTIVATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR SOLIDARITY AND EXERT GROUP INFLUENCE

Using a term that has gained currency among the Liberian Diaspora in the U.S., Lubkemann notes that a majority of the Diaspora are interested in living the life of "the house with two rooms" (one in the U.S and one in Liberia). According to survey results of 136 Liberians households in Minneapolis, only 26% indicated that they had no plans to re-establish

residency in the homeland. Interestingly, 84% of those who had plans to re-establish residency

back home also planned to maintain a residence in the U.S. Even among those who had no plans

to establish residency in the U.S after establishing a home in Liberia, 61% plan to maintain a

savings account or maintain some form of economic investment in the U.S (Lubkemann 2008).

The concept of the "house with two rooms" can be seen as a rational pragmatic approach of

survival without abandoning commitments to the homeland. The Liberian Diaspora fits into what

Lubkemann has labeled as "diasporic transnationals" because "they plot life-strategies and see

their social, political and economic future as one that involves investment and activity in two

countries simultaneously" (Lubkemann 2008).

HOW THE U.S-BASED LIBERIAN DIASPORA DEVELOPS PEACE-BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora seeks international peace-building partnerships with the

following: liberal international organizations such as the UN; liberal states such as the host

country - United States; liberal Non-Governmental Organizations involved in advocacy and

development; and private and corporate entities.

PARTNERSHIPS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Diaspora is emerging as a very important political actor in peace-building by

providing expertise to all groups and factions and functioning as a bridge to the international

community (Auten 2006, 17). The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora serves as a bridge between the

international community and the homeland government in securing much needed reconstruction

assistance. Then board Chairman of the Union of Liberian Association in the Americas (ULAA),

Anthony Kesselly attended a February 2004 UN hosted reconstruction conference for Liberia.

Kesselly shared the Diaspora's perspective on the peace-building agenda being discussed for Liberia with both Liberian government officials and representatives from donor countries. "Many individuals residing out of their country of region in a political Diaspora, regardless of whether they left voluntarily or involuntarily, are able to answer questions about the geography, culture and social infrastructure of their former homeland. They can interpret the nuances, infighting and splintering of their home country's political landscape" (Auten 2006, 332).

ULAA also serves as third party mediators in collaboration with international mediators. Auten (2006, 16) observes that the Diaspora is able to play a crucial role in homeland conflicts because it hails from the country of conflict and understands the nature of the conflict better than foreign mediators. In addition, Diasporas are able to provide better insights on how to sustain long-term dialogue between warring factions long after the conclusion of a formal mediation process. Citing Cochrane, Auten (2006) posits that "Being from outside the conflict zone but having a connection to it might provide Diaspora groups with specific abilities as third party actors in pre-negotiations or even formal talks over a political settlement" (17).ULAA was fully represented at the 2003 Accra Peace Conference where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia (GOL) and rebel factions was signed on August 18, 2003. At this conference, it played an important role by forcefully leaning on wavering warlords to compromise on their entrenched positions for the sake of peace. ULAA representatives were able to play a constructive role because they knew many of the leaders of the warring factions such as Charles Taylor who was a former leader of ULAA in the 80s before launching his armed rebellion in 1989.

In addition, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora serve as cultural ambassadors by bridging any cultural divide between the foreign donors and their homeland counterparts. This is an

important role because well-meaning international donors and supporters of Liberia's peace and

reconstruction efforts could find their assistance doing more harm than good or being under-

utilized because of a lack of cultural understanding of their aid recipients. For example, when a

well-meaning international donor donated mosquito nets to help combat malaria in Liberia, many

Liberians were not using it because of the local belief that the white nets were like shrouds used

to bury the dead. To solve this problem, some members of the Liberian Diaspora suggested the

donation of colored nets instead of white nets, thereby boosting patronage. Narrating attempts at

bridging the cultural divide, a U.S-based Liberian Diaspora member whom I call "Ben" said the

following:

> You know, for example, they gave out mosquito nets and some people just didn't
> want to use it. They thought when they put it over their head; they will look like a
> dead person. So we have to tell them the importance of using their nets and
> suggested different colors. We taught them about the importance of the
> environment, keeping water clean by working along with them as brothers and
> sisters and not as someone from the United States who couldn't relate to them
> (Taped interview 2009).

However, some members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora expressed frustration with

certain aspects of international collaboration. They decried the practice of the UN in relying too

much on expatriate staff to implement projects on the ground instead of employing equally

qualified Liberians from the Diaspora who know their country better. The use of committed

Liberian members from the Diaspora has the advantage of transferring knowledge to citizens of

war-torn countries and can also make projects more sustainable long after the mandate of the UN for a particular project has expired. In the words of one Diaspora member, "some of these expatriates are just airport anthropologists who don't know what they are talking about because they don't spend enough time in the country to interact with the people and get a better appreciation of their problems, yet are quick to prescribe solutions" (Taped interview 2009).

PARTNERSHIP WITH HOST STATE AND OTHER LIBERAL WESTERN STATES

According to Baser and Swain (2008, 14), Diaspora organizations lobby host governments, in order to shape policies that are favorable to, or against, a homeland government. They also influence their homeland's policies through their support or opposition to the governments. Such influence is demonstrated through financial support of political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations.

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora in partnership with the Liberian government has lobbied international organizations and Western creditors of Liberia to cancel most of the country's external debts. Debt cancellation can provide a major boost to peace-building for a post-war country such as Liberia as badly-needed money is freed from the vicious cycle of debt-servicing for peace-building programs such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, institutional building etc. "For Liberia - like other African countries emerging from war - debt relief can provide a vital financial boost, enabling a shift of scarce revenues from debt payments to reconstruction and combating poverty. Eliminating a high debt burden can also encourage domestic and foreign investors to finance new ventures" (Harsch 2009, 3).

Efforts at seeking debt cancellation and post-war reconstruction assistance are a national cause that has attracted the support of all Liberians including the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora. The leadership of the Liberian Diaspora in collaboration with Liberian government officials has made representations to international organizations such as the UN and Bretton Woods institutions seeking post-war reconstruction assistance. Such unity of purpose has the potential to strengthen the case for whatever assistance Liberia seeks from an international community, eager to see countries reach national consensus on vital issues of national interest. This national consensus was demonstrated at the 2004 International Reconstruction Conference on Liberia organized by the United Nations and the U.S. government in New York. In attendance were Gyude C. Bryant then Chairman of the Liberian National Transitional Government and then Board Chairman of The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA), Anthony Kesselly. At this conference, the international community pledged $500 million towards Liberia's reconstruction efforts. In securing such international assistance towards post-war reconstruction, members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora have been a valuable resource by providing access and expert advice to the Liberian government in areas where the government lacked the expertise or the contact.

The leadership of some U.S-based Liberian Diaspora organizations holding U.S citizenship has also been using this privileged status to successfully lobby top U.S policy makers for major policy adjustments in favor of Liberia. For example, through the leadership of some U.S-based Liberian Diaspora members, Liberia was added as a beneficiary of the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). This was introduced by former President G.W. Bush to assist a selected group of African countries to combat malaria. Liberia was initially excluded as a beneficiary

after not meeting the original criteria for the aid. A top U.S-based Liberian Diaspora leader described the successful lobbying efforts as follows:

> … they had given all kinds of excuses that Liberia could not guarantee but then...we made phone calls and talked to so many people. We gave teaching studies and the educational aspect of it, as a result, the United States was able to make Liberia part of the President's Malaria Initiative (Taped interview 2009).

In addition, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora continuously fosters relationships between Liberian government officials and their U.S counterparts at the state and local levels for the development of Liberia and thereby making peace a viable option to violence. During an official meeting between Mayor Daley and the Mayor of Monrovia, Hoff Saytumah in 2005, the former was touched by the latter's request for assistance which led Mayor Daley to announce a package of assistance for the City of Monrovia which included the following: two garbage trucks; 15,000 garbage containers; two containers of school supplies including books and computers; training of Monrovia's firefighters at Chicago's Fire Academy and of Monrovia's Policemen/women at Chicago's Police Academy; and medical supplies (TLC Africa 2005). The role of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora in getting the City of Chicago to assist in the training of Liberian fighter fighters and policemen/women represents a major contribution towards peace-building. A well-trained law enforcement team is necessary to maintain law and order and to reduce the culture of impunity that is still rife in post-war Liberia. The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora also maintains strong relationships with powerful African-American leaders such as The Reverend Jesse Jackson, founder of Operation/PUSH Coalition. As a result of these relationships, the U.S-based

Liberian Diaspora is able to strategically arrange visits for Liberian government officials and connect them to the former for assistance and mutual collaboration. One of the highlights of Hoff Saytumah's 2005 visit to Chicago was her invitation to speak at the close of Operation/PUSH Coalition's Annual Convention. In her speech, which was broadcasted live to 27 million viewers, she strongly advocated for assistance for Liberia's peace-building and post-war reconstruction efforts (TLC Africa 2009). Such a huge media audience raises the awareness level of Liberia's post-conflict needs among the American populace. A high American public awareness of the plight of post-war Liberians makes it easier for American politicians to financially support peace-building efforts in Liberia.

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora also invites U.S government officials to fact-finding missions in Liberia to get first-hand experience on the peace-building and developmental needs of the country. For example, Torlu Kruah, the head of Universal Human Rights International, a refugee assistance NGO, was able to get Massachusetts State Representative, Benjamin Swan to visit rural Liberia in December 2008. "After returning from Liberia, Representative Ben Swan initiated a series of meetings with citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to educate them about the problems he witnessed firsthand and how ordinary Americans can help Liberia" (Liberiawebs 2009). In response to this direct appeal, Pastor Miles T. Crawford Jr. of the Zion Community Baptist Church made a donation of $3,500 to the visiting Mayor of Tappita City, Nimba County, Liberia, Sarah Mendoabor on August 2, 2009 as the congregation's contribution towards the construction of a bridge in Tappita (Liberiawebs 2009).

From the above, it is evident that the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora group serves as interlocutors between their homeland and their adopted country. In the above cases, the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora was more effective in altering U.S policy towards Liberia, than the

Liberian government itself. This is because apart from relying on the relationships that the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora may have cultivated over the years with top U.S policy makers, they also know how to effectively advocate for a policy change compared to a Liberian diplomat who is limited by diplomatic protocols. By virtue of their U.S citizenship, the Liberian Diaspora has more access to a wide range of policy makers who are obligated to be responsive to the views and needs of fellow citizens. This is in contrast to the use of expensive lobbyists that foreign countries have to hire in order to shape U.S foreign policy towards a desirable outcome.

PARTNERSHIPS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

Diasporas use their location to connect local NGOs and civil society to organizations and institutions in the host countries. This enables local peace advocates to gain access to influential and powerful international civil-society networks, which would otherwise have been difficult to access. Furthermore, partnership with global networks elevates the profile of local peace groups and organizations. It also improves their access to information, resources, and external partners that could boost their domestic standing vis-à-vis other local actors (Mohamoud 1999, 8).

The U.S-based Liberian Diaspora collaborates with pro-democracy NGOs such as the Carter Center to promote peace-building in Liberia. For example, a brainstorming conference was hosted by the Carter Center on June 9, 2007 and attracted a diverse group of legal scholars, religious leaders, human rights activists and Liberian Diaspora members from the Metro-Atlanta area. The theme of the conference was "Reconciliation and the Law in Post-Conflict Liberia: Between Law, Society and Healing." The views and contributions made at the conference enriched the Carter Center's rule of law project in Liberia.

In addition, in the course of collaboration with NGOs, some qualified members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora are hired and sent to Liberia to assist in on-going projects. For example, a U.S-based and trained Liberian Lawyer, Johannes Zlahn, was recruited by the Carter Center and seconded to the Ministry of Justice of Liberia to provide technical assistance in the day-to-day operations of the ministry. In a country where the lack of qualified legal personnel is a major hindrance in the administration of justice, the services of qualified Diaspora lawyers is a boost to the administration of justice.

Similarly, a former U.S-based Liberian Diaspora member, Saah N'Tow served as the national coordinator of the field research team of the United States Institute of Peace and George Washington University, on a rule of law project in Liberia. This culminated in a joint authorship of a 2009 report titled "Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options". This report is "intended to provide the Liberian government and other stakeholders in the country with more robust evidence than has hitherto been available on how both formal and customary justice systems are perceived and utilized by Liberians. It also addresses what implications this evidence has for policy options regarding justice sector reform" (United States Institute for Peace 2009).

The building of effective institutions for good governance and peaceful resolution of conflicts is a central component of any peace-building program. This depends on the availability of quality human resource well trained in judicial processes and public administration in general. Unfortunately, years of Civil War have devastated Liberia's once vibrant civil service via brain drain with some of the highly qualified people moving to the United States. To ameliorate this trend, qualified Liberian Diaspora members have been actively offering their services via the Senior Executive Service Program. This program was instituted and funded by the United

Nations in collaboration with the World Bank and Western donors as part of efforts to build the capacity of Liberia's weak civil and public institutions.

Other internationally-sponsored Liberian human resource capacity-building programs funded by smaller NGOs and think-tanks are patronized by the U.S-based Liberia Diaspora. These programs offer Diaspora members generous financial rewards thereby making the programs highly attractive and competitive. For example, the Center for Global Development administers the Scott Family Liberia Fellowship which assigns "fellows to work for one year in Liberia as "special assistants" to senior Liberian government officials, primarily cabinet officials, in a wide range of areas and activities. The fellows are funded through the generosity of the family of CGD Board Chairman, Edward W. Scott, Jr." (Center for Global Development 2007).

As part of efforts to restore a modicum of social and economic normalcy to post-war Liberia, some U.S-based Liberian Diaspora members are collaborating with former American Peace Corps volunteers to Liberia under the umbrella of Friends of Liberia to execute various peace-building projects. Liberia is a pioneer recipient of U.S Peace Corps Volunteers in Africa and currently has about 3,000 Peace Corps Alumni. This group represents a valuable human resource that has continuously been engaged with Liberia throughout the turbulent war times and is currently seeking opportunities to assist in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

One of the major components of the reconciliation process is the rehabilitation of psychologically traumatized people as a consequence of the violent conflict and human rights abuses. For example, the members of the Sierra Leonean Diaspora living in the United Kingdom have established the Sierra Leone War Trust for Children (SLWT) (Bercovitch 2007, 35). Members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora have collaborated with U.S. NGOs to address war-time human rights abuses of women in the form of sexual violence that has led to health

problems such as vaginal fistula. For example, the Metro-Atlanta Chapter of the National

Coalition of 100 Black Women of America have secured $220,000 and have been able to provide

115 complimentary airline tickets to support both U.S and Liberian Diaspora doctors, nurses and

friends of Liberia on 10 medical and trade missions, in an effort to help rebuild Liberia. The

Metropolitan Atlanta Chapter has also partnered with Dr. James Sirleaf, who is Chairman of the

board of a U.S Liberian Diaspora humanitarian NGO, HEARTT, Inc. and son of the president of

Liberia to help support their efforts at the JFK Hospital (The National Coalition of 100 Black

Women 2009).

PARTNERSHIPS WITH PRIVATE/CORPORATE ENTITIES

Financial remittances play an important role in the post-conflict phase. In addition, by

contributing towards economic recovery, the Diaspora community is also consolidating the

foundations of peace. Furthermore, post-conflict rebuilding offers a great opportunity for a

Diaspora community to invest heavily in its homeland. Any type of economic investment can

revive business confidence and boost the economy. This will ultimately aid reconstruction and

recovery and the long-term goal of a durable peace (Bercovitch 2007, 34).

Some members of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora solicit financial and material support

from private individuals, corporations and other institution towards reconstruction and peace-

building efforts in Liberia. Most solicitations begin at the work places of Diaspora members or

contacting foreign individuals they meet in formal and informal forums. For example, a Diaspora

leader working for the *New York Post* sought permission from management to post an appeal for

assistance on the company's web page after making a presentation about the Liberian conflict.

Some U.S-based Liberian Diaspora members operate NGOs focused on peace-building activities and post-conflict reconstruction. They have been successful in seeking assistance from U.S-based corporations, private foundations, individual wealthy Americans and celebrities for the purpose of peace-building. For example, Kimmie Weeks, a Liberian Diaspora activist and founder of Youth Action International has initiated peace-building programs focused on the youth in Liberia which include: the Former Child Soldiers Reintegration Health Project, the FCS Agricultural Project for Peace and the FCS Survey and Video Project. The Former Child Soldiers Reintegration Health Project recruits former child-soldiers and trains them to implement health care awareness programs and to promote reconciliation between former child-soldiers and the community. The FCS Agricultural Project for Peace seeks to provide a source of employment to former child-soldiers by training and assisting them to embark on Agricultural ventures. The FCS Survey and Video Project, seeks to chronicle the war-time experiences of former child-soldiers as part of a healing process and to identify their needs in order to effectively reintegrate them into society (Youth Action International 2009).

CHALLENGES OF DIASPORA-INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE-BUILDING

LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES: TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

The poor transportation network in Liberia limits the quantity of relief items that Diaspora members can accept from willing international donors. Diaspora members complained about the lack of government assistance such as tax exemptions for items imported into the country to support post-war reconstruction efforts. There is also rampant harassment at the points of entries i.e. airports and ports. In an archetypical case, the transitional government of Liberia under Gyude Bryant failed to pay for the cost of the importation of twelve buses donated, by the

City of Dayton to the city of Monrovia via a sister-city initiative and the collaboration of ULAA. In a scathing criticism of the government's inaction ULAA issued a press statement regretting the government's behavior:

> … As our people struggle daily for affordable transportation, Mr. Bryant (transitional president) is very comfortable buying bullet-proof Mercedes Benzes while at the same time refusing to transport free buses to ease the suffering of the people. The Liberian people are now about to lose the buses due to the failure of the government to transport them to Liberia (ULAA 2005).

Such inaction by the government stifles the initiative of the Diaspora in seeking international collaboration that can assist in peace-building in Liberia. In addition, it sends a signal to potential donors who have competing demands on their resources that a country is not serious about being helped.

SELF-INTEREST AT THE EXPENSE OF SACRIFICE

There are also self-seeking Diaspora leaders and members who use all the right words expected by international partners, always interested in working with moderates. Instead, these double-speaking Diaspora leaders and members act contrary to what is expected of them when they acquire assistance. Although respondents admitted knowledge of instances of corruption, there was near unanimous hesitation to name offending organizations and their leaders mainly out of concern for washing the Diaspora community's dirty laundry in public and jeopardizing existing relationships with donors.

Some Diaspora leaders lack dedication towards working on behalf of Liberia and seek leadership for narrow parochial interests. One of the criticisms often leveled against the leadership of the Union of Liberian Associations in Americas (ULAA) is that some of them have been too cozy with the government in power in Liberia to the point of trading their advocacy for political appointments. The leadership of U.S-based Diaspora organizations enjoy high-profile and respectable status in Liberia. As such, some in the Diaspora seek leadership as a spring board towards future political careers at the expense of much needed peace-building.

While admitting the aforementioned weaknesses in the operations of U.S-based Liberian Diaspora organizations, Siahyonkron Nyanseor, a founding member of the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas, argues that "ULAA as any other organization will have members and leaders who will have their own "HIDDEN AGENDA" other than that of the goals and objectives of the organization. What can be done about it? Nothing, since they are hidden" (Nyanseor 2006, 8).

DIVIDED LEADERSHIP AND POOR COORDINATION

For the Diaspora to be capable of influencing the foreign policy of the homeland, it must be united in its position on an issue. Although it is expected that different segments of a Diaspora community might hold divergent views on the appropriate foreign policy to be taken by the homeland, a fractiously divided Diaspora is bound to have less influence on the homeland. By contrast, if the Diaspora is united on an issue and the homeland seeks help then the influence of the former over the latter is bound to be great (Shain and Barth 2003, 465).

Serious divisions in the leadership of the Union of Liberian Associations of the Americas (ULAA) is one of the main challenges facing the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora and threatens

effective collaboration with international partners for peace-building. Since 2004, ULAA has been divided into two factions after a bitter electoral dispute between the then President and Board Chairman. This division has evolved along factional, political and tribal lines and all attempts to resolve it have failed. Currently there is an impending lawsuit from one faction against the other while ULAA is splintered into two groups with one led by Anthony Kesselly and the other by Dr. Mario Seton.

Such divisions make it difficult for effective Diaspora representation before potential international partners capable of supporting peace-building in Liberia. Potential international partners will be hesitant about engaging any of the factions for fear of being entangled in the ongoing legal saga. Also, they may have concerns about which faction to hold accountable for any financial assistance aimed at supporting peace-building projects. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, "a house divided cannot stand."

The effort of building peace-building partnerships is also hampered by a lack of coordination among the numerous Liberian Diaspora organizations. This leads to duplication of efforts as several Diaspora organizations keep going to the same international organizations making the same requests for assistance on behalf of Liberia. A top Diaspora leader pointed out that it will be better for Diaspora groups to focus on specific issue areas such as human rights, education, health, gender rights, economic development or refugee assistance.

LACK OF SUSTAINABILITY

International donor assistance is not sustainable and can lead to a vicious cycle of dependency which undermines local capacity building. Acknowledging Liberia's weak capacity at a 2009 World Bank roundtable discussion, Liberia's Minister of Planning and Economic

Affairs, Amana Konneh pointed out that the Civil War "wiped out what little capacity there was." He advocated for a phased approach to capacity development while stressing the need for long-term approaches that are part of "a national capacity-building plan that focuses on the public, private, and civil society together." The minister, while acknowledging the importance of Liberia's Diaspora involvement in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction, also observed that in the long-term, it is not a sustainable solution. He wants the focus to be on "developing a sustainable approach to capacity development" (World Bank 2009).

Liberian Diaspora respondents complained that even though they held similar qualifications and sometimes better qualifications than their Western counterparts, they were less likely to be hired by international organizations and NGOs for top management jobs with decision-making on major peace-building projects. They are also paid far less than their foreign counterparts. The hiring of nationals from the country recovering from conflict ensures that long after the expatriates are gone, the nationals will remain to run the programs. In addition, the active engagement of nationals of a country in the decision-making of peace-building project ensures that some of the cultural mistakes and insensitivity often associated with foreign projects in Africa are avoided. Furthermore, the hiring of qualified Diaspora members by international partners ensures that very qualified Liberians are given the opportunity to serve thereby limiting the conflict that normally arises when a disproportionate number of Diaspora returnees are seen as occupying higher government positions.

Some Liberian Diaspora members who work for international organizations sometimes find themselves in a dilemma because their motives are always under the microscope whenever they offer certain suggestions to their expatriate colleagues and bosses. This is because even though they may conduct themselves as professionals, their bosses are cognizant of the fact that

they have religious, ethnic or political ties to the country in which they are serving. Describing this sentiment, a Liberian Diaspora leader working for a U.S-based advocacy NGO made the following statement:

> You have to be careful, you have to really convince them and explain and justify why you think that is the right thing. Because of course you are a professional but they know you came from a constituency – right from a particular ethnic group and you're from a particular religion, part of the country and they know that the African context are based upon those loyalties and you can't come and claim that, no I'm not like that even though, I may not be (Taped Interview 2009).

NORMATIVE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DIASPORA PEACE-BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

The ability of the U.S-based Liberian Diaspora to build multiple partnerships with stakeholders of the liberal peace enhances the prospects of Diaspora effectiveness in peace-building in the homeland in a number of ways. First, a broader coalition of liberal minded partners serves as a check and balance mechanism against the potential pursuit of a hidden foreign policy agenda by any of the stakeholders. Second, Diaspora economic advocacy rather than excessive Diaspora involvement in partisan politics minimizes the negative consequences of contentious Diaspora engagement in domestic politics in the homeland. Third, successful Diaspora political and economic advocacy can generate a peace-dividend whereby refugees, the internally displaced and former combatants can return to normalcy. Fourth, the ability of the Diaspora to deliver the bacon without any strings attached can increase the patriotism profile of the Diaspora among their often skeptical homeland counterparts thereby improving the relations

between the two. Fifth, a diverse coalition of liberal minded groups sends a powerful message to

will-be domestic provocateurs about the resolve of the international community towards the

peace-building of Liberia. Finally, for all the above normative benefits to materialize, it is

imperative for all Liberia's peace-building stakeholders to address the challenges to Diaspora

peace-building partnerships identified in this research by coming up with the necessary

ameliorative policies.

BIOGRAPHY

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FORCED ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN NIGERIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

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ABSTRACT

The post-colonial experience of Nigeria has been marked by missed opportunities, truncated development and frustrated hope. The failure of governance manifests in poor socio-economic performance, causing suffering and unfulfilled expectations as well as facilitated insurgency, conflicts and political instability. The involvement of multilateral development agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the management of the nation's economy further aggravated the development challenges. These conditions have led to massive migration of trained professionals like doctors, nurses, engineers and academics to developed countries in Europe and North America and increasingly to emerging countries in Asia and Latin America, a situation conceptualized in this paper as forced economic migration. Contrary to the prevailing notion that the migration of skilled professionals is voluntary and good for the sending countries in terms of brain gain, brain circulation and remittances, the sending countries lose more as they are deprived of the expertise and services of these migrants, which is critically important for their development. The paper concludes that Nigeria must re-orient her development strategies toward ensuring that the conditions that necessitated the forced economic migration of professionals are mitigated such that when people migrate, it will be done on a voluntary basis. Also, in view of the current reality that substantial numbers of Nigerians now work as professionals outside the country, deliberate efforts must be made by the government to creatively engage this Diaspora population toward achieving the much needed development goals.

KEYWORDS: *Forced economic migration, Political Economy, Good Governance, Skilled Professionals.*

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is the most populous black country with an estimated population of 160 million people (PRB 2011). The country has become an epicenter of various crises comprising economic social and political dimensions over the past three decades. The country has witnessed unprecedented incidences of economic doldrums, societal dislocations and political upheavals. Due essentially to the mono-cultural nature of the economy which depends on oil as the main earner of foreign exchange and the bad management, Nigeria's economy experienced serious macro-economic difficulties in the 1980s. This situation, which necessitated the intervention of the Bretton Woods Institutions –the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to impose the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) as a way out of the economic malaise, laid the foundation for more problems. Evidence abound that the failure of SAP led to the closure of many industries, resulting in loss of employment, eradication of the middle class and erosion in the purchasing power of an average worker. (Onimode 1988, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, Ninsin 2000).

Similarly, and flowing from the economic problems enunciated above, conflicts, violence and wars gained ascendancy during the same periods as various ethnic groups rose up against one another. Politically, the Nigerian state has virtually lost its legitimacy and failed to meet the expectations of the people. Consequently, from 1966 to 1998, coups and counter coups became a normal phenomenon while political instability became the rule rather than the exception. This tripartite trajectory has accentuated the massive movement of people within and outside the country. The failure of governance and the inability of the state to contain insurgency have

further threatened the continued existence of the country as a corporate entity. The current spate of violence unleashed on the country by the radical Islamic sect known as Jamā'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lādda'awatih wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad or Boko Haram) has further aggravated socio-economic economic conditions as well as the safety of the people, especially in the Northern part of the country.

While it is true that migration within the country dates back to the pre-colonial era, the colonial policy deliberately encouraged the movement of people to the cities, to increase the prospect of earning wages for the payment of taxes, which by then had become compulsory. Although the concept of forced migration is predominantly used to describe the movement of refugees, asylees, and internally displaced persons (Castles 2003), this paper conceives of the Diasporization of Nigerians due to economic constraints as an instance of forced migration. There are several perspectives about the effects of migration on the development of sending countries. This paper contributes to this debate by examining the implications of forced economic migration and the effects on Nigeria's development. With a focus on the emigration of skilled professionals from Nigeria to other countries such as United States of America, Canada, and Europe, we contend that for Nigeria to become relevant in the twenty-first century, the circumstances that warrant forced economic migration must be clearly examined and meaningfully addressed.

Against the prevailing tendency to justify economic migration as a necessary feature of development, we argue that Nigeria must ensure that the conditions that force people out of the country and continent must be frontally tackled so that trained professionals are retained to contribute their own quotas to the development of country. This paper is divided into four sections. Section I deals with the conceptual and theoretical framework, section II contains a

survey of the causes, dimensions and effects of forced economic migration on Nigeria and the third section attempts policy oriented advice through which Nigeria can minimize the disruptive effects of forced economic migration, while maximizing the gains. Section four concludes the paper.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Migration is as old as human civilization. Human beings have always moved from one location to the other in search of better opportunities. While many cases of migration are voluntary, some such as movement on account of wars, conflicts, natural disasters and economic hardship are involuntary. In recent times, interest on migration has received increased scholarly attention.

From the 1950s to the current time, there has been a radical shift both in the magnitude and geographical pattern of international migration (Clunies-Ross, Forsyth and Huq 2009). By the 1990s, Europe, North America and Oceania had become large scale recipients of immigrants up to approximately 2.5 million per annum. The sending countries are African, Latin American and the Caribbean (Clunies-Ross, Forsyth and Huq 2009; 671). Pritchett (2003) stresses that there are economic, technological, and demographic reasons for increased labor mobility and migration flows across borders.

Scholars have tried to explain the causes of migration from various perspectives. Some see forced economic migration as a consequence of the pre-capitalist state's response to the penetration of the European merchant capital. In this view, the colonial administration in most African states introduced taxation which made it imperative for able bodied-men to migrate to the cities to work in order to earn enough money to pay taxes (Ake 1981, Zegeye and Ishemo

1989). As Ake (1981) notes, this pattern of migration caused a serious disruption in the indigenous production processes because able bodied men left the rural areas for the cities. Consequently, agriculture, in which the colonized countries had comparative advantage, was neglected. Others see migration as a normal phenomenon with socio-economic benefits. It is common knowledge that before the European colonization of the African continent, the movement of people was a regular occurrence. However, colonization and later, neo-liberalism accentuated this phenomenon both in pattern, structures and outcomes (Amin 1974, Toure and Fadayomi 1992). During the colonial era, a lot of migrations took place both at the regional and international levels. Also, the pattern of migration was a reflection of the development policies of the colonialists which was focused on exploitation of raw materials and seeking market outlets for manufactured products.

The colonial administration in Nigeria deliberately emphasized the development of specific cities, usually near ports of shipment, to further its mercantilist cause of procuring raw materials for its industrial production in the metropole. A classic example is the Lagos port to which all the railway lines from Nguru to Kaura Namoda, Kano, and Oshogbo, among others have direct links. However the nature of migration during the colonial era remains mainly within Nigeria and other African countries and it can be categorized as rural-rural, rural urban, urban-urban and urban-rural (Amin 1974). Ayittey (1999) in his book, *Africa in Chaos: A Comparative History*, shows how the European government balkanized the various nations in Africa and caused massive disarticulation into the indigenous economies of these countries and oriented them towards the metropoles. He contends that the disarticulations in the indigenous economies are today partly responsible for the food crisis and other poor showing in economic performance.

There is a perspective that international migration is undertaken to eliminate disparities in wages in the sending and receiving countries. As de Haan (2007, 273) argues in regard to this perspective, 'there is an assumption that the movement of labor would lead to the elimination of disparities and equalization of development'. In other words, migration is mutually beneficial, especially to the sending countries. The import of this assertion is that through international migration, particular disparities in wage differentials will be minimized. As Ozdeh and Schiff (2006) argues:

> The principal cause of south-north migration is, in most cases, the difference in the present value of expected real wages, adjusted for migration costs. These costs increase with the distance between source and destination countries, and decline with social networks in the destination country…Migration would be expected to rise with the difference in expected real wages and decline with migration costs (cited in Clunies-Ross, Forsyth and Huq 2009; 678).

While earlier theories of migration tried to explain the colonial basis of this phenomenon, the most important theoretical starting point for migration studies since the 1960s has been the model by Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970). In her analysis of this model, de Haan (2007, 287) states that "in the Todaro model, a prospective migrant is expected to weigh the difference between the expected earnings from formal sector urban unemployment and the expected earnings from the village." She argues that while this model has been criticized by many, empirical analyses have shown that the model has certain predictive value. More recently Lucas (2002) provides a theoretical model of rural-urban migration based on Todaro-Harris,

emphasizing the increasing skill levels in urban areas and widening gap with agricultural workers. While the 1960s migration theories are situated in discussions of structural changes, the focus of Todaro-type of analysis has been on individual incentives and remittances. It is this orientation, which holds that migration benefits the sending countries that motivate some scholars to advocate for more migration of people from regions of low economic growth to the developed economies. For instance, Moses and Letnes (2004) estimate through an applied equilibrium model that liberalization of international migration would lead to an efficiency gain of US$774 billion for the sending countries over a specified period.

The international political economy of migration and remittances has been conceptualized in the context of advantages for global capital and richer nations. This is problematic for developing countries in the first place, because the sending countries are gradually being deprived of the best of their human capital to the benefit of the advanced countries. This is even more puzzling when one examines the huge cost that the struggling economies of Africa incur in the process of educating her citizens. As Okeke (2008, 129) submits 'African countries generally fund the education of their nationals, only to see them end up making contributions to the continual growth of the advanced and developed economies with little or no return on their investments. For instance, it costs about USD40,000.00 to train a Doctor, and USD 10,000-15,000 to educate a University student.'

Secondly, the advanced countries of the world have a gradually ageing population, which in effect constitutes a veritable threat to the sustainability of their economies, particularly given the commitment of the state to maintain stable social security benefits for pensioners and the unemployed. It is therefore necessary for these countries to devise ways of recruiting skilled people from the Third World to augment the shortfall in their labor demand. This is currently

manifested in various visa and lottery programs introduced by various countries both in Europe and North America. It is interesting that these countries are not looking for illiterates or semi-skilled people to emigrate to their countries. In effect, there is a subtle replication of the interpretation of "Mathew Effect" (the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, derived from Matthew 25:29)-a term used to decry a situation where the advanced countries are so far ahead of the Third World countries in all ramifications of development that Third World countries lose what they have and the advanced countries gain more.

Two sets of theoretical innovations known as the "new economics of migration" have taken migration studies beyond the individual incentives central to the Todaro-type model. Here the family is conceptualized as a coalition vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Family members share costs of and rewards of migration. Migration is seen as a form of portfolio diversification by families, in which they enter into chosen contractual arrangements, and remittances exemplify the inter-temporal contractual arrangement between migrant and family with families investing in migrants, migrants in families and both expecting returns from that (Dustmann 1997).

This type of contractual arrangement is very common in Africa since the cycle of economic crises after the mid-1970s, where most families both from the rich and poor social strata are of the opinion that it is imperative for at least a member of the family to be a resident abroad. Many families pressure their members to migrate as a means of escaping grinding poverty, which is prevalent at home. There is even more pressure if a classmate or a contemporary of a family member had earlier migrated abroad and is sending money home. To actualize the objective of having a representative abroad, families contribute money and in extreme cases sell valuable assets to accumulate enough money for the travel requirements and initial cost of settlement. This is done in anticipation of refund and compensation through

remittances. To this extent, we uphold the theoretical orientation of the 'new economics of migration as explicated above.

World Systems theory leads us to believe that that the socio-economic characteristics at the periphery are not conducive to the economic capacity and optimal productivity of many professionals like doctors, nurses, engineers, academics, sportsmen and women, artists, among others who are mostly underpaid and under-employed and under-appreciated. The loss of policy autonomy by the states at the periphery has also created a situation in which the opinions of many of the professionals are neither sought nor appreciated by policy makers who act as agents of the transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2004). In contrast to countries at the core of global capitalism that have well developed political institutions, countries in the periphery operate a kind of democracy that promotes primitive accumulation by the ruling elites but disempowerment for the people (Ake 1996). The resultant socio-economic conditions in the periphery and the better opportunities that are available for skilled professionals at the core of global capitalism such as United States of America, Europe, Canada and Japan have created conditions that accentuate migration flows from the periphery to the core.

While it may be argued that the conditions at the sending countries facilitate the migrations of technical and skilled professionals, it can also be argued that the ageing population at the core countries as well as their wide industrial bases and sophisticated services sector have led to the design of various programs to attract skilled professionals to these countries. Although some of these countries such as United States of America give the need to diversify the nationalities of their population as the reason for devising diversity lottery, evidence abounds that the migrant populations are needed in the labor force and are contributing significantly to the

US economy. The number of immigrants in the civilian labor force is presented in the table 1 below:

Table 1. Occupations of Employed Workers in the Civilian Labor Force Age 16 and Older by Gender and Origin, 2009.

	African born		Foreign born (total)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Number of persons age 16 and older employed in the civilian labor force	547123	369167	13,143,161	9,377,865
Total (percent)	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Management	12.5%	9.0%	10.7%	10.5%
Information technology	4.4%	1.2%	4.2%	1.9%
Other sciences and engineering	5.1%	1.5%	4.0%	2.2%
Social services and legal	2.9%	4.0%	1.1%	2.0%
Education, training and media, entertainment	5.3%	8.2%	3.5%	7.3%
Physicians	2.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.0%
Registered nurses	1.4%	8.2%	0.4%	3.6%
Other health care practitioners	3.5%	5.9%	1.1%	3.2%
Healthcare support	3.3%	13.9%	0.7%	5.6%
Services	15.1%	18.7%	18.5%	26.5%
Sales	10.7%	9.0%	7.8%	10.3%
Administrative support	7.4%	13.1%	5.3%	14.2%
Farming, fishing, forestry	-	-	2.7%	1.0%
Construction, extraction, transportation	15.9%	1.8%	24.5%	3.0%
Manufacturing, installation, repair	9.7%	4.1%	14.2%	7.8%

Source: US Census Bureau. 2009 American Community Survey.

Although the proportion of other foreign-born to African immigrants is high, the figures for Africans in the various categories are significantly high. With a total working population of 916, 290 in the survey, African migrants are a significant part of the civilian labor force.

The shrinking economic space could simply not afford to accommodate the growing population of trained professionals, hence the need for the professionals to seek alternative destinations for the utilization of their skills. This view was forcefully reinforced by Egbe and Ndubuisi (1997). They contend that during the decade of the 1970s, tens of thousands of Nigerians entered the United States of America to study. The overwhelming majority of those students came on students visas, with the expectation of returning home after their studies. However, the end of the oil boom and the associated disarticulations in the economy led them to stay back. This trend has continued up till now as many people who travel out for higher education never contemplate coming back to the country because the conditions abroad are more conducive while the remuneration is far more rewarding than what an average professional earns in any African country. According to (Obom-Egbulem 2010), there are more than 5,000 Nigerian medical doctors practicing in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. When compared with the estimated 39,210 doctors practicing in Nigeria (with an estimated population of 160 million people), this is a huge number!

As Okeke (2008) has poignantly elucidated, forced migration is a reaction to certain push and pull factors, which are stated below:

> Low and eroding wages and salaries, poor and unsatisfactory living conditions, lack of good transportation system, inadequate housing and accommodation, under-utilization of qualified personnel, coupled with unsatisfactory working conditions, low and discouraging prospects of professional development, lack of research fund and research facilities, including support staff, continuous decline in the quality of the educational system, including an unstable academic

calendar, which is often disrupted as a result of strike actions by staff unions, violent student demonstrations, cult activities and general break down of law and order reinforced by political instability, discrimination in appointments and promotions, which results in frustrations among qualified and skilled personnel; and the vexed issue of bad governance and corruption among many African countries.

The above factors create major problems for leadership and governance, with the attendant policy inconsistencies, which further create an incommodious working environment for skilled professionals who have no option but to look elsewhere for more conducive conditions. Contrarily, the external push factors include the following: Higher remuneration and standard of living, more favorable working conditions, including job and career opportunities and professional development, substantial and readily available research funds, advanced technology, modern facilities and availability of experienced support staff, assured political stability that encourages a modern educational system coupled with the prestige of advanced training and presumed emphasis on meritocracy, transparency, hard work and intellectual freedom.

However, as de Haan (2007) contends, the above reasoning falls under Marxist perspectives on migration, which seems to be unduly fixated on economic factors (of exploitation). But it is incontrovertible that migration processes can best be understood as the outcome of interaction of a diversity of factors, including social-cultural influences and economic forces, gendered norms, and rules, and how migration in turn alters these, and the interaction of structures and agency. Consequently, it is imperative that multidisciplinary perspectives are integrated into the understanding of the causes of forced migration.

Sociologically, the massive emigration of African professionals to the developed economies can then be located within the context of the various conflicts, crisis, violence and wars that have ravaged the continent since gaining independence from colonialism. From Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan reverberated echoes of wars and societal disorder. This unfortunate scenario has resulted in forceful uprooting of millions of people from their land of nativity to other environments.

Paradoxically, in most of these crisis areas, the professionals were not spared as they and other unarmed groups in the various societies became internally displaced persons and/or refugees in their own countries. The political economy trajectory of this scenario is underlined by the fact that problems are essentially caused by unbridled competition for access to the resources of the state. As politics is perceived as a sure avenue to instant wealth and capital accumulation in the continent, the struggle for public office became a winner-takes-all zero-sum game. In this process, a do-or-die orientation to political contestation became an overt strategy for capturing political power. This, itself, manifests indiscriminately in electoral violence, rigging, and other breaches of constitutional provisions for the conduct of a free and fair election.

Other than the above, Litchfield and Waddington (2003) have argued that different migrants may have different motives for migrating. These scholars' research on Ghana and India showed that while half of the population of Ghana may be categorized as migrants, the reasons for migration are very diverse, and only a small part of the population movement is directly related to work. Similarly in India, the largest proportion of migration (particularly), short distance as registered in the census may be for marriage because most women move to their husbands' house and outside their village of birth.

THE IMPACTS OF FORCED ECONOMIC MIGRATION ON NIGERIA

There is an increasing concern over the effects of forced economic migration on Nigeria and other African countries. Notwithstanding the paucity of data on rural-urban migration within the continent, the effects of this phenomenon are visible everywhere. Importantly, the agrarian nature of the African society has accentuated the impacts of massive flows of able bodied men on food sufficiency. In the same vein, urban conurbation and associated crimes from unemployed youth remains a central concern for African policy makers.

As David (1995) has found out, in the labor-scarce West African environment, the absence of able-bodied men was keenly felt and led to a "labor gap"; women have to work longer and harder in their compounds' communal fields and had less time to work their own lands. However, in his study of England in the eighteenth century, Thirsk (1991) found out that migrants appeared to have played important innovative roles in the modernization of agriculture. Such positive impacts are contingent upon many factors like the seasonality of movements, educational levels, length of time spent away, assets and social structures and institutions, allowing women and others to pursue activities previously reserved for men and household heads. We agree with Thirsk's study that migrants can significantly contribute to the development of a particular community if the necessary conditions are in place.

Perhaps, the most deleterious effect of forced economic migration is its latent manifestation at the international level. There has been significant concern about brain drain for many decades. Although hampered by data availability and quality, recent analysis has considered the issues involved (de Haan 2007). According to statistics made available by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Africa has already lost one third of its human

capital, and has continued to lose its skilled personnel at an ever increasing rate. An estimated 20,000 doctors, University lecturers, engineers and other professionals have left the continent annually since 1990. There are also currently over 300,000 highly qualified Africans in the Diaspora, out of which about 30,000 have Ph.D.s (IOM 2007 cited in Okeke 2008). The breakdown of IOM's statistics shows that, in Ethiopia, over the past 10-15 years, about 50 percent of those who went abroad for training did not return after completing their studies. Again, Ethiopia lost about 74.6 of its human capital from various institutions between 1980 and 1991. This was the period of war between that country and Eritrea, a veritable testimony to the fact that political conditions in the sending countries do foster sporadic migration.

In the case of Nigeria, the estimates from the Presidential Committee on Brain Drain set up by the Babangida Administration, showed that between 1986 and 1990, Nigeria lost over 10,000 academics from tertiary institutions alone. It is also estimated that over 30,000 highly skilled personnel left the country, including the public and private organizations. This period also coincided with the massive collapse in the economic and social infrastructure in the country, which in itself was the fallout of the ill-advised Structural Adjustment program. Nigerian migrants to the United Kingdom have continued to increase from the 1980s to the present moment. In a recent study by David Owen of Warwick University in the UK, it was found out that in 2006-2007, the number of Nigerian migrant workers to the UK was 12, 500 based on the number of National Insurance authorization issued (Owen n.d., 12). The graph below shows the number of Africans and their dependents that were allowed to enter UK from 1997-2007.

Figure 1. African Migration (Work Permit holders) to the UK 1997-2007

Source: David Owen. "African Migration to the UK." University of Warwick, UK

What is obvious from this graph is the gradual increase in the number of migrants and their corresponding employment status from 1997 to 2003 in the first instance and then from 2003 to 2007. In tandem with the central proposition of this paper that the feasibility of getting job abroad is a strong motivation for the emigration of skilled professionals, the graph shows that on average those who migrated from African countries to the UK got jobs within the first 12 months of relocating. Of course it is important to state that the ability to secure jobs is one of the considerations for being selected under the UK's Highly Skilled Immigrant Program.

Table 1: Emigration of Skilled Africans to Industrialised Countries (*Based on IOM and ECA Estimates)*

Time Period	Average Annual Rate	Total Number
1960-1974	1800	27000
1975-1984	4000	40000
1985-1989	12000	60000
Since 1990	20000	-

Source: Brain Drain in Nigeria: Facts and Figures.

Ironically, while the developed countries keep attracting the best of African human capital, it is increasingly becoming a disturbing pattern to see semi-qualified personnel dubbed as 'experts' taking very critical and important positions in lucrative sectors such as oil and gas as well communication companies in most African countries. These 'experts', who are usually paid in hard currencies (such as dollars, Euros and British pounds), create a disincentive to the development of indigenous human capacities in African countries because they are made to occupy positions that are otherwise supposed to be occupied by Africans.

As we stated earlier, the developed countries have established different programs to attract more qualified Africans to migrate. The justification for this is the tenuous argument that international migration has some beneficial effects on the sending countries. Such beneficial effects could include remittances, return migration, creation of trade and business networks and incentive effects on human capital formation at home (de Haan 2007). The question of remittances is central to much of the thinking on the impact of migration. However, it is very difficult to have accurate data as conditions for making remittances have a tendentious effect on the certainty of the remitted amount. Apart from the uncertainty in estimates of remittances, assessments of impact need to be sensitive to the complexity in which these financial flows are

embedded. As de Haan further argued, such assessment need to take account of the fact that this considers only successful migration, and there is a possibility that many migrants have not remitted despite having invested heavily in relocating (de Haan 2007). In addition, with the ongoing global economic crisis and the resultant deceleration in the rate of growth in developed countries, the possibility of migrants securing jobs looks unpromising. No jobs implies fewer remittances.

It is also important to state that with regards to brain drain, remittances need to be offset against the (public) investment in education and other forms of publicly funded investment, This is because, regardless of the amounts being remitted, the sending countries remain at a very strong disadvantage in other areas of potential benefits like taxation, mentoring, leadership development, patriotism and other dimensions of contribution which the skilled personnel would have made to the economies. The scholars that have vigorously argued in favor of migration as a sure means of facilitating development have tried to justify their position by providing figures of remittances. For instance, Papademetriou and Martin (1991), Durrand et al. (1996a, 1996b) show income from migration stimulates economic activity, both directly and indirectly and that it leads to significantly higher levels of employment, investment and income. For extremely poor people, very small amounts of remittances can be vital for food security.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, we contend that the negative effects of forced economic migration both at the domestic and international level far outweigh its positive contribution to the development of the sending countries. Docquier and Rapoport (2004) contend that international migration has increasingly become selective. According to them, detrimental effects of migration include international inequality, particularly if migrants are disconnected from those left behind at home. As we mentioned above, the consistent depletion of the skilled

workforce of African countries is affecting the potential for the development of the continent, in a negative way. In the health sector for instance, the high percentage of the medical personnel that have migrated abroad could have been available to render high quality service to the people, thereby contributing to the improvement of the health sector. Also, given that most of the skilled personnel that have migrated were trained with public money, it amounts to loss of investment, and at best, a negative return, for people to migrate without giving back to the society, which has invested in them. In the same vein, the income redistribution effect that the presence of the skilled professionals that have migrated could have had on the sending countries is conspicuously missing.

 Other negative effects of migration of skilled professionals on the economies of the sending country such as Nigeria are:

- The further reduction of the already low quality of skilled manpower

- Increase in the continual dependence on foreign technical assistance

- Gradual but steady slowdown of the transfer of technology and the widening of the gap between Africa and the industrialized countries;

- The loss of money in taxable income from the skilled manpower which would have been a potential contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

We have argued in the preceding section in this paper that the high rate of migration of people in Nigeria and other African countries is a direct result of the social, economic and political conditions. These conditions have not been favorable to the majority of the citizens in the continent. Most states in Africa today are suffering from crisis of identity. As Adejumobi (2005)

observes, the content and character of globalization promote social fragmentation, disintegration and disaggregation; split groups and identities into warring factions; undermines the state by emptying it of its social content and relevance; and sacrifices the human soul for the fundamentalism of the market. These immanent tendencies erode the social basis of existence and warrant the struggle for survival at all costs, including searching for greener pastures outside the shores of one's country.

Also the deepening of poverty, social inequalities and declining social welfare under globalization, especially in the developing countries, has pushed many individuals to sectarian identities, reinforced their potency in society and made them alternative sites of political expressions and struggles, fuelling tension and conflicts in many societies. In other words, the state in Africa is under a beleaguered complexity, which has made it incapable of meeting the needs of the people. The attendant conflicts in many of the countries have been responsible for the forced economic migration of African professionals to other lands. Politically, the preponderance of the inclination toward "do or die" politics of intolerance and exclusion ensure that the wrong people acquire political power for the wrong reasons. Consequently, good governance is sacrificed on the altar of political opportunism. In the process the state lacks the wherewithal to provide the common good and effectively regulate the market. The failed expectations of the professional class, inevitably necessitate their mass exodus to advanced countries, where they can have their needs met.

THE CHALLENGE OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

We have argued that far from being a desirable option for facilitating development, migration portends a long term danger to Africa and constitutes a veritable threat to the desire of

the continent to catch up with other emerging economies in other regions of the world. In recognition of this threat, African leaders at various levels have started making arrangements to mitigate the effects of migration, while maximizing the gains. One of these strategies is the Diaspora Option. Through this initiative, African leaders have taken it upon themselves to encourage the skilled personnel outside the continent to take active part in the process of nation building.

Although the various Diaspora organizations are the initiatives of the professionals, the fact that the governments of their countries of origin now see them as partners in development, is a welcome development. This is an improvement over the previous adversarial postures of most leaders to the informed contributions of the Diaspora organizations. These organizations/people are now involved in assisting to generate foreign direct investment, boosting knowledge exchange among higher institutions of learning as well as making useful contributions to reforms agenda. Some are even returning to their respective countries of origin to take up political appointments. Examples in Nigeria were the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Ambassador Olu Adeniji who were working as technocrats and international civil servants, when they were appointed to work as Ministers by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration.

In the current Goodluck Jonathan administration, some of the cabinet ministers are also Nigerians who have made their marks while working as professionals in the advanced countries. Examples include Dr. Olusegun Aganga, formerly of Goldman Sachs in the UK and currently Minister of Trade and Investment and Mr. Adesina who has worked for various agencies of the United Nations, and is now the Minister of Agriculture. There is also the option of "virtual linkages", which are independent, non-political and non-profit networks that facilitate skills

transfer and capacity building using information technology. These networks mobilize skilled Diaspora members' expertise for the development process in their countries of origin. There are about Forty-One (41) virtual networks in 30 different countries. Some of them are the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) with members in 68 countries, the Nigerian in Diaspora Organization (NIDO), Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas (ANPA), etc. There are also contributions through virtual networks by individuals in the Diaspora. Some such linkages go beyond the virtual, and migrants come back to their country of origin as visiting scholars, investors in existing and new businesses, and also assisting in facilitating joint ventures between host and sending countries.

There are also many efforts in various parts of the world to encourage the exploitation of the positive gains of brain drain. For instance, in 2004, the Association of for Higher Education and Development (AHEAD), in collaboration with International Development Research Centre (IDRC) organized an international stakeholder roundtable which was held in Ottawa, Canada and brought together key stakeholders, including International Organization for Migration, (IOM), Canadian government agencies, African Missions, Non-Governmental Organizations and Diaspora groups to discuss brain drain in Africa and the potential strategies for mobilizing the Africans in diaspora. As Tebeje (2006) submits, the summit emphasized the importance of sustained Diaspora engagement. This will require policy and resource committed by key stakeholders, including international organizations, African governments, and the host countries. They agreed that there was urgent need for the emerging diaspora movements to become more involved in Africa's development efforts. The growing political will of African leaders   to recognize the Diaspora's potential contribution and the possibilities created by information technology show the impression that brain drain, is not after all, a total loss to the African

continent. It is hoped that this momentum will be sustained over time to achieve the objectives.

de Haan (2007, 280) provides some incisive analysis on the usefulness or otherwise of

remittances. She reasoned thus:

> there is no doubt that remittances can have negative and positive consequences-
> evidences suggest that the way remittances are used depends on the form of
> migration, the characteristics of the migrants and those who stay behind, and
> conditions for use of remittances and returning migrants. This finally points to
> one of the complexities of understanding impact of migration: The conditions that
> make remittances helpful for development or poverty reduction are generally the
> same conditions that made migrants leave in the first place.

In other words, regardless of the quantum of remittances, if the socio-economic and political

conditions are not right, there is no possibility that the much anticipated improvement in the

living conditions of the people that are left behind will be better.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In reacting to the inscrutable phenomenon of forced economic migration, the government

of Nigeria and other countries in Africa should collate data on their skilled professionals and put

in place mechanisms to pool the resources of Africans in Diaspora to boost development. In view

of the growing importance of remittances, such flows should be monitored such that taxes could

be deducted.

Second, the government should also leverage the Diaspora organizations to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Following the example of the South-East Asian countries as well as the China and Japan, African countries should encourage technology transfer by tapping into the knowledge of professionals of African origin outside the continent. Diaspora Africans should be encouraged to visit home and motivated to remain if need be. It is instructive that some technical experts from these Asian countries 'poached' technology formulae from the western countries which they used to develop their countries. Although the regime of intellectual property rights in the World Trade Organization has made this difficult in contemporary times, African professionals in the Diaspora can replicate what they have learned and practiced in their host countries at home.

Third, the brain drain, which the emigration of skilled professionals has caused, should be turned to facilitate brain gain and brain circulation. For instance, academics of African origin in the Diaspora can form partnerships with universities in their home countries such that during summer breaks they can spend time at these universities to help in supervision of Ph.D.s and bringing in best practices to teaching and university administration. These academics and other professionals can also help to facilitate exchanges and grants with foreign universities and from corporate bodies abroad.

Fourth, it is pertinent that political elites in Nigeria and other African countries work to ensure that the conditions at home are conducive for the citizens at home and for those   in diaspora who may wish to return home. It is a common saying in Yoruba language that ***ajo ko le da bi ile*** (living outside one's land of nativity cannot be compared to living in one's land of nativity). The import of this is that living or working abroad should be optional, voluntary and based on rational decision rather than involuntary compulsion.

CONCLUSION

This paper has critically examined the political economy of forced economic migration Nigeria. It has also considered the same phenomenon in a few other African countries and its impact, challenges and prospects in the yet unfolding new millennium. We have looked at the conditions that necessitated the mass exodus of African professionals from the continent from the 1970s till the present moment. Even though many scholars have tried to establish a positive link between international migration and development, we argued that, in the main, Africa is the loser both in material and human terms. With particular respect to the health sector, we contend that the implication is very grave. This is because; most hospitals in the continent lack the requisite qualified manpower to treat sick people. This invariably affect productivity and life span.

The challenge for Africa on the issue of forced economic migration is to respond in such a way as to tackle the conditions that we have stated above. In other words, the strategies to be used involve both a response and a reaction. Responsively, African political elites must ensure that they formulate policies and act in ways that can engender peace, security and development. Thus, it is necessary to avoid wars and crises which are strong factors that generate forced migration. These constitute disincentive to socio-economic development. The political systems in the continent must also be operated in such a way that inclusion, participation, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and establishment of constitutional empowerment of state institutions, which are hallmarks of liberal democracy should be entrenched. This way, good governance will be guaranteed and the state will be able to fulfill its social contract with the people. This will make access to education and opportunity for gainful employment a reality. Under this situation, only few people will have the motivation to migrate.

It is therefore pertinent for African governments to ensure that good and appropriate socio-political and economic conditions are put in place to reduce the mass movement of her trained professionals. For those who have already migrated, a linkage should be established to leverage their intellectual, experiential and material resources to develop Nigeria and other African countries.

BIOGRAPHY

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RACIAL DIFFERENCES
IN THE TEMPO OF ASSIMILATION FOR
WHITE AND BLACK AFRICAN-BORN MEN
IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

Understanding how immigrants assimilate to the U.S. labor market over time is important, but measuring the true effect of time is difficult. We know little about the assimilation of African immigrants, a group that has recently begun to enter the US in large numbers. The African foreign-born are unique among US immigrants in their racial diversity, with substantial numbers of both Black and White migrants. This paper examines the effect of duration on African immigrant men's earnings between 1990 and 2000. Using Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% and 1% sample data from the 1990 and 2000 censuses, it applies a double-cohort method of analysis (Myers and Lee, 1996) that avoids problems presented by trying to measure age-period-cohort effects. The paper examines the differential tempo of assimilation for Black and White African immigrant men. While White African-born men's earnings surpass those of White US-born men over time, Black African-born men continue to experience a disadvantage in earnings that cannot be explained by human capital characteristics. Additionally, while some age-and-migration cohorts of Black African-born men experience steeper increases in earnings over time compared to White African-born men, racial inequities in earnings remain, suggesting that racism continues to depress the earnings of Black African immigrant men despite their advances over time.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of assimilation has generated renewed interest among social scientists, and has been reconceived to no longer rely on past oppressive assumptions (Alba and Nee 2003). Where once the term "assimilation" connoted a colonialist discourse of eradicating home cultures, scholars no longer assume that some forms of assimilation, such as higher earnings attainment, requires eradicating all cultural differences (Alba and Nee 2005; Green 2006; Portes 2000; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1997). The current assimilation perspective on earnings predicts that as the foreign-born population improve their English skills (if they are not already fluent in English upon arrival) and accumulates US job market experience over time, their earnings will converge with those of the US-born population (Kollehlon and Eule 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Accumulated job market experience is operationalized by the number of years a person has been in the US, or their duration.

There are two prevailing theories of immigrant assimilation (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Waters 1994). The first is the straight-line assimilation theory, which predicts a linear convergence of immigrant earnings with the US-born. The second is segmented assimilation, which predicts that structures of racial inequality shape the opportunities of immigrants of color, so that immigrant earnings will converge with those of the US-born but only within racial categories. This theory suggests that assimilation is not just an individual process but also one shaped by racism in the receiving society. Scholars developed segmented assimilation theory to explain the downward mobility of the children of immigrants as their education and earnings converge with those of oppressed racial minorities (Portes and Zhou 1993; Waters 1994). However, segmented assimilation has also been used to explain how foreign-born persons of

color continue to have lower wages than White people born in the receiving country, despite immigrants being in the country for many years (Skuterud 2010).

In fact, it is the passage of time (and the complexities of measuring it) that lies at the heart of assimilation theory (Green 2006). Time is usually measured as either the number of years a person has been in the US, or by the year in which they arrived. But using either measure conflates duration with job market conditions at time of arrival. Additionally, the effects of aging are rarely considered in immigrant assimilation research. Measures of time of arrival, duration, and aging are all required in order to properly measure assimilation changes over time.

AFRICAN IMMIGRANT ASSIMILATION AND RACE

The existing research on African immigrant economic assimilation is sparse, compared to what is available on Hispanic and Asian immigrants. Most of this literature compares African immigrants to Caribbean immigrants and US-born Blacks at one point in time (see for examples Dodoo 1997, Model 1991, and Poston 1994). None uses more than one data collection time point, and therefore no literature exists on African immigrants that can separate the effects of age, period, and cohort. In part, this absence may be because it was not until 1990 that sufficient numbers of African immigrants in the US existed to make it possible to analyze their assimilation using Census Bureau data (Logan and Deane 2003). But now with sufficient sample sizes in both the 1990 and 2000 Census samples as well as American Community Survey (ACS) microdata, scholars can conduct proper testing of duration effects on African immigrant assimilation.

Extant research on African immigrant economic assimilation generally supports segmented assimilation theory (Lee and Bean 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993), in that their

economic outcomes converge towards those of US-born Blacks rather than towards Whites. Studies examining African immigrants' human capital characteristics (specifically the level of education attained and prestige of occupation) find that African immigrants have high levels of education (Butcher 1994; Dodoo 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Poston 1994) and occupational status attainment (Butcher 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) compared to US-born Blacks. However, after controlling for human capital variables, Black African immigrant men earn less than Afro-Caribbean immigrant men and about the same as Black US-born men (Butcher 1994; Dodoo 1997; Kposowa 2002). Butcher (1994) attributes this difference to self-selection of migrants, showing that foreign-born Blacks have similar earnings to US-born Blacks who moved out of the state of their birth. Dodoo (1997) argues that this is because the foreign acquired degrees of Africans are not respected, but the foreign acquired degrees from the Caribbean are. Kposowa (2002) also found that Black Africans experienced lower educational returns on earnings compared to White immigrants and US-born Blacks and Whites, attributing this difference to racial discrimination in the labor market.

A few studies have disaggregated African immigrants to look at the diversity within the population. Comparisons of Black and White Africans immigrants found that Blacks earn less than Whites, even when human capital and demographic variables were considered (Dodoo and Takyi 2002; Kollehlon and Eule 2003). Dodoo and Takyi (2002) conducted a decomposition analysis, which showed that Whites earned 80% more than Blacks, with only 53% of that gap explained by human capital characteristics and years since immigration. They conclude that racial stratification in the US remains a key determinant of the earnings of Black African-born men.

Because different countries in Africa have migrant streams with different racial compositions, it is also useful to examine the effects of specific sending countries in Africa. Doing so can parse out the effects of racism in the U.S. labor market versus residual effects of racism in the home country. Poston (1994) showed that men from South Africa (a country with a large White population) had the highest rate of earnings return on their education across the 92 different countries he studied, while Nigerians experienced considerably less return and Ghanaian immigrants ranked near the bottom. Moore and Amy (2002) also found South African immigrant men to have the highest earnings among men from the nine largest African-origin groups, with Nigerians and Liberians at the bottom. This suggests that home country disadvantages, including racial disadvantages, affect the earnings of Africans after they migrate to the US. But the question of how long those home country effects continue to effect migrant earnings remains unanswered.

These studies are important and useful, but they still fail to tell us the effects of duration on African immigrant earnings. While all these studies include a control for either year of arrival or time in the US, none can properly measure the effects of time as they all use cross-sectional data (from either the 1980 or 1990 Census). Of course, nationally representative longitudinal datasets do not exist that include African immigrants in their sample. The solution to this problem is to conduct a double-cohort analysis that creates multiple cohorts from cross-sectional data that can be followed over time.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TWO OBSERVATION PERIODS FOR MEASURING DURATION

As many scholars have noted, identifying the "age-period-cohort" effect is problematic given the limited availability of nationally representative longitudinal data on the foreign-born

(Firebaugh 1997; Mason and Fienberg 1985; Myers and Lee 1996). As Myers and Cranford (1998:75) state, "'duration' in immigration research confounds year of arrival and duration of United States residence, much as birth cohort is confounded with age." Thus, a single measure of time in a cross-sectional sample (such as what has been used in previous studies of African immigrant earnings) cannot disentangle the effects of the time spent in the US from the conditions of the labor market at time of arrival or the effects of aging. As a solution, Myers and Lee (1996) proposed a double-cohort method, in which birth cohorts are nested within immigration cohorts. The double-cohort method differs from other age-period-cohort models in its dual nature, tracking not only age-period-cohort but also duration-period-arrival cohort. The method focuses on separating effects of growing duration from synchronic effects of aging, as well as distinguishing differences in arrival cohorts from these duration effects.

To get around the synchronicity between measures of time, the double cohort method uses interactions between time variables. The variables measuring time are year of observation, arrival cohort, and age cohort. The true effect of duration is separated from aging by using a comparison of US-born individuals, who are assumed to experience similar age-related changes in the labor market compared to the foreign-born. The result is an analysis that shows the changes an immigrant cohort experiences from one time to another, net the effects of the changes that a US-born group within the same age group experience over the same time period. If an immigrant cohort has earnings that get closer to the earnings of the same age group of US-born people over a given time period, the immigrants are thought to be assimilating to the labor market. Using the double cohort method while controlling for human capital characteristics such as education and language ability also allows one to measure if duration is enough to allow earnings assimilation, or whether immigrants of color will never achieve full parity with the US-

born because of racism in the labor market. It is also possible, by including both race and country of origin in the model, to test how much racial differences in earnings can be attributed to one's home country versus racial dynamics in the US labor market. Therefore, this paper answers the questions, 1) what effect does race have on the earnings of African immigrants to the U.S. over time, and 2) to what extent can the effects of race be traced to home country effects?

METHODS

DATA

This paper uses Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), made available by the Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles et al. 2008). The PUMS provides datasets collected by the US Census Bureau, derived from the long form of the decennial census and the American Community Survey (which replaced the decennial long form in 2006). The data collected include demographic information such as sex, race, national origin, and other variables such as income and educational level. This paper uses the 5% sample in 1990 and 2000, selecting males who were born in a country in Africa, not of American parents. This sample of African-born men was combined with a 10% random sample of US-born males from the 1% PUMS sample in 1990 and 2000. This paper focuses only on men because women have very different (and somewhat more complicated) earnings trajectories, so limiting the analysis to men simplifies the presentation of findings on race, nativity and the effects of time.[1]

The analysis is limited to men who were between 25-64 years old, as these are the prime earning years in the life course, and to those who were employed either full- or part-time at the time of the census (having worked for pay or profit during the prior week). The U.S. Census

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[1] This is not to say that women's earnings trajectories are less important than men's, and I examine the effects of time on African-born women's earnings compared to their male counterparts in other work.

allows people to self-identify their race, but within particular categories; these are White; Black; Asian and Pacific Islander; American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut; and "Other" category. To limit the complexity of the racial analysis, the paper uses only males identifying as either Black or White. This eliminates from the analysis men who might be phenotypically or culturally similar to Black or White African migrants but who do not identify themselves as solely Black or White (such as Arab men who might identify as either Black or White but instead chose "Other"). Variables were created to measure race (Black vs. White), immigration status (African- vs. US-born), and an interaction term to measure the differential effect of migration status for Black and White men.

The outcome variable is logged annual wage income, adjusted for inflation (in year 2000 equivalent dollars). The paper excludes cases in which individuals reported being employed but had no annual wage income. Control variables include educational attainment (less than high school, high school degree, some college, or college degree or higher), current school enrollment, marital status (married with spouse present vs. other), ability to speak English well, and citizenship status (citizen of the US vs. other). Additional controls are included for country of origin for African-born men (with variables measuring the top 10 sending countries; Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Liberia, Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone).

I constructed four age cohorts (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64) and three migration cohorts (pre-1970, 1970-79, 1980-89). Age cohorts were constructed based on actual age reported in the census. Migration cohorts were constructed from year of arrival reported in the 2000 census and the interval of arrival reported in the 1990 census.[2] Both age and cohorts replicate the cohort divisions used in Myers and Lee (1996) and Myers and Cranford (1998).

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[2] African-born men who reported in the 1990 census that they arrived in the interval 1987-1990 were assigned to the 1980-89 migrant cohort.

The analysis excludes African-born men who arrived in the US since 1990 in order to have two data points for all immigrant cohorts. Variables were created to test the two-way interactions between age and migration cohorts, year of census and age cohorts, and year of census and migration cohorts, and finally three-way interaction terms for each age cohort, migration cohort, and year of census.

ANALYSIS

First cross-tabulations were run to compare variable distribution within the African-born by race. Next ordinary least squares regression was run using variables measuring race, nativity, human capital characteristics, and variables measuring time (census year, age and migration cohorts) with no interactions. The second model includes an interaction term between race and nativity, but no interaction terms for time. The third model is the saturated model using the double-cohort method. This model takes into account not only the separate effects of time of arrival and duration in the US, it also assesses the effects of experienced gained in the labor market. The third model was then repeated, this time including variables for the top 10 African sending countries in order to determine if native country effects were driving race and nativity differences in earnings.

FINDINGS

Table 1 depicts cross tabulations comparing Black and White African-born men. There are no differences between Black and White African-born men in their ability to speak English. Black African-born men were less likely than White African-born men to be citizens, and were less likely to be married with spouse present in the US. Black African-born men were more

likely than White African-born men to be enrolled in school, and to have some college

education. They also arrived more recently than White African-born men (even though half of

White African men in the sample arrived in the US between 1980-1989), and tended to be

younger.

Table 1: Cross tabulations for African-born Men by Race

	Black	White	
Speaks English Well	88.16	89.05	
Citizenship	46.02	69.8	***
Education			
Less than high school	2.32	2.45	***
High School	11.05	13.03	
1-3 years of college	25.40	21.97	
4 or more years of college	61.23	62.55	
School Attendance	20.50	7.67	***
Married, Spouse Present	57.94	72.85	***
Age Cohort			
Age 25-34	28.57	27.98	***
Age 35-44	44.27	35.54	
Age 45-54	22.98	24.8	
Age 55-64	4.19	11.68	
Migration Cohort			
Migrated before 1970	3.26	22.96	***
Migrated 1970-1979	24.83	27.02	
Migrated 1980-1989	71.91	50.02	
***p < .01 level			

Table 2 depicts the nested regression models measuring main effects only (Model 1), the

interaction of race and nativity (Model 2), and the interaction of age and migration cohorts with

census year (Model 3, the double cohort method). Model 1 illustrates that even when accounting

for the effects of English ability, education, school enrollment, and marital and citizenship status,

there remains a positive effect for being African-born but a negative effect for being Black.

Older cohorts earn more than younger cohorts, although there is a dip in average wages as

cohorts approach retirement (in the 55-64 age cohort). More recent migrant cohorts earn less

than earlier migrant cohorts. The variable for Census year 2000 is statistically insignificant,

indicating that there is not a significant difference between earnings in 1990 and 2000, net the

main effects of age and migration.

Table 2: Regression Models Predicting Logged Adjusted Yearly Earnings: Main effects (Model 1), race/nativity interaction (Model 2), and the double cohort method (Model 3)[a]

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b		b		b	
African-Born	0.18	***	0.19	***	0.19	***
Black	-0.25	***	-0.22	***	-0.22	***
Black African			-0.10	***	-0.12	***
Speaks English Well	0.18	***	0.19	***	0.18	***
Citizenship	0.12	***	0.11	***	0.07	***
Education						
High school	0.27	***	0.27	***	0.27	***
1-3 years of college	0.44	***	0.44	***	0.45	***
4 or more years of college	0.79	***	0.79	***	0.80	***
School Attendance	-0.22	***	-0.21	***	-0.21	***
Married, spouse present	0.29	***	0.29	***	0.29	***
Census Year 2000 (cy00)	0.00		0.01		0.01	
Age Cohort						
35-44 (ac2)	0.21	***	0.21	***	0.21	***
45-54 (ac3)	0.28	***	0.28	***	0.32	***
55-64 (ac4)	0.17	***	0.17	***	0.19	***
Migration Cohort						
1970-1979 (mc2)	-0.08	***	-0.06	**	-0.25	***
1980-1989 (mc3)	-0.19	***	-0.16	***	-0.25	***
constant	9.37		9.37		9.42	***
Adjusted R-squared	0.18		0.18		0.18	
N	89022		89022		89022	

** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

[a] Model 3 includes two-way and three-way time interactions, not shown

Model 2 depicts the effect of being both Black and born in Africa. While the effect of being African-born remains positive, Black African men experience an additional depression in their wages that can be attributed to the combination of their race and immigrant status. Again, this effect remains after controlling for English ability and education, indicating that those variables do not counteract the effects of the interaction of race and nativity.

While these results provide general support for findings from previous research, the effects of immigrant duration and aging are still not properly specified. Model 3 includes the interaction terms for age cohort, migration cohort, and census year. In the interest of keeping the table from becoming too large, the time interactions were not included, but the three-way interaction terms were statistically significant for all but the oldest age cohort (ages 55-64). The effects of the time interaction terms are most easily understood when graphically displayed. Figure 1 shows earnings estimates from Model 3, predicting earnings for college-educated married men who speak English well, are not enrolled in school, are citizens, and were 35-44 years old in 1990. African-born men are from the 1980-1989 migrant cohort. Figure 1 shows that African-born men have a steeper increase in earnings between 1990 and 2000 compared to US-born men. White African-born men's earnings actually start out lower than White US-born men's, but surpass them in 2000. Black African-born men start in 1990 with a significant earnings disadvantage, and although they make gains between 1990 and 2000 their earnings still fall behind those of US-born Black men. Thus, they are doubly disadvantaged by their race and immigration status, which they do not overcome even after being in the US between 11 and 20 years.

Figure 1. Logged Yearly Earnings Estimates by Race and Nativity, Model 3 Coefficients (Double Cohort Method) (College-educated, speaks English well, not enrolled in school, citizens, 34-44 years old in 1990; African-born men are from 1980-89 migrant cohort)

As previous scholars have noted, trajectories of assimilation of immigrants vary by the period in which they migrated and their age at migration. This variation can be examined by looking at the trajectories of different age and migrant cohorts. Table 4 provides a summary of the changes in earnings between 1990 and 2000 for White and Black African-born men, comparing them to their US-born counterparts. In the most recently arrived cohort (1980-89), White African men start out with lower earnings in 1990 compared to White US-born men but surpass their earnings by 2000. Black African-born men also have lower earnings than their native counterparts but only surpass them in 2000 in the oldest age cohort, largely because Black US-born men's earnings decrease for this age group between 1990 and 2000. In the 1970-79 migrant cohort, Black African-born men do a little better in comparison to Black US-born men; by 2000 they earn the same or more than Black US-born men, even in the age cohort 25-34 in

which their 1990 earnings are lower. White African-born men also have higher earnings than

White-native born men in 2000, including the 25-34 age cohort, which starts out with lower

earnings than US-born men in 1990.

Table 3: Comparisons of African-born Men with US-born Men within Racial Group, by Age and Migrant Cohort

Migration Cohort	Ages 25-34	Ages 35-44	Ages 45-54
Migrated pre-1970	White African born earnings start out with higher earnings than White US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000; Black African-born earnings start out higher earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000.	White African born earnings start out with higher earnings than White US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000; Black African-born earnings start out higher earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000.	White African born earnings start out with higher earnings than White US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000; Black African-born earnings start out higher earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000.
Migrated 1970-79	White African-born start out with lower earnings in 1990 but surpass those of White US-born in 2000; Black African-born start out with lower earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and do not catch up to Black US-born in 2000.	White African-born start out with higher earnings than US-born in 1990 and remain so in 2000; Black African-born start out higher earnings than Black US-born in 1990 but US-born catch up in 2000.	White African born earnings start out with higher earnings than White US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000; Black African-born earnings start out higher earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and remain higher in 2000.
Migrated 1980-89	White African-born start out with lower earnings in 1990 but surpass those of White US-born in 2000; Black African-born start out with lower earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and do not catch up to Black US-born in 2000.	White African-born start out with lower earnings in 1990 but surpass those of White US-born in 2000; Black African-born start out with lower earnings than Black US-born in 1990 and do not catch up to Black US-born in 2000.	White African-born start out with lower earnings in 1990 but surpass those of White US-born in 2000; Black African-born start out with lower earnings than Black US-born in 1990 but surpass US-born in 2000.

In the pre-1970 migrant cohort we see a more consistent pattern of African-born men out-earning US-born men within their racial group. White and Black African-born men earn more than their US-born counterparts in 1990 across all age cohorts, and maintain those higher earnings in 2000. This is true even in the 45-54 age cohort, in which for the first time we see African-born men's earnings decrease in 2000 as these men approach retirement age (similar to the pattern exhibited by US-born men). But it is also important to note that while Black African-born men show a consistent earnings advantage within this migrant cohort, neither in this migrant cohort nor the more recently-arrived migrant cohorts do Black African-born men approach the earnings of White men, whether African or US-born.

Because of the different racial structures in the many sending countries in Africa that might affect assimilation trajectories in the US, the double cohort analysis from Model 3 was repeated, this time including dummy variables indicating the home country of the top 10 sending countries from this sample. Zimbabwe and South Africa had the largest effects by far than other sending countries, so the model was rerun including only these two countries, shown in Table 5. The inclusion of variables measuring sending countries Zimbabwe and South Africa substantially decrease the race/nativity interaction, indicating that much of the differences that we see between Black and White African-born men are not directly related to racism in the US per se but an indirect effect operating through the effects of these sending countries. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa have recent histories of White elite political rule (Zimbabwe's ended in 1980, South Africa in 1994), and both countries sent the largest number of White migrants of all Sub-Saharan African countries in this sample Therefore, the effects of being from Zimbabwe or South Africa are likely a combination of race interacting with the colonial system in those countries that privileges White migrant men from those countries in the US labor market

(such as the greater wealth that White migrant men from these countries bring with them). But
the strong positive effects of Zimbabwean or South African nativity on earnings still does not
completely diminish the significance of the race/nativity interaction, and it has only a very small
effect on the three-way time interactions. Therefore neither Zimbabwean nor South African
nativity diminishes the significant barriers that Black African migrant men face in the US labor
market, nor the fact that these barriers do not diminish over time.

Table 4: Regression Model Predicting Logged Yearly Wages: Model 3 Adding Country of
Origin (South Africa and Zimbabwe)[a]

	b	
African-Born	0.14	***
Black	-0.22	***
Black African	-0.04	*
Speaks English Well	0.15	***
Citizenship	0.09	***
South Africa	0.4	***
Zimbabwe	0.28	***
Education		
High school	0.27	***
1-3 years of college	0.45	***
4 or more years of college	0.79	***
School Attendance	-0.21	***
Married, spouse present	0.29	***
Census Year 2000	0.01	
Age Cohort		
35-44	0.21	***
45-54	0.32	***
55-64	0.19	***
Migration Cohort		
1970-1979	-0.26	***
1980-1989	-0.28	***
constant	9.44	***
Adjusted R-squared	0.18	
N=	89,022	
*p < .10 ** p < .05 ***p < .01		

[a] Includes two-way and three-way time interactions, not shown

CONCLUSION

As previous research has shown, African immigrant men tend to have very high levels of educational attainment, which explains their relatively high earnings compared to US-born men. However, an analysis over time illuminates stark differences by race. When controlling for education, school enrollment, ability to speak English well, and marital and citizenship status, all age and migrant cohorts of White African-born men had earnings that started higher or surpassed those of White US-born men. Conversely, only in the earlier arriving migrant cohorts (1970-1979 and pre-1970 migrant cohorts) did Black African-born men consistently out-earn Black US-born men by 2000. No age or migrant cohorts of Black African-born men earned as much as White men (native- or African-born).

These findings point to significant racial differences in the advantages experienced by immigrant status. For White African-born men, being an immigrant is advantageous, but for Black African-born men, their relative disadvantaged position upon arrival to the US remains for some time. These findings support Dodoo's (1997) assertion that the disadvantage Black African men experience in their earnings cannot be entirely attributed to a foreign-obtained education, as we would expect to see a similar disadvantage for White African-born men. Rather, this research supports the existence of structural disadvantage experienced by Black African-born men due to their race, with an advantage for White African-born men through their privileged position in the racial hierarchy. This privilege appears to begin in their home country, as the two African countries sending the largest numbers of White men (Zimbabwe and South Africa) account for much of the combined effects of race and immigrant status. How much of this privilege is structural (such as access to elite education or the effects of a racially stratified occupational structure) versus individual (such as the absence of racial or nativist discrimination in the

workplace that Black African men face) cannot be determined with these data. However, the results clearly point to racial hierarchy playing a pivotal role in the earnings trajectories of White and Black African immigrant men in the US.

While differences between racial groups persist over time, the disadvantage *within* racial group (comparing African-born to US-born Blacks) may dissipate with time, as indicated by the comparisons within racial group presented in Table 4, and vary according to the age at which one entered the US. All of the men in the pre-1970 migrant cohort arrived as children or young adults; the oldest an African-born man could have been upon arrival was 33 years old, and among the 25-34 age cohort, these men would have arrived as pre-school age children. So we would expect among the youngest age cohort that they would exhibit patterns of earnings trajectories typical of what migration scholars refer to as the 1.5 generation (foreign-born individuals who received some or all of their schooling in the US), in which immigrants have the advantages of their immigrant status as well as their US education. Indeed, these age and migrant cohorts exhibit progressive earnings advantages predicted by theories of the 1.5 generation (Myers and Cranford 1998; Myers, Gao, and Emeka 2009). The 25-34 year olds from the 1970-79 migrant cohort (who came as older children or young adults) do not earn as much as US-born men in 1990 but do surpass the US-born by 2000. And according to segmented assimilation theory, Black African-born men would have earnings more similar to Black US-born men. This holds true in these data, but contrary to segmented assimilation theory this is not a result of having similarly low levels of human capital, as Black African-born men have higher educational attainment than Black US-born men. Rather, it is the persistence of racism that Black African-born men have that they are not able to overcome, despite the success that many age and migrant cohorts have in overcoming the nativity disadvantage.

These findings also point to the importance of more accurately specifying the effects of time when studying immigrant assimilation. By using a double-cohort method, one can see how the conflation of age-period-cohort effects can underestimate the improvement in wages over time for immigrant men, particularly those from recently arrived cohorts. Estimates using a double-cohort method show that it would be easy to underestimate the improvement that all African-born men experience in their earnings over time compared to US-born men, but also the significant advantage that White African-born men experience in the US labor market.

The limitation to all cohort studies is the inability to measure individual-level effects. Findings from this research are limited to the cohort level, and as cohort characteristics can change over time through death and out-migration, interpretation of the findings needs to be limited to characteristics of cohorts rather than to individuals. But from a policy perspective, it is still relevant to know how particular migrant cohorts are faring over time, even if we cannot directly measure the effects of duration on individuals.

Additional study should be directed towards examining the effects of specific African countries of origin, with attention to the factors that might contribute to certain nationality groups being privileged in the US labor market over others. This paper was able to address some diversity among Africans who arrived in the US during different decades, but further research is necessary in order to understand what effects the period of arrival and aging might have on African migrants and what we might expect from these migrants as they age through the US labor market and eventually enter retirement (or perhaps return to their country of origin).

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GHOSTS OF OUR PAST, ECHO OUR FUTURE [**]

JACKIE COPELAND-CARSON

Through Middle Passages and Sea Islands they came
Through shackles in clouds of Allendale cotton
Ghosts of Our Past, Echo Our Future

Keeping whispers of Africa in Geechee tongues
Through Dolly and Charlie in bondage born but died free
In Miracles lie today in the face of Mother Mamie
Brought to life by Cousin Betty
Ghosts of Our Past, Echo Our Future

Wiping away generations of fears and tears
Giving life to a shared future of hope
Seen in the lands of Smoakes
And new miracles come in the generations of Dorians, AJs, Yetundes, Trentons, Jameses, and Justlanas
With dreams yet to come
Ghosts of Our Past, **Echo Our Future**

Let us hold onto each other knowing that in that embrace the yearnings of a family
The history of a people and the
Promise of a nation are made

[**] A Poetic Tribute to the Aiken-Riley-Major Family; August 6, 2011 Inspired by Our Family Reunion.

BIOGRAPHY

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