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Editorial

Antinomies of Globalization in Contemporary African Migration: The nexus of Gender, Youth, Health, Remittances, Social Media, and Higher Education

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Contemporary African migration continues unabated. It increasingly attracts media, state, expert, popular, and scholarly attention. The focus of most of the attention tends to respond to media reports of atrocities, tragedies, conundrums, xenophobic pronouncements and policy responses by powerful international actors, including decision makers in the most popular destinations of migrants. Today, the goings on in Europe, the United States of America (US), the countries of the European Union, the Gulf states, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Niger, and South Africa attract the most attention. Due to the catastrophic casualties and calamities experienced by migrants, the routes favored by migrants such as those through the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea, are also the subject of such focus. Youth migration and the health of African migrants are a big part of the story. Gender and migration is receiving more scholarly interest but not to the same extent as other aspects of migration.

Previously, I contended that "the study of African immigration enables the study of some of the antinomies of globalization within the contemporary world system…" meaning that "there are fundamental contradictions integral to the process of globalization." Globalization simultaneously has both positive and negative effects:

> … on the lives of many people who live marginal lives in the impoverished countries
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> … the negative and positive consequences of globalization often relate, one to the
>
> other in a dialectical manner. As it were, there is a crisis of being, that presents
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> existentially and materially, affluence in the intended country of immigration, and

widespread poverty in the home country. Attending the poverty are serious political and socioeconomic crises that make departure and immigration all the more attractive. Antinomies are an integral part of the process of globalization because of the peculiar circumstances of having the same process cause radically opposite effects, with each effect occurring as a logical consequence. It is as normal, for instance, for globalization to produce wealth in some parts of the world, as it is to produce poverty in other world regions. Access and exposure to technological innovation is as much a consequence of globalization, as is the lack of access to technology. It is as much a consequence of globalization that whole areas of the third world are no more than labor reserves for the advanced industrial, more affluent countries, as it is for other areas of the world to be magnets that draw migrants and immigrants that seek an end to the problems of unemployment and underemployment (Okome 2002).

The papers in this issue reveal the antinomies of globalization in ongoing African migration, uncovering the nexus of gender, remittances, social media, youth, health, and higher education. A majority of African migrants move within the continent. Sabine Marschall's article, "Transcultural Memory and Social Media in the Context of Migration: A Case Study from South Africa" focuses on how social media can facilitate the creation of communities without propinquity, and the important role played by new technologies in mnemonic practices of migrants that contribute to the creation, preservation, and disruption of transcultural memory. Marschall's article, which interviewed African migrant students in tertiary institutions in South Africa, draws upon the concept of "transcultural memory" theories in memory studies. Marschall evaluates the use of social media and Internet–based communication applications by the students and shows that these new technological tools facilitate the easing of some of the hardships of

migration. Rich social interactions are facilitated; communities which are not based on close proximity are affordably created and nurtured. These communities without propinquity share news and "engage in mnemonic practices" that nurture "memories of home and fondly remembered episodes experienced with social groups." They help migrants better cope with the challenges "of alienation and isolation" and foster "the sense of belonging" in communities over far flung geographical locations.

Alice Ncube, Yonas T. Bahta, and Andries J. Jordaan's paper, "Exploring Short- and Long-Term Survival Mechanisms and Perception of Job Market by Zimbabwean Migrant Women in South Africa" interjects a gendered lens and important element of South-South migration; particularly Southern African migration to South Africa. South Africa has a long tradition of treating Southern Africa as a labor reserve, a relationship cemented during the apartheid era, and continuing in this democratic era. In this period, migration from Zimbabwe was part of the routine flow, but the migrant workers were men who came for seasonal work, predominantly in South African plantations and mines. They were given limited passes/work authorization permits, could not bring their spouses, and had to reside in the infamous single sex dormitories. At the beginning of this relationship, Zimbabwe was Southern Rhodesia, a country with its own white supremacist political, social, and economic order. Labor flows to South Africa were due to perceived superiority of economic options to those in Southern Rhodesia even under the onerous unequal and racist conditions in South Africa. A more formalized apartheid system came with Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, which ended with the Lancaster House agreements that signaled the end of the national liberation war and the country's departure from the name, Southern Rhodesia, in favor of Zimbabwe. Today, both male and female Zimbabweans migrate to South Africa to seek employment, and the

phenomenon of feminization of migration observed by Ncube et al. has become the norm. What is responsible for this phenomenon? Is migration empowering or limiting for women? What accounts for success in accessing economic opportunities in the migration field?

None of the questions raised by Ncube et. al.'s paper can be successfully answered without considering Zimbabwe and South Africa's political history. Zimbabwe's independence ushered in a democratically-elected government, but did not live up to the expectations of Black Zimbabweans of a life more abundant for all. The Mugabe administration became a fixture, winning one sham election after the other. Mugabe's dictatorial governance, the unresolved land question led to the country's pariah status and economic sanctions from the US, United Kingdom (UK), and their allies, which pauperized Zimbabwe. Increased economic pain contributed to heightened pressure to migrate, spurring the growth in women's migration. The subjects of Ncube et al.'s research are part of this feminized migratory pattern. They address the important subject of the job perception of Zimbabwean women migrants in South Africa and the relevance of gender, as well as networks that provide material and moral support, and information, to migrant Zimbabwean women in a manner that shapes the possibilities both of movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa, and of success in accessing economic opportunities. The capacity to cope and adapt to the migration field is also significantly affected by the strength or weakness of networks.

South Africa also had a racist apartheid history that had significant effects on the political economy of the region. It is more affluent than its Southern African neighbors. Its post-apartheid democracy made people in these Southern African countries hopeful about the prospects of more fertile opportunities than those in their own countries, particularly since South Africa had become post-apartheid. Increased economic problems and scarcity of such opportunities at home

stimulates the urge to migrate. Competition for resources that pits indigenes against migrants generate tensions and even xenophobia when there are no public policies, institutionalized mechanisms, nor strategies directed at proactively addressing such challenges. Racism compounds the problems faced by migrants in accessing economic opportunities, a factor stressed by some of Ncube et al.'s research subjects.

As is evident from the title, Adetayo Olorunlana's paper, "European Migrant Crisis: Health and Policy Implications," focuses on the African migrant's health from transit to destination, and the policy responses of the European Union (EU) countries in which the migrants sought refuge, as well as the policy gaps and challenges experienced by migrants in consequence. The increased inflow of migrants and refugees coincided with the growing influence of right wing ultranationalist parties in EU countries. The flames of ethnonationalist fervor were fanned due to European right wing perceptions about what they saw as the religious difference between some of the refugees originating from Syria, the racial difference of those from African countries, and the sheer increase in the numbers of the migrants and refugees coming. Further complicating the situation was the 2008 world economic crisis and consequent increase in economic pain and anxiety in European countries, including the intensity of the news coverage due to the interest in the Syrian conflict because of European geopolitical considerations. Right wing rhetoric combined with expediency by mainstream EU politicians who presented the mixed migration as a threat to European state capacity to address the welfare of its embattled citizens due to the flood of migrants and refugees from other places. The assumption is that the demographic threat would endanger the European ethos, health, and budgetary capacity to respond to the needs of citizens. While there is no doubt that migrants, like all human beings, would suffer from health challenges, the idea of migration as a threat to the

body politic was embraced and presented by politicians of all persuasions. Yet, as Olorunlana points out, migrants may not necessarily become healthier in destination countries because of inequitable access to healthcare services, they also become sick during migration. The lack of understanding of the causes and consequences contributed to increased and unnecessary precarity for migrants in dire need of medical attention. However, one cannot say that the European countries did not begin studying the problem, and it cannot also be said that they did not come up with policy. To what extent can the policies made be said to have contributed to improved health outcomes for African migrants? Olorunlana gives us initial insights that ought to be further explored in future studies.

The number of migrants to Europe did increase, but was this a deluge? Does Europe not need migration? In the case of refugees, is there not a refugee convention that requires the acceptance of refugees? Why is the refugee convention being flouted so blatantly and blithely? Why are migrants demonized as a scourge? Why the animus and resentment that presumes that migrants are vectors of disease and threats to the health integrity of European countries? Inequality and power are intrinsic to the structural relations in the international economic system. The South-North migration of which Africans are part is complex, thus, some of the migrants are desired and courted, but they are the well-educated, the few wealthy, and the professionals, skilled artistes and entertainers, the sports celebrities. Others who tend to leave Africa "by any means necessary" as Ifekwunigwe contends, tend to be reviled, "other-ized," and marginalized. This latter group of migrants is the one that is seen as a menace and problem. Olorunlana's paper focuses upon the health aspects of their plight and how entrenched bias and animus shapes policymaking and discourses, as well as slipshod implementation of policies that are believed to be essential even by the studies of the governments that ignore them. Indeed the sheer number

and intensity of the migrants and refugees in the period at a time when European countries were themselves wrestling with the vagaries of the international economy that had disrupted and destabilized the established order, distressing their citizens in manifold ways. It is the height of expediency for politicians to blame migrants and refugees for the intractable problems set in motion by the combination of adverse circumstances that increased the level of precarity for most Europeans. The aforementioned nativism and xenophobia of the right-wingers, was more overt and vitriolic but the errors of omission by the liberals and centrists and their expediency combined to make the healthcare and other challenges of African migrants and refugees low priority issues on the agenda of EU countries. Since these countries' established social contract drives a need to be seen to be concerned for human rights and democratic access to resources, and there are pressure groups that advocate for refugees and migrants to be accommodated, they give a nod to such concerns by establishing study groups, committees of inquiry and such other initiatives as produced:

> The conference 'Health and migration in the EU: Better health for all in an inclusive society,' in Lisbon in June 2007, led to a draft Council Conclusion, adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2007. The draft Council Conclusion highlighted the link between the health of migrants and that of all EU citizens. According to Peiro and Benedict (2010), the Council Conclusion recommended that the European Commission support action through the Programme of Community Action in the Field of Health 2008–13. These issues were put on the European agenda during the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2007 (Olorunlana 2019).

The level of commitment to the Programme of Community Action in the Field of Health can be gauged by the extent to which European Union member states have "integrate[d] migrant health

into national policies and … facilitated access to healthcare for migrants" (Olorunlana 2019). As well as whether reports such as the suggested "European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) comprehensive report on migration and infectious diseases in the EU" and its recommendations that tuberculosis (TB), Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and vaccine-preventable diseases, … inform policy and public health responses" (Olorunlana 2019) are implemented in a serious manner.

Berhane Keleta's paper considers the questions: Why do people migrate? Why engage in irregular migration? Scholarly attempts to answer these questions proliferate, with some attributing these migrations to push and pull factors that emphasize the causal effects of dried up economic opportunities and precarious conditions for marginalized groups in sending countries at the same time as opportunities for upward mobility proliferate in receiving countries (BBC News 2019; Paul, Akindes, and Kirwin 2007; Min-Harris; Green and Kloos 2009; Ifekwunigwe 2013; Yaseen 2012).

Some scholars of migration put the focus on environmental stressors and catastrophes, political and ethno-religious crises as push factors; while others focus on the "individual characteristics of migrants… economic determinants, demographic determinants, gravity variables, labour market determinants, conflict, and environmental determinants." Climate change is identified as causing the displacement of 2.55 million people over the period of 1960–2000 in sub-Saharan Africa. The problem is particularly severe for countries that depend on the agriculture sector and these have led to rural outmigration as well as a shift from agricultural to nonagricultural sector. Similarly, a survey conducted in Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Uganda has considered education, marital status, age, ethnicity, and number

of births as determinates of rural out-migration (Wondimagegnhu and Zeleke 2017; International Organization for Migration 2018; International Organization for Migration 2018a).

Youth migration within and outside the African continent causes great concern. Given that the continent has the largest youth population (15-24-year-olds) in the world, this is a significant matter that presents both challenges and opportunities (Yahya 2017; UNICEF 2017). Focusing on causes of youth migration in the Horn of Africa, Berhane Keleta's article, "Youth Outmigration in the Horn of Africa" considers the larger geographical, socio-political, and economic factors that stimulate migration of youth from the Horn of Africa.

The youth is the largest and fastest growing section of the population in the African continent. They comprise the majority of contemporary migrants. Their increased determination to migrate is stimulated by the intra- and inter-state conflicts that have bedeviled the Horn of Africa, and Keleta argues that these conflicts have intensified irregular migration and human smuggling as well as human trafficking. Mixed migration from the Horn of Africa includes refugees, asylum seekers, smuggled, and trafficked persons. A majority of the migrants are between fourteen and forty years old, are mostly male, and have low levels of educational attainment. Berhane also attributes youth migration to the allure of remittances made by past migrants, a desire to similarly migrate and send remittances to their home countries. Further, he attributes migration to the social capital created by networks that link migrants' countries of origin to their destinations. Origin countries' "geographical proximity to migration hotspots" is another driver of migration.

Remittances have been recognized as important by most actors in the international system. Given the substantial size of remittances from Africans in the diaspora to the continent, it is unsurprising that considerable research on remittances has been undertaken by multilateral

organizations, multinational corporations, states and scholars to determine the implications of remittances for developing countries' economies and the effects and consequences on international political economy. "Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa grew to $37.8 billion in 2017, according to the World Bank and are forecast to hit around $39.2 billion this year [2018] and $39.6 billion in 2019" (Adegoke 2018). The importance of remittances is underscored by their having outspanned Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in many African countries. Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin remind us that there is no consensus on the effects of remittances, but conclude that remittances do have "a weakly-positive effect on long-term economic growth," particularly where there are "sound economic policies and institutions" that create an enabling environment for these transfers to contribute to developing human and financial capital" (Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin 2009). This contradicts Keleta's assessment of the effects of remittances on Eritrea.

Youth migration is unlikely to stop or decline without prior improvement in the economies of African countries and consequent increase in economic opportunities and upward mobility. According to the Pew Research Center, from 2010, "8 in 10 of the fastest-growing migrant populations are from sub-Saharan African nations" (Adegoke 2018). Social media and new communications technologies are useful for seeking and accessing information, building communities, and engaging in social interaction that lower the transaction costs involved in migration. Such costs include securing information about the best migration routes, destinations, and strategies. New technologies have also facilitated easier remittance transactions, although the cost of transfers is higher in Africa than in many other world regions (Adegoke 2018).

The quest for higher education is a significant causal factor that drives African migration (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). Marschall's subjects are African students in higher educational

institutions in South Africa. Her focus on their use of new communications technologies

represents a significant contribution to a growing field of inquiry, and it helps us better

understand the emergent cultural practices that contribute to community-building and thick

communication.

C.J.P. Niemandt argues that the use of new communications media and search engine

tools like Google, as well as social media constitutes a mass migration from the real into the

virtual world, and from older culture into new ones, in "a shift from shared space to shared

interest." In this world, migrants engaged in "new glocal" relations endeavor to not only

communicate, but to build communities and make meaning of their lives. Relentless

communication is made possible by cutting edge technological innovations (Vacarelu 2017;

Komito 2011; McGregor and Siegel 2013). While Niemandt focuses on missiology, it is useful in

explicating and complicating the influence of migrant communities as "a point of convergence of

some of the biggest challenges facing the church and society at large: globalisation, hyper-

diversity, interconnectedness, a Google culture, and postmodern tribalism." All social, political,

and economic institutions must grapple with how to engage these new communities and the

"network society (especially social media)"created as well as with migration, both real and

virtual.

Niemandt is right. "The network society represents a profound social transformation.

New technologies deliver connectedness in the palms of our hands and social media serve as an

expression of the passion for connection, community, and knowing others and being known by

others." This is what Marschall shows in her article on the use of WhatsApp by African students

in South Africa. She also uncovered "contextualisation and inculturation" in social media

culture; "the foundational role of relationships in a network society and migrant culture; the

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ability of social media to facilitate connection to the multiple cultural … belongings of migrants; the role of social media to help migrants to find meaning through shared, self-generated experiences" (Niemandt 2013).

WhatsApp groups, Facebook, and other social media platforms, are very useful for affinity groups interested in forming and building community (Herbert and Ghoulidi 2019). Marschall's subjects attest to the usefulness of these communications media that facilitate their connections with former classmates, friends, family, and other affinity groups. Niemandt's analysis indicates that these groups are also migrants of a different sort—virtual ones, and he argues that social institutions should pay more attention to understanding the new mechanisms, processes, and the meanings they make of life, its challenges, opportunities created, and consequent structural and other changes in human life.

Social networks can be maintained more robustly through the use of new communications technologies. Social media and new communications technologies reduce some of the alienation and anxieties experienced by migrants who feel dislocated, those for whom migration is akin to exile, those who are actual exiles, and those experiencing the precarity of being aliens in countries or communities that are xenophobic.

Marschall, Olorunlana, Ncube, Bahta, Jordaan, and Keleta all explore and uncover complexities and possibilities involved in migration, revealing the antinomies of globalization and nexus of youth, migration, health, employment, remittances, social media, and higher education. These papers contribute to the growing pool of empirical research and analysis needed to move discourse on African migration away from stereotypical assumptions and pathological conclusions about the nature, form, and character of the population movement from the continent, as well as within it.

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Transcultural Memory and Social Media in the Context of Migration:

A Case Study from South Africa

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Abstract

Theoretically rooted in memory studies (notably the concept of "transcultural memory") and methodologically based on interviews with African migrants in South Africa, this paper explores the use of social media and Internet–based communication applications in the context of migration. Results indicate that participants use digital media platforms not only to exchange personal news, but also to engage in mnemonic practices. It is argued that conjuring up memories of home and fondly remembered episodes experienced with social groups deepens the sense of belonging for migrants in a context of alienation and isolation.

Keywords: memory, social media, migrants, South Africa, Africa

Introduction

Migration and displacement, whether temporary or permanent, voluntary or forced, are characterizing the life experience of growing populations in the contemporary world globally. The advent of modern information and communication technology, notably mobile phones, social media and internet–based communication applications has fundamentally changed the ways in which migrants and refugees organize themselves in unfamiliar territory and maintain contact with family and friends back home. Common sense suggests that communication apps

and social media platforms—notably WhatsApp, Facebook and Skype—are widely utilized to update social relations about personal news, discuss important developments and inquire about each other's physical and emotional well–being. Little attention has been paid to the fact that social media communication is also about memory—remembering the past.

Much scholarly literature has investigated the multifarious ways in which migrants preserve memories of their pre–migration past—conjuring up memories of their home or homeland, fostering reminiscence among loved ones, and engaging memory to retain important elements of cultural identity in a foreign context. This may be achieved for instance, through food, music, photographs and other images, furniture and artefacts, clothing, social performative practices, temporary return trips, homemaking practices and routine private rituals (Hage 2010; Hung et al. 2013; Rabikowska 2010; Roberts 2018; Tolia-Kelly 2004). In this paper, I argue that migrants use social media (employed here as an umbrella term to refer to a range of related online communication platforms) not only to communicate about the present and the future but also about the past. The technology-based exchange of old photographs and messages referencing bygone episodes is positioned here as a memory practice, even an emergent memory culture, that plays a very particular role in the context of migration and displacement.

This paper focuses on African migrants or foreign students, notably Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) candidates, enrolled at a South African university. Within the wider field of migration studies, this focus addresses the relative lacuna of research on African migration across the African continent (Bakewell and Binaisa 2016; Cohen, Story and Moon 2015). Within the literature on migration in South Africa, it draws attention to the neglected niche of the highly skilled and educated, whose experience is in many ways markedly different from the majority of economic migrants and asylum seekers. When using the summary term "migrant," it is

acknowledged that some participants do not categorize themselves as such, and individuals may officially fall within different types of visa classifications. Whether they are temporary migrants for study purposes or permanently settled in South Africa, what matters, in the context of this paper, is that these foreign students are resourceful in maintaining contact with family and other social relations in their home country and elsewhere in the diaspora. The paper investigates how the eliciting and sharing of memory through social media bolsters the displaced person's sense of belonging in an alienating environment, and–in theoretical terms, aims to advance our understanding of memory in the digital age, in the specific context of migration, and through transnational and transcultural interaction.

African Migrants in South Africa

Migration figures in South Africa are contested because many migrants are undocumented. The 2011 census (Statistics South Africa 2011) maintains that South Africa hosts approximately 2.2 million people born outside the country (4.2 percent of the total population). According to recent research by Meny–Gibert and Chiumia (2016), 75.3 percent of foreigners are from the African continent, most predominantly (68 percent) from the Southern African Development Region (SADC). Many of these foreigners are asylum seekers or economic migrants; some are refugees (UNHCR South Africa 2015), and a portion comprises highly skilled and educated individuals who take up professional employment and leadership positions (Crush and McDonald 2002).

International student migration has been a growing trend in many parts of the world in recent years (Thomas and Inkpen 2017). As South Africa has internationalized its higher education system and de facto become a leading "education hub" for foreign students (Bhandari and Blumenthal 2010; Kishun 2007; Dell 2010) many educated Africans from across the

continent engage in what Donaldson and Gatsinzi (2005) call "educational tourism." Increases in the youth population size in many African countries and the associated higher competition for jobs necessitate the acquisition of higher degrees and foreign credentials to secure attractive professional employment positions (Thomas and Inkpen 2017 citing Hatton and Williamson 2003). Because the pursuit of higher education options, especially a PhD, is either unavailable or undesirable in their home country and unaffordable at universities in the developed world, many of these candidates come to South Africa. They typically enter the country on a student visa for a period of several years, but several participants of the current study had already been living in South Africa long before enrolling for their higher education programs.

Some participants were adamant that they intend to return home after completion of their doctoral program (usually three to four years). However, respondents close to submission of their thesis often indicated that they were weighing their original intention against the more attractive prospects of finding suitably qualified employment in the host society. As many other countries, South Africa also offers incentives to retain highly qualified international graduates and encourage them to enter the local economy, especially to address critical skills shortages in the fields of science and technology (Bhandari and Blumenthal 2010). Increasing levels of adaptation to the host country, society, and consideration of future opportunities for spouses and children are likely to turn many temporary migrants for study purposes into long–term migrants or permanent residents.

The emergence of dual allegiance to both home and host country, what Appiah (1997) calls "cosmopolitan patriotism," is often coupled with alienation (Carrier and Kabalek 2014:54). Most African foreigners, especially those from the southern African region blend easily into the local population, but their societal acceptance and integration suffer in a host environment

characterized by pervasive xenophobia targeted at African "immigrants" (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). Almost all participants of this study have experienced some form of discrimination or humiliation, but no xenophobic violence, which tends to be meted out at economic migrants, directly competing with the livelihoods of the local poor. African professionals and postgraduate students are relatively isolated (and they isolate themselves) from these contexts.

The lives of these "study migrants" are largely consumed by their academic pursuits and almost entirely focused on the university environment—where some hold part–time jobs in teaching or administration. Paralleling findings from studies elsewhere (Brown and Holloway 2008), the initial period of their sojourn is particularly stressful, as they have to cope with an unfamiliar academic and sociocultural environment—whilst being homesick and feeling isolated. Language is a major alienating factor not only for francophone candidates with imperfect competency in English. Many participants of this study highlighted their unfamiliarity with isiZulu, the dominant local African vernacular, as a major problem. In public settings, they are habitually addressed in that language and then forced to identify themselves as a foreigner—a situation that some local Zulu speakers exploit to humiliate them.

Memory and Social Media

Although most respondents occasionally travel back home for temporary visits, they heavily rely on new media technology to stay in touch with family, friends, and professional networks in their home country. They belong to an educated, technologically well-versed elite and can locally benefit from a highly developed information and communication technology infrastructure; however, their communication partners back home are not necessarily equally equipped. On the technologically underdeveloped African continent, computer literacy rates, access to computers and the Internet are still low in global comparison (Greyling and McNulty

2011). Frequent electricity outages, slow Internet speed, and high costs of mobile data restrain access to the web and online apps in many African countries. Nevertheless, the mobile phone penetration on the continent has evolved rapidly (GSMA 2019). Increasingly, Africans are accessing the Internet through their phones. They hence partake in the digital revolution in very specific and locally adjusted ways.

As remembrance is partly dependent on media or technologies of memory, access to and availability of such media influence the memory practices of individuals and social groups (Kansteiner 2010; Van House and Churchill 2008). The advent of digital media, the internet and mobile communication technology has altered the way we store, retrieve, and disseminate memories, and has opened up new avenues for performing memory work and for generating and using memories. We may distinguish between digital memory as the storage of data on servers and portable devices (where information may be preserved, but not remembered) and digitally facilitated forms of memory practice, the functional process of remembering in individuals and among social groups for which social media provide an enabling platform (Pentzold 2011).

A growing body of scholarly literature engages with memory in the digital age, "mediated memories" (Van Dijck 2007), "digital network memory" (Hoskins 2009; Hoskins 2017a), and more specifically the role of social media in the process of remembrance. Hoskins (2017b) argues that digital media have fundamentally changed what memory is and what it does. Digital media, with its more immediate, visceral modes of representation and circulation, have changed the storage, accessibility, and usage of memory previously held within archives, organizations, and institutions—the shift from the so–called second to third memory boom (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010).

Garde–Hansen et al. (2009) consider "social network memory" as a new hybrid form of public and private memory (2009:6). They show how "digital memories become us," as our movements and the minutiae of our daily lives are recorded and documented through digital technology, uploaded to websites and shared on social media, but also stored and distributed without our knowledge. The thoughts, conversations, images, and voice recordings we post today become memories on social network sites in the near future (2009:1). As will be illustrated below, past experiences with family, friends and classmates, digitally documented (e.g., in photos and videos) and most likely previously shared, are retrieved and circulated again through social media among the same or slightly reconfigured groups, but now in a new context, that of migration and displacement. This provides a novel setting for the interpretation of these references to the past and the purpose of remembering itself.

A digital image might be retrieved from a computer's memory forever unchanged, but human memory always entails an active process of (re)construction from a range of sources, under the influence of multifarious contextual factors and situational demands. Processes of remembrance and sharing of memories are driven by personal and social motivations, adjusted to particular audiences and consistent with "self–identity goals" (Freeman 2010; Rose 2010; Schacter 1996; Sutton et al. 2010). The use of lifelogs, blogs and social media is generally associated with self–expression and the construction of the self (Van Dijck 2011); as a private/public platform for remembrance, social media offer an ideal forum for the representation and purposeful reconstruction – or rather construction – of one's life history and identity in relation to others.

Transcultural Memory

Social media and networked technology as media of memory become more significant for migrants and the displaced, as geographical distance decreases opportunities for personal contact and increases the need for remembrance as a coping mechanism and strategy of fostering belonging. Astrid Erll's (2011a, 2011b) notion of "traveling memory" and most particularly the concept of "transcultural memory," which has recently generated much scholarly interest (Bond and Rapson 2014) are particularly relevant in the present study's context of migration. Drawing on Rigney's (2005) work, which advocates a shift away from static considerations of *lieux de memoires* (sites of collective memory) (Nora 1989) to "dynamics of memory," Erll (2011a) highlights mobility and circulation as essential characteristics of cultural memory. She defines "traveling memory" as "the incessant wandering of carriers, media, contents, forms, and practices of memory, their continual 'travels' and ongoing transformations through time and space, across social, linguistic and political borders" (Erll 2011b:11). Both migration and the digital network technology promote, and to some extent, prompt the traveling of memory and its influence by transcultural dynamics.

Transcultural memory, still a new approach within the field of Memory Studies, rejects older conceptualizations of culture as discrete and hermetic, carried by clearly bounded, homogenous and localized identities, now commonly referred to (or derided) as the "container culture" model. Instead, transcultural memory emphasizes hybridity and cultural fluidity, paying particular attention to "the border–transcending dimensions of remembering and forgetting" (Erll 2011a:29), although this does not necessarily refer to a sense of cultural rootlessness or invalidate place bound memories in cultural identity formation. Transcultural memory, according to Bond and Rapson (2014:19), describes two separate dynamics: "firstly, the traveling of memory within and between national, ethnic, and religious collectives; secondly, forums of

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remembrance that aim to move beyond the idea of political, ethnic, linguistic, or religious

borders as containers for our understanding of the past."

Carrier and Kabalek (2014) feature several innovative approaches to the understanding of

transcultural memory, one of them, focused on migration,

> …studies about migration address subjectivities, that is experiences of the past on
>
> the individual "micro level" (Welsch 1999) which occur within or are shared by
>
> small and/or large groups, the reflexivity of remembering subjects, the influence
>
> of different countries on people's personal remembering… (2014:54).

In the context of migration, displacement and diaspora, even temporary migration for

study purposes, national, ethnic, and other localized cultural identifications and subjectivities

transform and develop, as individuals are confronted with and partially adapt to new cultural

environments. The findings below illustrate how this dynamic influences their practices of

remembrance with the aid of social media, but first, I will provide a brief note on how the present

research was carried out.

Methods

This paper is part of a larger ongoing research project focused on African migrants in

South Africa (Marschall 2017a; 2017b; 2018b; 2019). While previous publications included

samples drawn from a cross–section of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, this particular

portion of the investigation focused specifically on PhD candidates. As mentioned earlier, this

addresses the relative research gap on highly skilled African migrants in South Africa, but it also

represents an attempt at drawing a sample from a more homogenous research population, or

rather a population with similar migration profiles and social/educational characteristics.

Although the interviewed PhD candidates originate from a range of different countries, mostly in

the Southern African region, and were registered for diverse qualifications (although mostly engineering), they clearly belong to an educated elite, who either emanate from a privileged social stratum or have worked their way into it. They also manifest certain shared characteristics: excellent mastery of English and being more articulate than the average economic migrant, communicating in more nuanced and meaningful ways.

Based on an anticipated saturation point and similar studies of this nature, a sample size of twenty respondents was adopted for this research. The sampling process was structured in two phases. In the first phase, ten candidates were randomly selected from a database of foreign PhD candidates enrolled at a South African university (N=204) in Durban for the year 2017. In the second phase, an additional ten interviewees were selected purposively from the same database to attain approximate gender proportionality and maximum diversity in terms of country of origin and degree programs. In total, fourteen males and six females originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Lesotho, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe were interviewed. Their ages varied, but the vast majority were in their thirties; some were single, others married, with or without children. As it is acknowledged that the location of spouses and children influences social media usage (along with other factors); brief introductions will be provided for the persons quoted below. It should moreover be mentioned that free Wi-Fi is provided on the university campus, but not necessarily in all places of accommodation.

Most interviews (lasting between twenty-five and forty-four minutes) were conducted in person, and two were conducted via Skype. Questions explored the personal background and migration experience of participants, how memories of the past were transferred within the family, temporary return travel, how memories of home are fostered in the host country, as well as the use of networked technology and patterns of communication with social relations. Probing

questions were sometimes added to elicit richer responses about the use of social memory in the context of remembering. Data were transcribed and a first round of thematic coding (mostly along the above-mentioned themes) was conducted through the use of NVivo. Within each node, themes emerged in a second round of coding, which were subsequently analyzed in relation to relevant scholarly literature.

Results: Migrant Associations, Personal Networks and Social Media

Historically, migrant associations and organizations have often played a crucial role in supporting migrants, refugees, exiles, and displaced people in their daily needs and multifarious challenges of survival in their new country of residence. They moreover represent a symbolic link with the homeland that helps migrants maintain aspects of cultural traditions and national identity (Marschall 2018a; Bakewell and Binaisa 2016). Most participants of the current study were aware of a migrant association that brought together nationals from their respective country, but were either not a member or did not attend meetings and events, usually citing lack of time. Most, however, were in contact with the organization through a WhatsApp group or Facebook.

For these participants, social media are augmenting and to some extent displacing the role of these associations, allowing them to stay connected without necessarily being physically present. Participants were not specifically asked this question, but it may be speculated here that these PhD candidates' lack of interest in joining a national migrant association could also be linked to a perception that they share too little common ground with the broad mix of displaced fellow nationals in South Africa. They clearly sought the company of peers, as almost all of them belonged to—and physically spent time with—university-based fraternities and student community associations, whether comprising of nationals from a specific country (e.g., "Zim

Soc") or gatherings of postgraduates of different nationalities. In addition, almost all participants had established their own network of friends and fellow students, with whom they regularly socialize. Mutual interests and a sense of belonging are fostered through eating home food, debating, talking about mutual issues and current affairs in the home country, listening to or even performing familiar music associated with home, and—not least—sharing memories of home and the past. A typical example is Sogo, a 32-year-old male Nigerian participant, who is married with a small child, but came to South Africa (SA) on his own in 2016:

> I also have friends from my area from home that I regularly meet with. Some are students, and some are working scattered around different campuses and locations. When we meet, we do create things that make us feel a sense of home, like preparing of our food, talking about the situations of things in our country, Nigerian politics, Nigerian leaders, and how our country can be better. We do also play our music as that is very important to us, we don't joke with it. When we are together also, we talk about the past because understanding the past is a key to the future. We feel concern about the situation about our country especially those of us with like minds (Sogo, personal communication September 28, 2017).

Maintaining Social Relations Back Home

Most respondents are in touch with their local social clubs or informal networks through Facebook and WhatsApp groups. More importantly, for the current study, social media was extensively used to maintain social relations back home. One characteristic of the interviewed PhD candidates is their altered relationship towards time and leisure. Most respondents, and virtually all those registered for Law and Engineering degrees, complained about feeling almost constantly under pressure. Their lives revolve virtually exclusively around studying, leaving very

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little time for social activities and leisure. Even their social use of information and communication technology and especially social media was affected by the perceived time constraint—many indicated a preference for WhatsApp over Facebook, because the latter was perceived as too time-consuming. This is exemplified by Emmanuel's response, a 36-year-old Nigerian who came to South Africa in 2012; his spouse and two small children are staying with him, but his father remains in Nigeria:

> I don't use Facebook, because to me, it's a distraction. My only surviving parent,
> my father, used Facebook, but now he is no longer [using it], because we
> communicate physically using WhatsApp messenger (Emmanuel, personal
> communication, November 1, 2017).

> I don't often visit Facebook because to me it's time-consuming, looking at…you
> know…but on WhatsApp, I can just quickly drop a message and then move on
> with other things I want to do (Benedict from Nigeria, 37-year-old, male, married
> without children, in SA since 2009; personal communication, November 4, 2017).

Some participants attested to using WhatsApp or Skype with their family, but Facebook with their friends and former classmates. Only in very exceptional cases did participants use conventional phone lines to communicate with parents, either because the latter lived in remote areas without infrastructure or because they were not versed in the use of digital technology. For the vast majority of respondents, digital communication apps and social media played an extremely important role in maintaining contact with social relations back home, as well as family members and friends dispersed in other countries. Virtually all participants emphasized the importance of WhatsApp groups. Most had at least two groups: one for family members, another for friends. Some had many more groups—for example, immediate family and extended

family, locally versus home–based friends, groups of alumni or classmates from previous schools and universities, church–affiliated groups, and/or professional network groups.

Talking About the Present and the Past

Participants were asked whether they communicate mostly about the present or the past (i.e., sharing news and commenting on current events versus sharing memories and conjuring up a mutually experienced personal history). The most frequent responses are exemplified by the following examples. "It's a mixture of everything, we share old photographs, we talk about the past, we talk about the present, we talk about where we are heading to. We talk about achievements" (Benedict).

It is both past and present, but mostly the past because you always long for your childhood. … We share videos of our childhood asking one another if we remember such video in our childhood … we share current and past events in our country. … Thanks to Mark Zuckerberg, though he makes money from it, but the fact that he makes people from the past to connect is really awesome; though not really seeing those people but seeing them in the virtual space makes me connect to the people of the past and connect to old collective memories (Danford from Zimbabwe, 33-year-old male, in SA since 2008, unmarried; personal communication August 4, 2017).

We also have WhatsApp groups for alumni associations from different schools that I have graduated from. We share and discuss memories of the past in such WhatsApp groups. We also share where we are at the moment, our levels academically and so on. Discussions around our present constitute … about 20

percent, while discussion around our memories constitute the remaining 80

percent (Sogo).

Reminiscing about the past seems to occur especially often in groups linking friends and old classmates or alumni groups. Communication appears to be casual and entertaining, but also serious and productive, often focused on organizing initiatives to support the old school.

> For friends, I have WhatsApp group for them, [they are] alumni from the schools
> I finished. On these WhatsApp groups, we share things like calls for action for our
> alma mater, job vacancy related posts, jokes, good memories, news about the
> schools where we finished. … Also friends back home, we also have WhatsApp
> group where we communicate with ourselves. During our communication on the
> group with friends, we do and always share memories of the past and updates of
> the moment (Daniel from DRC, 36-year-old male, in SA since 2010, married with
> two children, who are staying with him; personal communication, October 30,
> 2017).

> We do have groups that we have created both for my friends from high school and
> other friends. There we talk about when we should come home, when we should
> have a reunion; and [there is an] other group from my primary school where we
> share old photos and we laugh at the pictures we didn't like and things like that. It
> just keeps us connected. On the group, we only share memories of the past, not of
> the present, because to some people it feels like you are bragging and also
> knowing full well about how people at home in Zim[babwe] are struggling
> (Muneinazvo from Zimbabwe, 28-year-old female unmarried; came to South
> Africa first in 2008; personal communication, August 3, 2017).

Focusing on memories of the past fosters a sense of connection—with a mutually shared pre–migration history; with the homeland and specific places there, especially educational institutions that played a formative role in where the PhD candidates find themselves today; and, most importantly, with meaningful social relations, friends, and former classmates who have walked along one's path of life. Such connections and the sense of belonging and rootedness they provide are important for migrants and the displaced, who experience loneliness, alienation in a foreign country, and isolation, exacerbated by their intense PhD research, a lone project few others can relate to.

The second quotation above moreover suggests that the participant is acutely aware of and sensitive about her achievements and societal status in relation to fellow nationals, even many of her friends and former classmates. As talking about the present, personal or academic achievements may be perceived as bragging, resulting in envy, jealousy, or a sense of distance, the focus on remembering a mutually experienced past and shared values is a form of escape that can help bridge fault lines and foster unity and belonging.

All migrants experience some degree of identity change as a result of their displacement from home. The trajectory of the PhD candidate's migratory and educational journey changes various aspects of their daily life experience, their values, expectations, and sense of awareness and identity. It is often during temporary home visits, the re–encounter of their home environment and social relations there, that participants become acutely aware of how different they have become in comparison to their peers back home.

My view of things - after getting home - changed, as some will always say that

the way I am speaking, and your way of thinking are different and that I have

grown. For me, my perception of friends I left never changed, because as a

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Christian, I must humble myself no matter what I have achieved in life, though

some people feel uncomfortable as soon as they start to see you prosper. What

you do, whatever action you take, they judge you and see it as you are showing

off that you are now studying abroad, and that makes you proud. So I try to put

myself in their shoes, because every move you make, people are always going to

comment; they would criticize you. So [during] subsequent journeys, I focused on

my family and business (Daniel).

While family members and some friends tend to be proud of the participants'

achievements, welcoming them with admiration, respect, and a spirit of celebration, some former

peers react with envy and perceive the returnee as competition. This forces participants to

develop personal strategies and coping mechanisms. Where reminiscence and reflection about

the mutually shared past prove impossible or inadequate, one might be left with no other option

than walking away, focusing on one's own family and minding one's own business.

The reference in the above narrative to the Christian duty of humbling oneself highlights

a striking characteristic observed during the interviews with virtually all participants of the

current study, namely their humility. Whether they identified themselves as Christians or more

generally acknowledged their God or spiritual center in their achievements, almost all appeared

to have a profound sense of indebtedness to their community and the individuals—parents,

teachers, mentors—who enabled them to be where they are today. This attitude also explains

why so many of the participants indicated re–visiting their former schools or universities during

temporary home visits and the deeply emotional responses and sense of gratitude that this re–

visit and the encounters with remembered persons and familiar spaces instilled in them. The

perception of the former school environment as a formative experience and basis of current

academic success may also underpin their motivation to remain connected and active within alumni social media groups.

The Role of Pictures

To gain some understanding of the family–based "memory culture" prevailing in their childhood homes, participants were asked about the role of family photo albums and story–telling around old photographs. Most interviewees—irrespective of where they came from, geographically and socio–economically—indicated that their family had photo albums or collections of photographs, which would be jointly contemplated and narrated by a parent or grandparent, hence transferring memories and historical knowledge about the family and community to the younger generation. All participants moreover had collections of digital photos either on their mobile phones or other storage devices and some explained how they used these photos to reminisce about home or loved ones.

Of specific interest to this paper is that most participants indicated circulating "old pictures" on social media platforms and especially WhatsApp groups. These included photographs and to some extent videos of events from years gone by, and of persons during their childhood, adolescence or student years. Seen within the context of the participants' lifespan, the term "old" pictures may include visuals dating back only a few years, but the point is that they are testimonies of a remembered past.

> On the family WhatsApp group … we discuss family issues. Also, my mother
> when she needs something, she puts it on the family group so that all of us are
> aware of it. We share memories of the past, we upload funny pictures we took
> while we were small, and we laugh about them. We share how we go to our
> father's farm and things like that (Daniel).

I also have a WhatsApp group for the family. That's where we really communicate things that concern our family and it's been active for a while now. … We do use this group to reminisce about the past, which is common to us; uploading of old pictures, which we comment on. Sometimes some of us put some phrases that generate comments about our past experiences; it is always fun and interesting. We do also have photo albums where we sat down with our parents to watch them together. Before our mother died, we always took pictures together. Those are some of the memories we share together when we chat on the family WhatsApp group platform. For me it is always important to take pictures and keep them. It is always good to see how you were on those pictures in years gone by (Emmanuel).

The above speaks to the continuation of the family's past memory culture – sitting around the family photo album with the parents—and its shift into a new technology. One participant appears to inverse the familiar pattern of parents showing their children photographs of the past, perhaps laughing together about baby pictures, as he now sends his father pictures of when the latter was young, resulting in excitement and appreciation.

No, I'm not active in the professional [WhatsApp] group …but my family group. Like, my dad's birthday was earlier this month. I sent some old pictures … like that's usually my gift to them. I'd like to remember; they talk about it. … I know it's exciting for him. Like I send older pictures of my dad when he was much younger. So I would know he will appreciate it (Funsho from Nigeria, 29-year-old, male, unmarried; in SA since 2016; personal communication, November 30, 2017).

Many participants seemed to be particularly active in sharing photographs of the past among friends and alumni groups, using both WhatsApp and Facebook.

Yes, there is a WhatsApp group with my friends from back home, the people that I went to school with [and] also the family WhatsApp group. [In the friends group] … randomly people just post pictures of when we were back in high school, we would laugh and share memories. Sometimes we would have pictures of others that have passed on and we would remember them through those pictures (Bianca from Zimbabwe, female, 30-year-old, married with small child; came to SA in 2007; personal communication, October 23, 2017).

If these words contain an element of sadness and imply paying tribute to friends and classmates who passed away, for the most part, the photo–elicited sharing of memories seems to be fun, affirmative, and rewarding, conjuring up happy memories and "good old times."

During our communication on the group with friends, we do and always share memories of the past and updates of the moment. We share photographs from the past, which people comment on. It is quite amazing that it makes you remember the good times (Grace from DRC, male, 34-year-old, married, no children, came to SA in 2012; personal communication, October 13, 2017).

Yes, I am involved in a lot of WhatsApp groups. … Yes, we do talk about the past, post old pictures and talk about what is happening in our lives now. … Mostly we share pictures we took in the past, one of us can post an old picture that we took together and it's like we remember those days (Mary from Kenya, 47-year-old female, married with two children, came to SA in 2015; personal communication, September 29, 2017).

Old group photos or pictures taken during joint experiences in the past cement the bonds between friends and with the institution (school, university, etc.) that brought them together, because they provide unique visual evidence of mutually experienced places and events. The effect of old photographs can be more powerful and effective than text–based mention of such events, because images are complex, multivalent signifiers that can elicit many memories as different details are noticed and contemplated (Brown and Phu 2014). Images easily evoke emotions, perhaps a longing for home, and a desire to relive the fondly remembered moments, warm feelings of appreciation of friends, and the good times one has had together. In the context of migration and displacement, such sentiments and indulgence in memory can strengthen one's sense of belonging and reduce negative feelings of alienation and isolation.

But this sharing of old pictures is not only about indulgence and nostalgia, as the following illustrates:

> Hmmm, when it comes to memories like…it's kind of freaky, because my friends…let's say we are going somewhere this weekend, they will post, okay we are going here, do you remember the other time we did this together, that's it. So sometimes they will be posting stuff from way back then to spite me like: hey girl, you are stuck there, and you …[could] be going there with us (Samantha from Zimbabwe, 28-year-old female, unmarried, no children, came to SA in 2009; personal communication, October 13, 2017).

In this quotation, the participant's friends are using memory, tongue–in–cheek, through photographs of the past; they are beckoning her and reminding her of what she is missing out on by having removed herself to another country. Testifying to the creative use of memory

prompted by situational demands, this response moreover illustrates the neat interweaving of past and present.

Programmed to Remember

The sharing of old photographs on Facebook and WhatsApp tends to entail more deliberate and considered processes than exchanging text messages. It involves scanning photo collections, considering which image to select, posting it and sometimes adding a caption. In the meantime, browsing through personal digital archives that document one's own past precipitates memories and self–reflection. Among the recipients, the surprise effect of seeing an image from "the old times" may cause a rush of memories or puzzlement, as one struggles to remember. Zooming into the image, contemplating details, comparing it with others in one's own collection initiates thought processes and may result in further communication exchanges—comments, questions, and/or posting of more pictures. Such flurries of activity or increased "user traffic" is, of course, much in the interest of commercially-operated social media platforms such as Facebook.

> …our friends, some of them I have barely…I can't remember their names, but when I see their picture on Facebook, I say I remember these guys; I send him a message and we try to reconnect; you try to remember, so it creates that…info cyber network of communication…(Benedict).

People often acknowledge not remembering names, but claim to remember faces. Facebook's heavy reliance on pictures, especially of people's friends, helps users to remember and prompts them to reconnect. The social media platform is built on memories—of friends and shared experiences—and the mere encounter of a picture may spontaneously trigger the user into

action: posting comments, questions, pictures, initiating an exchange of current information, and

memories. A closer examination of Facebook reveals that the sharing of memories is even more

deliberately built into the system itself through automated prompts, as the following participant

explains:

> …Facebook sometimes reminds you and post some memories and asks, like, do
>
> you want to share this memory? So like sometimes, people would share memories
>
> from, like, 2012 and it will be, like oh, you guys remember when we were still
>
> undergrad doing this or whatever (Samantha).

These examples illustrate that digital networking technology and, specifically, social

media platforms such as Facebook, are not simply a new memory technology, a neutral medium

of memory to facilitate remembrance among social groups. As Van Dijck (2011) similarly shows

for Flickr, through its interface, algorithm and database, Facebook plays an active role in

prompting its users to remember and disseminate memories. In other words, the system is to

some extent designed and programmed to generate memories among users, because this can

ignite excited, ongoing communication exchanges about past and present, accompanied by the

posting of multifarious material testifying to values and lifestyle interests, all of which

essentially advances the social media company's corporate commercial interests.

Discussion

It is self–evident that staying in touch with people back home, facilitated by modern

communication technology and social media, is important for migrants and the displaced.

Discussing diaspora formation in the intra-African migration context, Bakewell and Binaisa

(2016) found that the young Somalis in Kampala use different strategies from the older

generation, notably social media, to maintain contact not only with the home country, but with

youths in the wider Somali diaspora. The current study illustrates that such communicative exchanges may not be limited to updates about personal news and current matters of importance, but include significant elements of remembrance. All participants indicated using social media platforms to share memories (in the form of text messages, images, and videos) of their personal pasts and joint experiences with groups of family, friends, or alumni. This paper has argued that reminiscence (rather than mere exchange of news) can be very meaningful and deepen one's sense of belonging in the context of migration. The following discussion will draw some wider conclusions in relation to theoretical concepts introduced above, notably transcultural memory, and digital memory.

Transcultural Memory

Carrier and Kabalek (2014:52) maintain that the significance of transcultural memory "does not lie in the definitions of its terminology, but in the practical studies of memory formation between, across and even beyond the boundaries of closed groups." The current study is an example of such empirical investigation. The digitally–based memory exchanges in this research shift attention from static objects of memory and remembrance within the nation state towards dynamics of memory across borders, occurring not only between the migrant participant and communication partners back home but among social networks dispersed in several countries in the diaspora. If transcultural memory is contrasted with cultural memory that circulates among nationally or ethnically-bounded cultural groups (Erll 2011a), the question arises to what extent the findings of this research evidence the dissolution of "container culture thinking."

On one hand, one may say that the digitally–based memory sharing that occurred between the migrants and their social networks across borders does not erode, but in fact,

bolsters their sense of belonging to a clearly defined cultural group. Remembrance is fostered at the micro level of the family and among friends—with whom one has grown up in a specific locale, defined by a shared language, cultural values, norms, and practices. While most participants exchange both memories of the past and current news, it was shown above that some prefer to focus on the past to bolster a sense of belonging and sameness, rather than emphasizing their difference. The use of digital media with their immediacy and vividness (especially videos) enables them to overcome geographical distance and mimic the interactive dynamic of personal presence. The memory exchange in cyberspace becomes an extension of the home trip and its immersion in home culture; the affirmation of cultural belonging provides a stable base for coping with migration related stress and cultural change.

On the other hand, migrants (in general and even PhD candidates who have only lived in South Africa for a relatively short period of time) begin reflecting on their home country, and become consciously aware of cultural norms once invisible and taken for granted, in other words, they gradually begin to see from the outside the container that bounded their culture. This point of view constitutes the present context in which remembering the past occurs. As mentioned earlier, personal memory is always an active, selective, and purposive process of reconstruction, which is inseparable from the influence of the present. From this perspective, remembering one's own past will reflect in subtle ways some cultural norms and values absorbed from the host country context. But even the conscious focus on home culture, the strategic deployment of memories to bolster belonging to a secure bounded cultural group, when occurring from a position of partial absorption or gradual integration in a different cultural context, could be considered a transcultural memory practice. It does not dissolve, but problematizes or inflects identification with national, ethnic, and otherwise bounded forms of cultural memory.

Digital Memory

Transcultural memory can manifest itself in all types of memory practices and media. To what extent does the sharing of memories through digital media differ from other kinds of memory exchanges, notably by phone calls, letters, or personal interaction during migrant home trips? What makes digital media unique and interesting in our understanding of memory? The scope of this paper does not permit to delve deeply into the burgeoning literature on digital media memory, but a few important points shall be highlighted here.

Where temporarily or permanently displaced people struggle to integrate or adjust to an alienating environment, find themselves stressed by the demands of their daily lives, or feel lonely or homesick, digital media enables communicative exchanges—including the conscious utilization of memory to stimulate a sense of connection to the pre–migration past and belonging to meaningful places and social groups. Much more so than the receipt of a phone call or letter, the unexpected arrival of a message, image, video, or sound clip via WhatsApp or Facebook may induce spontaneous remembering and a sense of belonging, as it testifies to someone else reflecting on a mutually shared past and reaching out to connect across time and space. Perhaps more importantly, for individuals who find gratification or solace in reminiscence, but lack communication partners, social media platforms provide an implied audience, "friends" who may or may not participate in active communication.

Hoskins (2017b) argues that the "connective turn," the sudden abundance of digital media has fundamentally changed what memory is and what it does. In today's digital media culture, the dominant form of sociality is what he calls "sharing without sharing,"—a compulsive

behavior of posting, forwarding, and commenting that is primarily motivated by the rules of participation and the obligation to reciprocate. Viewed in this light, the digitally connected African migrant participant who receives messages and pictures referencing the past from her friends and relatives is compelled to acknowledge or comment, feeling obliged to engage in reciprocal acts of memory sharing. However, the findings of this research illustrate that many of the participants were very discriminate about their use of social media and their level of communication, given the time pressures they face. As remembering is always linked with self–identity goals (Freeman 2010), the compulsion to participate in the digital sharing of memories is weighed against the needs of fostering identity projects and the desire to belong to particular groups.

As digital networks are increasingly structuring the formation of memory, both the human and technological aspects of memory are closely intertwined (Van Dijck 2011:2); in the "socio–technical practices of memory–making and memory retrieval" (Van House and Churchill 2008), both human and technological agency play a role. One can prevail upon, dominate, or prompt the other in complex intertwined ways. Ultimately, the process of remembering is always performed in the minds of individuals, but online technology and social media communication can provide clues that stimulate remembrance and digitally–generated mnemonics may be carried over into analogue forms, notably verbal communication.

If social media hence facilitate remembrance in various ways, it is important to note that "people do not generate memories by means of networked platforms", explains Van Dijck (2011:4), drawing on Hoskins (2009). Rather it is "the dynamic of connection," the "connective work of human contributors" that constitutes the essence of memory and gives meaning and impact to texts, images, videos, and sound files uploaded on websites or shared through social

media. This dynamic of connection occurs on two levels. There is, firstly, the technologically-facilitated linking of a plethora of different media and thoughtful acts of combination—manifested for instance in the adding of a witty caption to a memorable image (as was mentioned in some of the narratives), a meaningful piece of music or a voice–over to a video, the collation of several images or their juxtaposition in comparison. Such "work" of linkage, combination, and association is performed very deliberately by human actors and intended to evoke memory through connection; it becomes worthwhile and meaningful only when shared. The connected media elements—the crafted "memory prompt"—constitutes a signifier in its own right, which can be fully decoded only by those belonging to the "in–group." As the data presented above illustrates, receiving such memory prompts may result in positive emotions, for example, prompting a laugh or causing a warm, loving feeling, not only because they precipitate fond memories, but because the ability to understand the signifier affirms one's belonging to a loved one or a social group with deep roots in one's autobiographical past.

The second level of connection facilitated by social media is the networking and interconnecting of persons and social groupings. The findings of this research illustrate the importance of WhatsApp groups and Facebook networks of family, friends, alumni, religious congregations, and local associations of migrants, in exchanging and discussing memories. The social media facilitated practice of evoking and distributing references to a mutually experienced past, fosters a group–based memory culture among individuals dispersed across geographical space, but often focused on localized, place–embedded memories. For the generation of this study's participants, who have already grown up with digital technology, many of the remembered episodes (e.g., graduation) will have been documented at the time of their erstwhile occurrence; they can now easily be retrieved, in some cases virtually beckoning to be compared

with present–day data. Social media hence promotes not only the constant interweaving of past and present by drawing on its own stored resources, but may even create a kind of "filter bubble" for memories.

Conclusion

One of the characteristics of the field of Memory Studies is the overwhelming emphasis on the memory of trauma and victimization – the personal and collective memories of suffering, violence and death – both internationally and especially in an African context. Far less research attention has been paid to other types of remembrance and memory in alternative types of contexts. Although a few studies make cursory reference to memory (e.g., Bakewell and Binaisa 2016), the systematic exploration of reminiscence, the process of mentally indulging in a fondly remembered past, or simply ordinary recall, the mundane activity of remembering that underpins every aspect of our daily existence, is neglected in the field of African migration. The present research makes a small contribution to this lacuna. The findings illustrate how digital media platforms are used to conjure up fond childhood memories, nostalgic memories of home, recollect funny episodes and warmly remembered interactions with friends and loved ones, as well as share proud memories of educational and other achievements. Such remembrance and memory–based communications give meaning to present experiences, provide continuity to self–identity, and foster a sense of belonging for migrants in a context of alienation.

Compared with sharing memories in personal interactions during phone calls and home trips, the use of digital platforms is significant for its formation of new memory groups, especially through the use of network-based social media and the popular practice of establishing WhatsApp groups. Images shared or comments posted will not always be relevant to every individual in the virtual group, notably when groups of friends contain both persons from the

home and host country, yet everyone is part of the audience, and can listen, observe, make their voice heard, and tell their own story. As opposed to personal interactions between locally-based groups of family and friends, digitally-linked individuals dispersed in the diaspora are subject to more diverse situational factors and cultural reference points influencing the process of remembering, which may over time lead to the emergence of a new transcultural memory.

The results of this study are obviously not generalizable. Limitations include the small sample size and other factors generic to qualitative research and the case study approach. This study has moreover not attempted to determine patterns and analyze findings in relation to gender, class, religious affiliation, migration experience and other demographic and circumstantial factors that could have a bearing on the use of social media. It is worth re–emphasizing that all participants and their communication partners in various African countries had access to the requisite technology. Different results may have been obtained from interviewing poor and uneducated economic migrants with very limited and, perhaps, expensive access to the Internet. Perhaps for them, indulging in remembrance on social media might be a luxury, de–prioritized against essential communication and information exchanges that support their efforts at survival. Further research can focus on comparing the role of memory in the communicative exchanges of different categories of migrants, but also investigate socio–cultural patterns of mnemonic practice in different geographical and transcultural memory contexts.

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European Migrant Crisis: Health and Policy Implications

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Abstract

Over 65 million people are displaced worldwide. Some have migrated to Europe, seeking refuge

from wars, conflict and natural disasters. Migration and refugee health have significant

repercussions for European governments and the European Union (EU), which were somewhat

unprepared to address such issues. The EU proposed Health 2020 as immediate measures to

address the health needs of refugees and migrants. The initiative was adopted to improve health

for all, and to reduce health inequalities through public policy. However, there are legal

restrictions barring irregular migrants from accessing these services. In addition, health service

policies for irregular migrants varies in the EU region. There is inadequate response to some

diseases affecting migrants from African origin. Consequently, refugee and migrant health is

neglected, producing an inequitable situation and unnecessary suffering for the migrants, as well

as potential risk to population in their host country.

Keywords: Africa, disease, European agenda, migration, policy, public health

Introduction

More than 65 million people are estimated to be displaced worldwide, (United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2015), with European countries registering over

two million asylum applications since January 2015. The number of migrants entering the

European Union (EU) member states has increased steadily since 2008, but reached record highs in 2015. Europe received the largest inflow of refugees and asylum seekers since World War II, fleeing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 1,046,600 migrants arrived in Europe by land and sea. There were almost 4,000 migrant deaths in 2015, nearly four times as many as in 2014 (EYGL 2016; BBC 2016; UNHCR 2016). This situation reportedly "overwhelmed" (Al Jazeera 2016) national authorities and calls for international solutions quickly ensued. International non-governmental organizations were quick to deploy missions at key points along migratory routes, and intergovernmental organizations supported national and regional policies. They also designed interventions on the ground. At the same time, under the auspices of the EU, the continent's leaders met to discuss possible responses to the increased migratory flows, to assign responsibility for the provision of basic services, and to decide on a process for relocating refugees and asylum seekers across the EU's twenty-eight member states. Nevertheless, despite repeated summits and policy declarations, the implementation of agreed actions remained elusive because according to the European Commission in its economic forecast for autumn 2015, three million people could arrive in Europe by the end of 2017 (EYGL 2016; Kenitikelenis and Shriwise 2016).

The trend of increased numbers of refugees and migrants on the Central Mediterranean route continues in 2017. More than 80 percent of all sea arrivals during the first six weeks of the year were registered in Italy (UNICEF 2017). Major risks confronted by refugee and migrant children and women along this route include detention, extortion, gender-based violence, abuse, exploitation and drowning at sea. In January 2017, UNICEF-supported outreach teams identified 1,793 children at risk in Turkey and across Europe, while 739 children, including adolescents,

joined structured education activities in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (UNICEF 2017). In addition, 256 babies and infants accessed Infant and

Young Child Feeding (IYCF) services, and 1,438 children received culturally appropriate basic

supplies in Serbia and Italy. As UNICEF enters its third year of response to the refugee and

migrant crisis in Europe, in January it launched its Humanitarian Appeal for 2017 requesting a

total of US\$ 43,452,000 for continued interventions in response to this complex crisis.

This migrant movement constitutes one of the largest movements of displaced people

through European borders since World War II. In 2015, the majority of people leaving by boat

from Turkey came from war-torn countries. By mid-December, 57 percent of those who arrived

in Greece were from Syria, 24 percent from Afghanistan, 9 percent from Iraq, and 10 percent

from other countries (UNHCR 2016). Yet the movement is also becoming increasingly diverse.

While 91 percent of those arriving in Greece from Turkey are from the top ten 'refugee-

producing' countries, people of other nationalities have increasingly joined the flow. A small but

growing number of individuals from South West Asia, North Africa and West Africa are also

moving along the same route in an attempt to reach Europe (UNHCR 2016).

This article will address the historical migration trend, migration pressure, European

agenda on migration, and health implications of the migration crisis. It will also provide possible

recommendations. Migration into and within Europe have implications for public health and

public policy. These issues were put on the European agenda during the Portuguese Presidency

of the Council of the EU in 2007 (Peiro and Benedict 2010). The conference "Health and

migration in the EU: Better health for all in an inclusive society," in Lisbon in June 2007, led to

a draft Council Conclusion, adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2007. The draft

Council Conclusion highlighted the link between the health of migrants and that of all EU

citizens. According to Peiro and Benedict (2010), the Council Conclusion recommended that the European Commission support action through the Programme of Community Action in the Field of Health 2008–13. It invited the member states to integrate migrant health into national policies and requested that they facilitate access to healthcare for migrants. The Conclusion also called on the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) to produce a comprehensive report on migration and infectious diseases in the EU. It recommended focusing on tuberculosis (TB), Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and vaccine-preventable diseases, to inform policy and public health responses (ECDC 2009).

Although certain diseases are associated with the migrant population, Frontières (2016) asserted that final destinations are not always what migrants and refugees expected, and even in Europe, living conditions in the transit camps, where they spend months and even years, often fall well-short of basic humanitarian standards. Preventable, but poor sanitation, overcrowding, and insecurity, which are commonplace among migrant occupation and refugee camps, cause or intensify a large proportion of the health problems being seen in these camps.

Historical Migration Trends

The European continent has been shaped by a long history of internal migration flows (De la Rica et al. 2013). Such flows often occurred in response to the constant shifts of economic and geopolitical power between Europe's constituent nation states. In the aftermath of World War II (WWII), for example, Germany received several million refugees from regions formerly part of Nazi Germany, while large numbers of Finns and Poles had to relocate to the western parts of their countries. According to De la Rica et al. (2013) large-scale immigration into Europe from the rest of the world is a more recent phenomenon. They note that starting in the early 1950s, many European colonial powers (in particular the United Kingdom and France, but

also Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal), lost their colonies abroad, triggering large

population movements toward the metropolitan countries from such diverse regions of the world

as Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia. Countries with no colonies, particularly in Northern

and Central Europe, often addressed their severe post-war labor shortages by signing guest-

worker agreements. The ensuing immigrant inflows played an important role in the economic

expansion in Europe after WWII and turned many ethnically homogeneous countries into multi-

ethnic societies. The IOM (2008) estimated an approximate 7.6 percent of the total EU

population to be foreign-born, and it was estimated that between 2.6 million and 6.4 million

migrants are in irregular status. The recent trends in the inflow of the migrants and refugees into

Europe reflect a combination of several factors such as political instability, social unrest,

violence, emerging geo-strategic dynamics in the West Asian region, the quest for better political

and socio-economic conditions, as well as access to the social security system. Global trends

point out that the number of displaced people has been rising. The UNHCR (2015) annual global

trends report, "World at War," noted that worldwide displacement was at the "highest level ever

recorded."

The movements include men, women, boys and girls; young and old; singles and whole

families. Many among those on the move have specific needs that place them at heightened risk

(UNHCR 2016). These include unaccompanied or separated children (UASC), single women,

pregnant or lactating women, the elderly, people with disabilities, as well as the sick and injured.

There is a significant number of children among the population on the move (both

unaccompanied or separated and traveling with families) requiring particular attention; with

approximately 30 percent of the total movement from Turkey to Greece being children. In total,

250,000 children have needed specific protection and assistance in 2015 alone (UNHCR 2016).

The current migration flow to Europe appears to have caught the international community unprepared. Although efforts were made at the European level in the course of 2015 to manage borders through registration, screening, relocation and return, this has only been partially implemented and often at a very slow pace, according to the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response (RRMR) Plan for the Europe Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route January-December 2016. While significant achievements have been made by many of the countries involved in terms of humanitarian assistance, the overall response has remained unstructured (RRMR 2016).

Migration Pressure

Over the last two years, Europe has experienced a significant migration and refugee crisis as people have fled conflict and poverty in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, South Asia, and other countries and regions (UN 2017). According to the United Nations, more than 1 million refugees and migrants reached Europe by sea in 2015, and roughly 362,000 did so in 2016 (UN 2017). Greece and Italy have been major arrival and transit points. Many individuals subsequently attempted to travel onward to northern EU member countries, such as Germany and Sweden, where they believed they were more likely to receive asylum and better welfare benefits.

Archicks (2017) analyzing the current EU challenges and future prospects beginning from 2015, argued that various EU initiatives to manage the crisis proved largely unsuccessful. The EU came under criticism for lacking coherent and effective migration and asylum policies, which have long been difficult to forge because of national sovereignty concerns and sensitivities about minorities, integration, and identity. The flows also created deep divisions within the EU. Frontline states: Greece and Italy; and key destination countries farther north, expressed dismay

at the lack of European solidarity. Others charged that traditionally generous asylum policies in countries such as Germany and Sweden were serving as pull factors and exacerbating the flows (Archicks 2017). Some EU governments reportedly viewed with dismay, Germany's announcement in August 2015 that it would no longer apply the EU's "Dublin regulation," (which usually deems the first EU country an asylum-seeker enters as responsible for examining that individual's application). Germany's decision was considered a unilateral move potentially subverting agreed-upon EU asylum procedures, and failing to consider the implications for the wider EU.

Efforts to establish EU redistribution and resettlement programs, in which each EU member state would accept a certain number of asylum-seekers and refugees (in part to relieve the burdens on Greece and Italy), were extremely controversial. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were particularly vocal opponents. They feared that the newly arrived migrants and refugees, many of whom are Muslim, could alter the primarily Christian identities of their countries and of Europe (Archicks 2017). Although the EU approved a limited but mandatory plan to relocate some asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy in September 2015, this outcome was achieved using the EU's qualified majority voting system rather than consensus. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania voted against the plan, and Finland abstained. Adopting a proposal on such a sensitive issue directly related to a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity by the qualified majority is largely unprecedented in the EU. Many observers viewed the need to hold the vote as a further indication of the profound cleavages within the bloc (Archick 2017).

As the uptick in refugees and migrants arriving in Europe continued unabated in early 2016, the EU began to focus on discouraging people from undertaking the journey in an effort to

stem the flows. In March 2016, EU leaders agreed to end the "wave-through approach" that was allowing individuals from Greece to transit the Western Balkans to seek asylum in other EU countries, and announced a new deal with Turkey. The main provisions of the EU's accord with Turkey centered on Turkey taking back all new "irregular migrants" crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands in exchange for EU resettlement of one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian returned. The EU also pledged to speed up the disbursement of a previously allocated €3 billion in aid to Turkey and to provide an additional €3 billion in assistance for Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Since these measures took effect, the number of migrants and refugees reaching Europe has decreased substantially. Nevertheless, the EU's deal with Turkey remains controversial and potentially fragile. Most EU leaders maintain that the return measures agreed upon with Turkey are crucial to breaking the business model of migrant smuggling and saving lives. However, some Members of the European Parliament and many human rights advocates are concerned that the agreement violates international law and the rights of refugees. Those of this view also worry that other parts of the accord with Turkey—in which the EU pledged to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens—and to reenergize Turkish accession negotiations could be seen as rewarding a Turkish government that they view as increasingly authoritarian.

The failed July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the subsequent government crackdown has exacerbated tensions between the EU and Turkey. Although Turkey has made progress in meeting most of the EU's requirements for visa-free travel, some issues remain outstanding. In November 2016, the European Parliament approved a nonbinding (although symbolic) resolution calling for Turkey's EU accession negotiations to be suspended until the Turkish government ends its "disproportionate" response to the failed coup. Amid these developments, some

observers suggest that the EU's deal with Turkey on the refugee and migrant flows could be in danger (Nikolaj 2016, 2017).

Although the agreement with Turkey has helped to staunch the migrant flows to Greece, Italy has experienced an uptick in migrant and refugee arrivals since mid-2016. Most of these individuals come from Africa, with Libya being their main point of departure. In early February 2017, the EU announced a plan to help the UN-backed Libyan government curb migration across the Central Mediterranean. Among other measures, the EU will seek to provide increased training and better equipment for the Libyan coast guard, improve conditions at Libyan reception centers, enhance EU cooperation with countries near Libya to slow the inflows, and work with local communities on migration routes and in coastal areas to improve their socioeconomic conditions. As a first step, the EU announced €200 million in funding through 2017 for such migration-related projects. Local Libyan authorities, however, have criticized the plan as likely to worsen the situation on the ground in Libya. Furthermore, refugee advocates worry that the plan does not sufficiently protect human rights, and some analysts suggest that Libya's continued instability casts doubt on the plan's prospects for success (BBC 2017).

The migration and refugee flows continue to have significant repercussions for European governments and the EU. Perhaps most notably, the migratory pressures have severely strained the Schengen system, which largely depends on confidence in the security of the bloc's external borders. This concept has been tested not only by the magnitude of the refugee and migrant flows but also by concerns that some terrorists may have been able to exploit the chaos to slip into Europe. In 2015, several Schengen countries (including Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) instituted temporary border controls in response to the migratory pressures. These

temporary controls remain in effect, and some experts worry they could become permanent, at least on a de facto basis.

EU officials assert that they remain committed to Schengen and are working to strengthen EU border controls, including by establishing a new European Border and Coast Guard to reinforce national capacities at the EU's external borders through joint operations and rapid border interventions. This new border guard corps became operational in October 2016 (Archick 2017). The European Commission also has been working with Greece to improve the country's border control management, and the EU continues to support "hotspot" facilities in both Greece and Italy to help register and process all refugees and migrants.
The influxes of refugees and migrants have renewed questions about European countries' ability to integrate minorities into European culture and society. Such anxieties have become more pronounced amid reports of criminal activity and sexual assaults allegedly committed by some migrants and asylum-seekers and by revelations that many of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe were carried out by extremists of Muslim background born and/or raised in Europe. At the same time, there are concerns about increasing societal tensions and xenophobia in Europe. Germany, Sweden, and other EU countries have seen an increase in the number of violent incidents against migrants and refugees (Jim 2017).

Debate has also arisen over the economic impact of the migrant and refugee flows. Some leaders and analysts contend that the influxes could be economically beneficial and help to offset unfavorable demographic developments (such as ageing populations and shrinking workforces), thus strengthening EU fiscal sustainability in the longer term. Many experts point out, however, that much will depend on how well migrants and refugees are integrated into the labor market (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2016). Others worry that the newcomers could take jobs

away or reduce wages, especially in the short term. Some suggest that such fears have helped to further increase support in many EU countries for far-right, anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic political parties.

European Agenda on Migration

On the basis of a Commission Proposal (10-point action plan), on April 23, 2015, the member states undertook to take swift action to save lives and step up the EU's action in the field of migration (WHO 2017). A European Parliament resolution was adopted on April 29, 2015. On May 13, 2015, the Commission published the "European Agenda on Migration." The Agenda proposes immediate measures to cope with the crisis in the Mediterranean and measures to be taken over the next few years to manage all aspects of immigration more effectively. As regards the medium- and long-term, the Commission proposes guidelines in four policy areas: reducing incentives for irregular immigration; border management –saving lives and securing external borders; developing a stronger common asylum policy; and establishing a new policy on regular immigration, modernizing and revising the "Blue Card" system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies and optimizing the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin. The Agenda also launched the idea of setting up EU-wide relocation and resettlement schemes and proposed a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle smuggling networks and combat trafficking in persons.

On the basis of this agenda, on April 6, 2016, the Commission published its guidelines on regular immigration in a communication entitled: "Towards a reform of the common European asylum system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe." There are four main strands to the guidelines as regards regular migration policies: revising the Blue Card Directive, attracting

innovative entrepreneurs to the EU, developing a more coherent and effective model for regular immigration in the EU by assessing the existing framework, and strengthening cooperation with the key countries of origin (Fact Sheet 2017).

For many supporters of the European project, the EU has entered uncharted territory. Although most experts consider a complete dissolution of the EU to be likely, the future shape and character of the bloc are being increasingly questioned. In light of the serious internal and external challenges currently facing the EU, especially Brexit, advocates worry that for the first time in EU history, at least some aspects of integration may be stopped or reversed. Others contend that the multiple crises currently facing the EU could produce some beneficial reforms and ultimately transform the bloc into a more effective and cohesive entity.

Following the June 2016 United Kingdom (UK) Brexit vote, many EU leaders acknowledged that it cannot be "business as usual," especially given the extent of public dissatisfaction, both with the EU itself and with Europe's generally pro-EU political establishment. Days after the UK referendum, the leaders of the 27 other member states announced they were launching a "political reflection" to consider further EU reforms and how best to tackle the key security and economic challenges facing the EU (European Council 2016). Germany, France, and Italy are spearheading this effort and likely will be influential in determining the EU's future direction.

In September 2016, the EU-27 leaders (meeting informally) held an initial discussion in Slovakia. The resulting *Bratislava Declaration* asserts that "although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us." EU leaders also pledged to find "common solutions" to current challenges and to improve communication between the EU and its citizens. The accompanying *Bratislava Roadmap* sets out "concrete measures" for addressing

some aspects of the migration crisis. These include countering terrorism, strengthening EU security and defense cooperation, and improving economic opportunities, especially for young people (European Council 2016). Despite the attempt to demonstrate unity in Bratislava, some EU leaders reportedly were disappointed that measures proposed were not bold enough, did not offer a strategic vision for the EU going forward, and were focused mostly on implementing tactical responses to the various crises or recommitting support to existing initiatives (Herszenhorn and Palmeri 2016).

In early February 2017, the EU-27 leaders held a follow-up discussion to their talks in Bratislava and sought to prepare for the European Council summit at the end of March 2017 in Rome. This was designed to coincide with and honor the 60th anniversary of the *Treaties of Rome.* The EU asserted that the March meeting in Rome would conclude the EU's "reflection process," and the EU-27 leaders were expected to issue a declaration setting out post-Brexit plans for the EU at that time.

Migration Crisis and Health Implications

Migration implies challenges and opportunities (Peiro and Benedict 2010). Health is one major challenge and an essential element for migrants' well-being and contribution to societies. Migrants' health and the implications for their integration, public health and health services in the EU are becoming more important as EU member states experience increases in their foreign-born populations. The health of migrants is seen by many experts and stakeholders as an essential theme in the current EU and member states' health agendas.

The issue of migration and health is high on the EU agenda. EU political commitment is reflected in policy instruments intended to ensure that migrants have access to healthcare and in the *European Commission's 2003– 2008 European Health Programme* and *2008–2013 Second*

Programme of Community Action in the Field of Health. The latter include projects on health inequities, migrant health status and infectious disease burden and models for the provision of health care for undocumented migrants. However, more can be done to improve understanding of the relationship between migration and public health, and to address the health and healthcare needs of migrants.

Migration involves several stages, each of which presents strategic opportunities for prevention and control of infectious diseases. There is a pre-entry phase, where a migrant's health reflects the disease profile of his or her country of origin. There is a transitional phase, where the process of moving, sometimes through intermediate countries, can influence a migrant's health (Ho 2003). Finally, there is a post-entry phase, where the process of adapting to working and living conditions in the host country can also influence a migrant's health.

There are European Union legal references in the field of health. The treaty establishing the European Community states that a high level of human health protection shall be ensured by the Community, with the proviso that Community action, by the subsidiary principle, can only complement national policies, for instance in relation to cross-border health threats, patient mobility and reducing health inequalities. The Council Conclusions on "Health in All Policies" under the Finnish EU Presidency stressed the fact that the impact of health determinants is unequally distributed among population groups, resulting in health inequalities (Council of the European Union (CEU) 2006). These Conclusions also recognized that immigration, integration and social policies could have a positive or negative impact on health determinants. Before the Finnish EU Presidency, the UK EU Presidency in 2005 also devoted attention to health inequalities, notably via a summit on "Tackling Health Inequalities: Governing for Health."

Despite concerns that migrants are responsible for the spread of infectious diseases, most migrants to the EU are healthy (Peiro and Benedict 2010). In population terms, however, migrants bear a disproportionate burden of infectious disease. For example, in the UK, approximately 70 percent of newly diagnosed cases of TB and HIV were in people born outside the UK (Health Protection Agency (HPA) 2006). The ECDC (2015) reported that in Europe, migrants bear the highest burden of infectious diseases, including TB, HIV, and malaria. The risk of outbreaks as a consequence of this burden is, nevertheless, extremely low. Displacement adds a litany of other health challenges, such as intentional and accidental injuries, psychological trauma, sexual abuse, poor nutrition, and exposure to infectious diseases (Uniken Venema and Weirdsma 1992; Selten and Sijben 1994; Karmi 1997).

Socioeconomic, cultural and legal factors, in particular, affect the physical and psychological health of migrant populations. Poor living and working conditions are also critical factors. Migrants often live in poor quality, overcrowded housing, which increases the risk of diseases such as TB. High rates of domestic accidents, including lead poisoning, have been recorded among migrant children living in poor quality housing (de Jong and Wesenbeek 1997). Reports suggest that most migrants and refugees are young and relatively healthy, but this should not eclipse the fact that many are coming from countries whose healthcare systems have broken down, and where protracted conflicts and poverty have long limited people's access to quality health care, including screening and vaccination (Frontières 2016).

Low-skilled migrants tend to do jobs in higher risk occupational sectors. For example, the incidence of occupational accidents and diseases in construction and agriculture is higher than in other sectors (Bollini and Siem 1995; Carballo and Siem 1996). Migrants may be unfamiliar with the safe use of equipment and often receive inadequate training, supervision and protection.

Psychological health may be affected by the process of leaving family and coping with job insecurity, legal problems, unfamiliar language and culture. Stress and anxiety can result in more serious psychological problems (Mirdal 1985; Selten and Sijben, 1994; Liebkind 1996). Limited access to healthcare for migrants is also a critical factor. Policies, laws and regulations governing service delivery, the characteristics of migrant communities, and wider social attitudes can all influence access to, and uptake of services. Legal status, with consequent lack of residence status and health insurance, are often barriers to healthcare. Lack of culturally sensitive information in relevant languages, suitably trained professionals and services tailored to the specific needs of migrants are also barriers. Within migrant communities, culture, religion, beliefs about health, disease prevention and healthcare as well as limited knowledge of available services can prevent uptake of services.

The stigma and discrimination associated with TB and with HIV may be exacerbated in the case of migrants who are already socially isolated, and fear further stigma, discrimination and marginalization. This may deter them from seeking screening, counseling and/or testing. Migrants also tend to be disproportionately represented in prisons in many countries of the EU. Conditions in prisons, such as overcrowding and poor ventilation, can increase the spread of infectious diseases like TB among inmates. Solutions and measures to deal with long-term displaced populations are lacking, with the focus falling on short-term "care and maintenance." Almost half of the refugees under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2014 had been displaced for five years or more. In many countries, the tide of public opinion is turning against migration as negative press coverage and, increasingly, the political discourse focus on security issues, social cohesion and pressure on basic public services, such as healthcare and education.

The 2016 UN high-level Summit for Refugees and Migrants in New York (UN 2016) provided an historic opportunity to engage world leaders in responding to the health dimensions of mass migration. Despite the magnitude of the phenomenon and its potential for changing global as well as national health patterns, the response to date has been, at best, variable (WHO 2015a, 2015b). At worst, it has been an example of benign national and international neglect. The health sector has been especially passive on this issue. At present, most of the health care being provided to refugees and migrants arriving in Europe is by volunteers and non-governmental organizations that do not necessarily have any special training or formal links with the healthcare system, leaving many migrants with variable healthcare quality, and making timely referral to secondary or tertiary institutions difficult (DeLargy 2016).

Public Health Aspect of Migrant and Refugee Health

Refugee and migrant health was probably the basis of the adoption of health 2020 agenda of the World Health Assembly resolution of 2012 (WHO 2012a) which is the improvement of health for all, and the reduction of health inequalities through policies focused on four priority areas (WHO 2018). According to the report, there is investment in health through a life-course approach and empowering people; tackling the region's major health challenges of communicable disease and NCDs; strengthening people-centered health systems, public health capacity and emergency preparedness, surveillance and response; and creating resilient communities and supportive environments. The question is: to what extent have these priorities been followed? The rest of this article will interrogate these priorities as linked to refugee and migrant health.

According to the WHO (2018) report, refugee and migrant health is a highly complex topic because findings cannot be generalized to wider refugee and migrant populations in a

country, region or globally. Hitherto, refuge and migrant health outcomes are a product of different interacting factors such as the migratory process, social determinants of health, the risks of exposure in the country origin, transit or destination environment, interacting with biological and social factors.

Social determinants of health require a general public health approach. As noted in the WHO (2008) article on the need for closing the gap in a generation through health equity and action on social determinants of health, "the condition in which people grow live work and aged have a powerful influence on health, and … avoidable inequality in these conditions could lead to severe inequality in health." Some such conditions are the displacement and migratory trajectories that place individual refugee and migrants at risk for certain diseases (WHO 2018, ECDC 2017). The report affirmed that in 2015 for example, more than one-third of all newly diagnosed HIV cases in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA) were of foreign origin; while in ten EU/EEC countries, more than half of all newly diagnosed HIV cases were also of foreign origin. This is of great importance to public health, and implies the need to attend to the health needs of refugees and migrants in the host countries. A study on mortality from infectious disease among African migrants in Portugal found higher mortality from Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in migrants, than in those born in Portugal (Williamson et al. 2009).

The epidemiology profile of migrants and refugees can impact the epidemiology profile of a country because the descendants of migrants might have genetically related illness and individualized diseases (Hemminki et al. 2015). Moreover, research also confirmed that refugee and migrant communities and their descendants frequently travel with other non-migrant travelers, which may expose them to different travel-related health risks (Piel et al. 2017; Public

Health England 2017). Neglecting refugee and migrant health, therefore, is a potential risk to the host countries.

Healthcare Delivery, Gaps in Coverage, and Discrepancy

There is a high degree of variability in the right to healthcare for irregular migrants in the European region. While healthcare should be available at all levels regardless of the administrative status of the persons seeking treatment, there are frequently legal restrictions barring irregular migrants from enjoying full and effective access to this service (WHO 2018). Generally, there is a lack of healthcare policies at the national level that address the irregular migrant issue (Suess et al. 2014; WHO 2015b). The policies for health services for irregular migrants vary greatly in the region from no access to full access (WHO 2015b). The literature on migrants' health service utilization in Europe shows the underutilization of screening services by migrants and inconsistent primary care (Graetz et al. 2017). Furthermore, information on the immunization status of refugees and migrants is often lacking because they may not be specifically targeted in surveillance programs (Mipatini et al. 2017). Although TB is a vaccine-preventable disease, it is prevalent among refugees and migrants (Dhavan et al. 2017). This is because, according to Dhavan et al. (2017), TB is a disease of poverty, aggravated by social deprivation and substandard living conditions, a condition that is almost ubiquitous among refugees and irregular migrants. There is evidence of higher levels of prevalence of multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) among refugees and migrants in Europe, than in host populations because of failures within the health system. Such failures include poor capacity for detection, late initiation of treatment and incomplete treatment courses (Hargreaves, et al. 2018).

Discrepancy in migrant and refugee health outcomes also occur because a person's migrant status is used to restrict entitlement to national healthcare services. For example,

irregular migrants do not have access to prenatal and postpartum health services, and are often

limited to emergency care services (WHO 2015; IOM 2016; WHO 2018). According to Suk and

Semenza (2011), restricted access to healthcare for refugees and migrants has the potential threat

of causing the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases.

According to the European Commission's (2018) report, only four member states

(Austria, Croatia, Germany and Portugal) in the EU at the end of 2017 had defined indicators to

measure the integration of refugees and migrants in the field of health. These were the only states

that also created healthcare frameworks for refugees and migrants. While some member states

may have national health strategies, these strategies often do not make any reference to refugee

and migrant health or accessibility to healthcare for the refugee and migrant population

(European Commissions 2018).

African Refugee and Migrant Disease Burden in Europe

Some diseases are uncommon in the majority of countries of the European region, and

those assessing and providing care for refugees and migrants should be familiar with the

epidemiology and distribution of such diseases (see Table 1). Tropical and parasitic infections

(e.g., schistosomiasis, strongyloidiasis, and Chagas disease) can also be associated with long

periods of latency or chronicity, which can have serious effects on individual health if left

untreated (Monge-Maillo et al. 2015; Olorunlana et al. 2016).

Another tropical disease that is of public health importance is malaria. The risk for re-

emergence of malaria in Europe is attributed to people in transit from sub-Saharan Africa

(Khyatti et al. 2014). A higher prevalence of hepatitis B and C infections (HBV and HCV) were

seen among refugees of North Africa compared with the host population in some countries of the

European region (Khyatti et al. 2014). In another report, evidence from Sweden suggests that

migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are 2.5 times more likely than the host population to develop type 2 diabetes (Bennet et al. 2014).

In the case of stroke, however, records indicate that consistently higher mortality and incidence rates have been observed for migrants of West African origin. In England in 1999–2003, stroke mortality was almost 200 percent higher among male migrants from West Africa (Harding et al. 2009). In a more recent study, the migrant population in Italy was seen to have a higher risk of stroke and hypertension than the host population (Clementi et al. 2016; Fedeli et al. 2016). In addition, rates of cerebrovascular disease, hypertension and heart failure were higher in migrants from Africa than in the general Italian population (Fedeli et al. 2018).

In France, maternal mortality is 2.5 times higher among refugee and migrant women than women born in France, and this rate increases to 3.5 times higher specifically for women from sub-Saharan Africa (Deneux-tharaux and Saucedo 2017; Pedersen et al. 2013). African refugee and migrant mothers in Sweden were found to have 18 times higher risk of neonatal death with potentially avoidable perinatal deaths (Essén et al. 2002; Esscher et al. 2013). The most common factors identified as resulting in potentially avoidable perinatal death were a delay in seeking healthcare, refusal of medical interventions, insufficient surveillance of intrauterine growth restriction, inadequate medication, misinterpretation of cardiograph and interpersonal miscommunication (Essén et al. 2002; Pedersen, et al 2013).

A large cohort study in Sweden indicated an increased risk for psychotic disorders for those who migrated during infancy and a variation in risk by region of origin, with migrants from Africa having an elevated risk for schizophrenia (Dykxhoorn et al. 2017).

Despite the recorded disease burden, the WHO (2018) report suggests that following specific strategies might alleviate the burden of these diseases by improved monitoring, a better

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understanding of risk factors, strengthened prevention and testing programs for refugees and migrants, removal of barriers to the provision of healthcare services, and updating services that contribute to strengthened evidence-based care; are all necessary for public health interventions. We assume that the consideration of health issues faced by refugees and migrants provide an opportunity to detect gaps in routine service delivery and finance arrangements. To strengthen universal health coverage however, European countries would need to enact policies that will promote the basic health and well-being of refugees and migrants as the EU follows the WHO strategies and action plans.

Conclusion

The number of displaced people globally influenced the new trend of increased numbers of refugees and migrants, and consequent constructions of crises in the EU in 2015. Although the numbers were technically reduced in 2016 by EU policy, a new trend of migration is in the continuum in 2017. In the modern era, historically, WWII recorded the beginning of significant migrant movement through European borders. Migration into and within Europe has implications for public health, as some specific diseases are associated with the migrant population. Millions of migrants are in irregular status, because a significant number of them fled from conflict and poverty in their countries of origin. The EU is currently facing these challenges amidst the escalation of nativist xenophobic rhetoric. Efforts to establish EU redistribution and resettlement programs, in which each EU member state would accept a certain number of asylum-seekers and refugees are extremely controversial, due to the growing influence of right-wing parties and attendant xenophobia. Nonetheless, the migration and refugee flows will continue to have significant repercussions for European governments and the EU, as well as on the health of the migrants.

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Table 1: Diseases and health condition of Africa refugees and migrants in Europe

S/N	Disease and/or health condition
1	Cerebrovascular disease (hypertension and heart failure)
2	Chagas disease
3	Hepatitis B and C (HBV and HCV)
4	Malaria
5	Risk for Psychotic disorders
6	Risk for Schizophrenia
7	Risk of Neonate death
8	Schistosomiasis
9	Stroke
10	Stroke and Hypertension
11	Strongyloidiasis
12	Type 2 diabetes

Compiled by author, 2019.

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Exploring Short- and Long-Term Survival Mechanisms and Perception of Job Market by

Zimbabwean Migrant Women in South Africa

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Abstract

This article assesses the perception of the job market, initial, and long-term coping and adaptation mechanisms employed by Zimbabwe migrant women in South Africa using survey data and Kendall's coefficient of concordance. It concludes that women migrants perceived the job market as favorable. The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and initial as well as long-term survival mechanisms of migrant women played significant roles in the coping and adaptation mechanisms. The study recommends that the government clarify policies on foreigners' business ownership to avert conflicts.

Keywords: perception of the job market, coping and adopting mechanisms, Kendall's coefficient of concordance, Zimbabwean migrant women, South Africa, migration

Introduction

The development and diversity of current international migration flow reveals that migration can no longer be detached from conventional population and development policy agendas (Hugo 2005). Globally, migrants are now part and parcel of modern day social, political, and economic life. Together with globalization, migration influences the speed and pace of modern-day developmental issues. The movements of people across continental, regional, and

national boundaries are routine daily events and in Sub-Saharan Africa especially, these movements test the artificiality of boundaries.

Traditionally, migration within and from Sub-Saharan Africa has been dominated by men, but it has become feminized since more and more women are also migrating—in contrast to women previously staying at home while men moved around in search of livelihoods to support their families. Since its first truly democratic election in 1994, South Africa has received an incursion of migrant women from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries whose populations had been migrating since the advent of the mining era in the nineteenth century South Africa. The SADC migrants, particularly the Zimbabweans migrants, dominate South Africa.

Existing international and African migration studies—such as those by Hatton (2004), De Hass (2007), Khatiwada and Samaniego (2014), and Lafleur and Stanek (2017)—focus on South-North flows. The few studies on South-South migration—such as those by Andreopoulos et al. (2011), Facchini et al. (2013), and Melde et al. (2014)—concentrate on the effect of South-South migration on the economic development and security nexus, and tend to focus on South-South movements of migrants and South-South migration and remittances. None of them assess South-South migration in relation the perception of the job market, initial and long-term coping and adopting mechanisms employed by African migrant women, let alone Zimbabwean migrant women in South Africa. Our research attempts to fill this gap in knowledge and literature.

South-South Gendered Migration Pattern

Movements of people as international migrants has always been more notable from the Global South (Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Middle East) to the Global North (North America, Western Europe and developed countries of East Asia) because the Global

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South has poorer nations. Movement also happens within regions. South-South migration between developing countries has also gained momentum (Ratha and Shaw 2007; Castles 2008; Ncube 2017). Stimuli for South-South migration include seasonal patterns, flight from natural and man-induced disasters or armed, and socio-economic factors (Ratha and Shaw 2007). Almost 80 percent of South-South migration is estimated to take place between countries with contiguous borders, and most appear to occur between countries with relatively small differences in income (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

It is estimated that there are 73.9 million South-South migrants that represent 47 percent of the 155.8 million international migrants in 2005 (Ratha and Shaw 2007, Campillo-Carrete 2013). At the same time, there are approximately 73 million South-South migrants in 2010, corresponding to 34 percent of the 2010 figure of 214 million total (known) international migrants (UNDESA 2012; Campillo-Carrete 2013). There are no global estimates for the share of women in South-South international migrants in comparison with South-North movements. However, many sources agree that the share of women among international migrants was 49 percent in 2000 (WB, 2006), and 49.2 percent in 2005 (UNDESA 2009; UNDP 2009). Compared with South-North migration, South-South international migration involves the movement of poorer people with fewer skills and/or less education (Hujo and Piper 2007). South Africa hosts a significant number of South-South international migrants.

The gender relations of the migrants' countries of origin create challenges for women, which affects the ease of coping and adapting to conditions in the host country. According to a 2006 UN survey, unjust legislation made it difficult for women to migrate. The laws denied women the right to be accompanied by their spouses and children. In addition, they were subjected to pregnancy tests before being permitted to move and could not consent to anything

without the approval of their guardians, who in some cases, were their husbands (UNDESA 2006). Patriarchal arrangements hinder women's migration, as well as their coping and adaptation to migration destinations, because men may not be willing to join their wives as dependents in host countries.

According to Jolly, Reeves, and Piper (2005), migration opens up a window of opportunity for women to improve the quality of their lives and break the barriers imposed by gender norms that cause their marginalization. Migration can also empower women economically, increasing their independence and improving their self-esteem (Raimundo 2009). Certain forms of forced migration—for example, those resulting from conflict—can change existing gender roles and duties in ways that are advantageous to women (Wells et al. 2013). Conversely, migration can also embed and entrench traditional gender roles and disparities, which expose women to new vulnerabilities due to precarious legal status, exclusion, and segregation (Adepoju 2006).

Social Network Theory Application and Labor Markets

Social networks refer to social relations among a set of actors, such as a set of personal contacts through which an individual receives support and information (Walker et al. 1977; Jackline and Zenou 2005). Social networks are important informal channels through which information about job opportunities is transmitted to individuals (Giulietti et al. 2010). Datcher Loury (2006) reports that between 30 percent and 60 percent of jobs in the USA are found through social networks. It is well known that such networks are particularly important to immigrants because they often lack country-specific skills, such as language or knowledge of institutions, and as new arrivals, they are newcomers to the local labor market (Giulietti et al. 2011). It is also well known that network membership positively influences the migration

decision, and that typically, migrants prefer to settle in localities in the host country in which

members of their network already reside (Giulietti et al. 2011). If the evolution of key labor

market variables is uncertain, then the probability of migration also rises with better access to job

information (Giulietti et al. 2011).

The mitigation of informational asymmetries implies that network characteristics, such as

its size and quality, influence labor market outcomes of individuals who use social networks to

look for employment, as theorized by Jackson (2001), Calvò-Armengol (2004), and Jackson

(2007). Networks, as represented by relatives, friends and acquaintances, are particularly

important for migrants, who typically lack information about the host local labor market and the

characteristics of the jobs offered (Giulietti et al. 2010). As Ryan argues (2011), analyzing the

"social" aspects of networks requires consideration not only of the relative social location of

others and the flow of resources, but also the meaning and impact of these personal relations

(Ryan and D'Angelo 2018). Migrants' networks shape and are shaped by cultural identities.

They affect, and are affected by broader social and economic dynamics in the countries of origin,

destination, and transit (Curran and Saguy 2001; McKeown 2001; Conway and Potter 2007;

Koser Akcapar 2010).

There are several conceptual models that explain how social networks operate. The first

is the social capital model, which assumes that actors migrate to maximize returns on their

investments in human capital and, in doing so, draw upon the social capital embedded in their

interpersonal networks (Spittel 1998). With the use of social capital, the costs and risks

associated with the act of migrating are reduced (i.e., access to safe transportation, housing,

employment, and social interaction) and thus the probability of migrating is increased (Spittel

1998). Additionally, the social capital theory assumes that access to social connections, in the

form of migrant networks, reduces the cost of movement—either monetarily, psychologically, or socially, and favors the act of migration to places where there exist some social ties (Massey and Palloni 1992).

According to Castles et al. (2014), migrant networks tend to decrease the economic, social, and psychological costs of migration. Migrant networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey et al. 1993; De Haas 2010). Migrant network theory tries to explain the migration flows that cannot be explained by other theories, and tries to show why migration continues even when there are higher wages elsewhere, or there are no migration pull factors, or migrant-friendly policies, in the receiving country. Network theory tries to explain why migrants' settlement patterns are not always evenly distributed over countries. It focuses on diaspora or different networks and is based on the assumption that the diaspora or migrant network influences the decision of migrants when they are choosing their destination (Castles et al. 2014, p. 43).

The risk diversification model posits that households are the decision-making units. This model draws its inspiration from what has been called the "new economics of migration," which argues that determinants and the decision-making process of international migration must be studied at the household level, not the individual level (Stark and Levhari 1982, Stark 1984a, Stark and Bloom 1985, Katz and Stark 1986). Some argue that social networks are even more important for migrants without proper documentation to help them obtain information for safe passage (e.g., identification, jobs, housing, etc.) (Spittel 1998).

Sampling Procedure

This study sampled 187 Zimbabwean migrant women who were surveyed over three months (February-April 2016). The sample was drawn from the migrant women in the six metropolitan cities. A multiple stage sampling technique was employed in this study. Firstly, four of the nine provinces of South Africa were selected, namely: Free State, Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Western Cape provinces. Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Western Cape provinces were selected as economic hubs of the country. On the other hand, the Free State province was selected because of its proximity and the availability of respondents to the researcher. The second stage was the ballot selection of the metropolitan cities, resulting in six metropolitan cities including: Bloemfontein from the Free State, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni from Gauteng, Durban from Kwa Zulu Natal, and Cape Town from the Western Cape Province. A questionnaire was used to collect data on demographics, socioeconomic characteristics, and socioeconomic coping and adaptation mechanisms.

Validity of the Questionnaire

In order to validate the questionnaire, we first pre-tested the survey instrument in a pilot study with fifteen respondents. In addition, for this study, validity on the trustworthiness of the research was supported by triangulation through utilizing the questionnaire, the informal interviews, and observations while in the field. Prior knowledge of the areas and understanding of the nuances of the migrant women made it easy to approach the participants. Furthermore, the personal experiences of the researchers were relied upon to ensure validity. Being a migrant woman, the researcher had knowledge and information on the dynamics and issues affecting the migrants in South Africa.

A Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF)

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) of the Department for International Development (DFID) (1999) was used to identify various coping mechanisms (Figure 1). The SLF portrays how the vulnerability context influences people's ability to survive and earn a living, which may result in them migrating. Livelihood capitals such as the human, natural, social, financial and physical capitals can also influence the vulnerability context. People may lack certain capitals and—together with how they are exposed to hazards—be more or less able to survive in their current situation, or they may be forced to migrate. Similarly, the policies and processes in the form of government and other structures in place, laws, regulations, and the culture of the specific community influence the survival and overall well-being of the people. These policies and institutional processes affect the coping and adaptation strategies devised, and they have an influence on the ultimate livelihood outcomes of a community (Hugo 2005). The SLF relies on the strategies for poverty reduction, survival, and prosperity that are dependent on the ability of individuals or a community to capitalize on the opportunities and resources at their disposal. These livelihood activities may be in the form of socioeconomic goods and services (Adato et al. 2002). Scoones (1998) and Majale (2002) stated that the SLF is versatile, as it can be applied at the individual, household, community, and region or even the country level.

The socioeconomic coping and adaptation mechanisms used by migrant women were categorized into four themes: family support, entrepreneurial support, employment, and humanitarian support. Kendall's coefficient of concordance was utilized to determine the most prominent perception of the job market, as well as the initial and long-term coping and adopting mechanisms employed by African migrant women in South Africa. An evaluation of the job market in South Africa was done using Kendall's coefficient of concordance.

Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihood Framework

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
Source: DFID (1999) with Authors' inclusion of Political and cultural capital

Empirical Specification

Kendall's evaluation uses the means from the individual responses to rank the various indicators considered under the South African job market. The total rank score calculated was used to compute Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W), which estimates the degree of respondents in the ranking. The equation for the Kendall's coefficient of concordance, according to Anang et al. (2013), is given as:

$$\frac{12[\sum T^2 - (\sum T)^2/n]}{nm^2(n^2-1)} \tag{1}$$

Where, = Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, T = Sum of ranks for the job

Where, = Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, T = Sum of ranks for the job market, m = Total

number of respondents, and n = Total number of the job market in South Africa being ranked.

The coefficient of concordance (W) will be tested for significance in terms of the F-distribution.

The F-distribution is given by Anang et al. (2013):

F = [(m-1)W / (1-W)] (2)

The numerator degrees of freedom is given as:

(n – 1) – (2 / m) (3)

In the same way, the denominator degrees of freedom is given as:

m-1 [(n-1)-2 / m] (4)

Perception of the Job Market by Zimbabwean Migrant Women

Table 1 indicates the job market perception of Zimbabwean migrant women in South

Africa. The Zimbabwean migrant women ranked job availability the highest, followed by skills

transfer in the workplace, ethnic preferences, policies on getting jobs, as well as the chances and

availability of getting a job. According to the respondents, jobs were readily available in South

Africa. However, necessary skills, qualifications, and the correct or legal documentation required

for foreigners to be employed in South Africa pose challenges. Some migrant women indicated

that they possessed the requisite qualifications and skills but were struggling to get employment

in South Africa due to, among other reasons, being on their spouses' permits. Such a permit does

not allow a woman to work in South Africa. Moreover, migrant women indicated that jobs were

available in South Africa, unlike in Zimbabwe, where unemployment levels are as high as 95

percent (World Fact Book 2016). Some of them were even creating employment in South Africa

because the atmosphere was conducive to job creation. When asked about discrimination in the job market, migrant women indicated that they faced a discriminatory job market, mainly because they were foreigners, and had stopped looking for jobs.

Table 1: Kendall's evaluation of the job market in South Africa

	Mean Rank	**Order of Ranking**
Job availability	3.98	1st
Skills transfer in work places	3.95	2nd
Ethnic preferences in work places	3.73	3rd
Policies on getting job	3.47	4th
Chances of getting job	3.19	5th
Getting you a specific job	2.69	6th

Source: Survey results (2016)

The chances of getting jobs in South Africa are high only if one meets all legal requirements. Some of the respondents in South Africa did not have the proper residence permits— and were unable to apply for jobs that matched with their qualifications. The policies on the employment of foreigners in South Africa required preference in hiring for jobs to be given to South African citizens, and only jobs requiring skills for which South Africans could not be found, to be given to foreigners. The respondents noted that such laws and policies were too strict, preventing them from securing employment. A number of Zimbabwean women who were selling vegetables and other wares in the shopping centers and other places within the metropolitan cities indicated that they were making more money than what the jobs they could find would pay them.

Using a scale of 1 to 10 to provide insight on the policies on securing jobs in South Africa, the migrant women had varying views: 43 (23 percent) respondents evaluated the job policies in South Africa as lowest thereby giving it a score of 1; 29 (15.51 percent) respondents also evaluated the South African job policies as very low, giving it a score of 2; and 12 migrant (6.42 percent) women indicated a score of 3 for job policies in South Africa. Lastly, 84 (44.9 percent) of migrant women evaluated the job policies 1-3, highlighting their negative opinion about the policies in South Africa on job acquisition by migrants.

On evaluating the likelihood of migrant women getting jobs, 89 (47.6 percent) of the respondents scored the lowest—between 1and 3 out of 10. Only 17.1 percent scored the chances of getting jobs in South Africa 8-10 out of 10. It is clear that the migrant women viewed their chances of getting jobs in South Africa as very unlikely. Hence, many of them became entrepreneurs and worked for fellow compatriots. Furthermore, they faced underemployment due to challenges in getting jobs commensurate with their training, skills, and experience. This was true of those who indicated that they were trained nurses, accountants, biologists, business management professionals, and those who gave prior indication that they were not doing the jobs that they were trained to do. A total of 122 (65.24 percent) respondents indicated that they considered chances of getting jobs commensurate with their skills, training, and experience very low, that is: between 1 and 3 out of 10.

Initial and Long-Term Coping and Adaptation Mechanisms of Migrant Women in South Africa

Socioeconomic, multi-attribute variables formed the basis of respondents' coping and adaptation mechanisms. The four multi-attribute themes are: family support, entrepreneurial support, employment, and humanitarian support. The family support involves factors such as

migrant women being looked after by one's husband, sisters, brothers, cousins, and/or parents on arrival in South Africa (Hungwe 2015). These networks were part of the social capital identified as coping and adaptation mechanisms utilized by migrants in host societies.

Employment is defined as the formal jobs and occupations secured by migrant women in government, private sector, as well as from other African migrants and fellow compatriots (Kalitanyi and Visser 2010). They managed to cope and adapt in South Africa through getting jobs and earning wages or salaries.

Entrepreneurial support means that the migrant women engage in some form of work in order to survive more immediately, whilst looking for means to guarantee long term livelihood (Kalitanyi and Visser 2010). The migrant women engaged in trade basketry and sales of artifacts brought from their country of origin, flier distribution on street corners, and by sandwich board advertising on behalf of local companies. In addition, they ordered goods that they re-sold in Zimbabwe, and upon return to South Africa, sold doilies, plaited hair by the street corners, worked as a maid, and in the farms as general laborers.

Humanitarian support is support received from friends, fellow compatriots, neighbors, strangers, locals, and NGOs or faith-based organizations in order to survive in South Africa. Those various migration survival mechanisms played a role in short-term survival—before migrant women were able to access long-term livelihoods. Humanitarian support meant that the migrant women had to rely on others outside their family for survival (Tati 2008). Those were local and international NGOs, fellow citizens, friends, and strangers. Those migrant women who had their requisite permits ready started looking for long-term means of survival and others had to go to Home Affairs to register as refugees and asylum seekers; some were in the country illegally until the South African government introduced the Special Dispensation Program (SDP)

in 2009. The government of South Africa in 2009 introduced the Zimbabwe Dispensation Permit to regularize Zimbabweans residing in South Africa illegally, to curb the deportation of Zimbabweans who were in SA illegally, to reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee regime, and to provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who obtained SA documents fraudulently. The permit was also a positive move for the migrant women as they were also benefiting from the regulation.

Short-Term Option of Initial Coping and Adaptation Mechanisms

The survey respondents were asked to evaluate their short-term coping and adaptation mechanisms on arrival in South Africa according to their priorities. They had options among employment, entrepreneurial support, family support, and humanitarian support as first choices of the initial coping and adaptation mechanisms they employed in South Africa. 103 (55.08 percent) respondents indicated that they used family support as the first option of an initial coping mechanism. Forty-three (22.99 percent) used employment as the first option of an initial coping mechanism. Those who indicated that they relied on entrepreneurial and humanitarian support as the first option were 21 (11.23 percent) and 20 (10.70 percent) respectively. A total of 31 (16.58 percent) respondents indicated that they relied on employment as a second option of initial coping and adaptation mechanism when they arrived in South Africa. Only 12 (6.42 percent) utilized entrepreneurial support. Eighteen (9.63 percent) used family support as the second option to cope and adapt on arrival in South Africa. A total of 34 (18.18 percent) respondents indicated that they utilized humanitarian support in the short-term when they arrived in South Africa. Ninety-two (42.20 percent) respondents had no second choices of coping on arrival, relying on the first option.

The third option of initial coping and adaptation was available to a few of them. The majority or 146 out of 187 (78.10 percent) respondents indicated that they relied only on two options. Four (2.14 percent) respondents indicated that they utilized employment as a third option of coping and adaptation in South Africa. Ten (5.35 percent) respondents utilized family support as a coping and adaptation mechanisms on arrival in South Africa. Only one (0.53 percent) respondent used entrepreneurial support as a third choice to cope and adapt on arrival in South Africa. Twenty- six (13.90 percent) respondents indicated that they were relying on humanitarian support as a third option of coping and adaptation on arrival in South Africa. Only 19 (10.16 percent) had fourth options of initial coping and adaptation mechanisms they used in South Africa. Eight (4.28 percent) were entrepreneurs. Finally, 14 (7.49 percent) relied on humanitarian support. Family support and humanitarian support dominated the initial coping and adaptation mechanisms soon after the migrants arrived in South Africa.

Long-Term Coping and Adaptation Mechanisms

Coping and adapting as a short-term strategy differed from long-term aims as the migrant women changed some of their resident statuses or established themselves in the country (Bhugra and Becker 2005). Long-term mechanisms were also categorized as employment, family support, entrepreneurial and humanitarian support. Among these were various jobs in which they were engaged, formal and informal businesses, assistance from family members like husbands, brothers, sisters, and children, as well as humanitarian help from relatives, fellow compatriots, locals and from various organizations.

A majority (53.50 percent) of the respondents indicated that they were employed in various places, especially the private sector and foreign-owned enterprises in South Africa. This was a significant increase from the initial employment rate of 23.0 percent on arrival. Those who

indicated that they used family support as the first option of long-term coping and adaptation in South Africa were 26 (13.90 percent). Only 2 (1.07 percent) respondents utilized humanitarian support as the first option of long-term coping and adaptation. Fifty-six (29.95 percent) respondents used entrepreneurial support as the first option of coping and adapting in the long term in South Africa. More and more of the migrant women got employment in South Africa in the long term. Adepoju (2006) emphasized that many African migrants came to South Africa for employment. South Africa was perceived as a rich country that is full of opportunities.

Considering the respondents' employment statistics of 53.5 percent, their perceptions were made into a reality as they migrated and got the jobs, which meant that their economic lives were better than in their home countries. Entrepreneurial means of survival also dominated the long-term survival mechanisms after employment, which translated to the fact that migrant women devised means to adapt in the host country.

A few respondents utilized employment and entrepreneurial support as their second options for long-term coping and adaptation mechanisms since those two were already first options. Only 14 (7.49 percent) utilized employment as the second choice. Fourteen (7.49 percent) also used entrepreneurial support as the second option. Eight (7.49 percent) respondents used entrepreneurial support as the third option for coping and adaptation. One respondent (0.54 percent) used employment as the fourth long-term coping and adaptation mechanism. Three (1.60 percent) respondents used entrepreneurial support as fourth options for coping and adaptation mechanisms. From the results, it is clear that the main long-term coping and adaptation mechanisms employed by migrant women in South Africa were employment and entrepreneurial support. Family and humanitarian support were not used much in the long-term as it was in the short-term by migrant women. As stated by Bhugra and Becker (2005) the

presence of family and friends in host countries assist migrants cope and adapt on arrival. Erel (2002) and Hugo (2005) also confirmed that the family, friends, and relatives in host countries offer immediate relief for migrants when they arrive in the host countries. In the long-term, the migrants integrated into the host communities due to their education, residence statuses and language proficiencies that facilitate employment (Berry et al. 2006).

Evaluating Policy Implications

The policy implications from this study focus on two main factors: firstly, while working on preventing conflicts, it is imperative to have household-centered strategies and approaches (integrating gender into development and migration) in international migration to South Africa. Secondly, empowering women migrants by providing them with more opportunities, and allowing them to become development agents will enhance the growth and productivity of South Africa and their home country. Lastly, gender-sensitive migration policies not only contribute to empowering women migrants, but also strengthen regional development and integration.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Due to its history of apartheid, South Africa has challenges such as skills shortages, unemployment, shortage of basic services like housing, water, and sanitation, and uneven wealth distribution. The country is inundated with international migrants and African migrants. Zimbabweans in particular continue to enter the country on a daily basis. Migrants compete with the locals for the scarce resources that are insufficient for the locals alone, resulting in tensions that spiral into sporadic xenophobic attacks on foreigners.

Innovation (multi-tasking, entrepreneurial capabilities, and social cohesion) is critical for coping and adaptation in the global system that has limited employment opportunities. Strong entrepreneurial capabilities were observed in the Zimbabwean migrant women. Compatriotism

was also exercised by the migrant women as reflected in their businesses, work environments, and even residential locales. Zimbabwean migrant women showed that a favorable economic atmosphere can become a window of opportunity for prosperity through enterprise development. This study recommends that in order to avoid conflicts, government clarify policies on businesses ownership, especially small businesses owned by foreigners. Moreover, the government must become proactive and capitalize on innovative ideas brought into the country by migrants. This could be done through providing more opportunities through good and relevant education systems and proactivity in drawing lessons from other countries that have managed to create valuable human capital bases in a manner that embraces migration while simultaneously developing the human capital and expanding the opportunities available to citizens.

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Outmigration from the Horn of Africa

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Abstract

The proliferation of sovereign states in the Horn of Africa has produced intra- and inter-state conflicts that have largely been induced by ethnic tensions. The conflicts resulted in the loss of millions of human lives, significant material damage, and forced people to leave their countries of origin to seek their fortune elsewhere, using a network of systems established between country of origin and destination. Some have been driven into desperation and they sought the services of human smugglers and traffickers. Geographical proximity to migration hotspots also encourages migration. This study explores immigration in the Horn of Africa countries from geographical, socio-political, and economic perspectives. The findings show mixed migration from the Horn of Africa of refugees, asylum seekers, smuggled, and trafficked persons. The last two categories are the largest number of undocumented migrants in the sub-region. They are relatively young, being primarily aged fourteen to forty. They are predominantly male, and have low educational attainment. One motivation for migration is to seek opportunities elsewhere that would facilitate ability to make remittances.

Keywords: Outmigration, migration, youth, trafficking, smuggling, asylum, Horn of Africa

Introduction

The movement of individuals or groups of people from their usual place of residence to another has been taking place since antiquity. Anthropologists and historians confirmed that one

of the distinguishing characteristics of Homo sapiens is the tendency to move from place to place, which eventually resulted in their living in scattered settlements (Du Toit and Safa 1985). Ravenstein (1885) and others claim that the phenomenon of human migration is a continuum where potential migrants mostly move, not randomly and spontaneously; instead, they follow some norms and patterns inherited from previous migration experiences.

Human migration has attracted scholarly attention of since the delineation of artificial boundaries produced sovereign states. Modern states exercise power over boundaries to monitor the flow of people and commodities. Consequently, any type of inter- or intra-border crossing conducted by individuals or groups of people without legal documentation authorizing or permitting such movement increasingly became classified as irregular migration (Icduygu and Toktas 2003). Immigration has no homogeneous definition. In the Horn of Africa, there is considerable irregular migration. This paper gives an overview of youth migration from the Horn to various parts of the world, specifically Europe, Gulf States, and South Africa. Refugees, displaced, smuggled, and trafficked people are considered as irregular migrants as long as they lack valid documents both at exit and entry points.

In the Horn of Africa, there is increased incidence of people crossing boundaries without valid and legal documentation. Their movement may be caused by push factors at home such as poverty, conflict, unemployment, political and ethno-national conflicts. On the other hand, the pull factors—enhanced living standards, better jobs, family reunification, political stability and access to better healthcare services—may be given equal consideration in determining what causes people to cross boundaries. Demographically, these immigrants are mostly the youth, defined by the African Youth Charter as young people who are between 15 and 35 years old (AU Commission, 2006). Border and ethnic conflicts, direct and indirect ethnic wars cause the youth

to leave their countries of origin. In countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, there are smugglers and traffickers—for whom the facilitation of migrants' movement is a profitable venture. Labor exploitation and sex trafficking are also part of the political economy of migration.

The desperation of securing successful migration opportunities causes migrants to engage in smuggling, human trafficking, and other clandestine activities. Increasingly, many host countries have enacted rigid migration laws and harsh migration regimes, including direct physical attacks, deportation, and imprisonment. The origin countries may develop resentment against the measures taken on their citizens by host countries. In response, they may reciprocate these measures against citizens of countries that have used draconian measures against their citizens. The measures taken by origin and host countries can trigger conflicts that later escalate into open wars. Thus, irregular migration can cause or intensify conflicts among the countries in the Horn of Africa.

This paper attempts to address the issues of outmigration in the Horn of Africa countries with a focus on youth participation in conflict resolution and regional integration. The paper has the following objectives: to provide an overview of youth migration; to analyze the nexus of migration and conflicts in the Horn of Africa; to highlight the geography of migration in the Horn of Africa; to assess the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of migrants; and to identify the causes of irregular migration.

Overview of Outmigration in the Horn of Africa

Outmigration has no homogeneous definition. As pointed out by Ferruccio (2006), the phrase encompasses all types of population movements across international boundaries, with or without valid and legal documents issued from the authorities of source and destination

countries. Most academics and experts refer to the definitions provided by the International Organization for Migration, which claims that the most common forms of outmigration are illegal entry, overstaying and unauthorized work permits (IMO 2006). Outmigration from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia includes irregular migrants like refugees, asylum seekers, displaced people, smuggled and trafficked persons. It also includes migrants who travel for business, pleasure, and family reunification. However, the paper focuses exclusively on irregular migration.

Migrants sometimes change their status along the course of their movement to accommodate to the realities in the alien environment. Hence, a person can leave home as a refugee, but if border crossing becomes difficult, he or she seeks the assistance of smugglers to cross the border safely and later seek asylum to guarantee living peacefully at destination. If unlucky, migrants in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia can end up as trafficked persons at the mercy of criminals who exploit and coerce them, and violate their human rights.

Irregular migration from the Horn of Africa presents complex challenges to regional governments, and to humanitarian and international agencies (Danish Refugee Council (DRC) 2011). Since 2004, tens of thousands of undocumented migrants from the Horn of Africa have landed in western and southern Europe and the Middle East by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (International Migration Office (IMO) 2010). In 2008, more than 50,000 irregular migrants, notably from Somaliland, Punt Land, Djibouti etc., arrived in Yemen by crossing either the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea (DRC 2011). About 17,000 to 20,000 undocumented migrants flow to South Africa from the Eastern and Horn of African countries per year (Christopher 2009). One hundred thousand to 120,000 outmigrants cross the Mediterranean Sea each year, of whom 35,000 are from countries including Ethiopia, Sudan, Somaliland,

Eritrea, and Djibouti (Partial evaluation by International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) quoted in United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC 2010)). Between 65,000 and 120,000 people from the Horn of Africa enter the Maghreb countries overland every year; only between 20 and 38 per cent of them eventually proceed to Europe. De Haas (2007) further indicates that Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is probably the North African country with the largest number of sub-Saharan migrants, followed by Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Outmigration by way of smuggling has become a critical issue in southern Europe since the early 1990s. The number of interceptions of unauthorized migrants sharply increased along the Italian, Spanish, and to a lesser extent, Maltese coasts. The UNODC (2009) indicates that about 65,000 undocumented migrants landed in Italy, Malta, and Spain and the migrants were mainly from western, eastern, and Horn of African countries. Living as migrants in these countries is very difficult as migrants are denied access to education, health, and other social services. The recipient countries stubbornly reject the demand of migrants and usually deport them to their countries of origin, otherwise they are put in detention, sometimes for years.

Undocumented migrants who escape from either deportation or imprisonment may have little chance to live in recipient countries. They are always on high alert about being discovered and apprehended by police in the recipient countries. Consequently, many live and hide in the outskirts of urban centers, and when indigent, in order to survive, sometimes move into nearby towns to seek food and other basic necessities from residents. Many of the migrants who experience this come to regret having migrated and even opt to go back to their countries of origin when they encounter unexpected harsh, grueling, and hostile situations. In addition, migrants arrive in these countries when they are totally exhausted and deprived of all their possessions during their journeys. They lose hope of successful migration and choose to stay

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behind to accumulate resources and seek assistance from relatives and friends who could assist them for the next journey.

Migrants leave their countries of origin for many different reasons. However, there is significant information deficit and statistical inflation about the number of migrants crossing international boundaries. In addition, the journeys by the migrants to southern Europe, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, South Africa are very dangerous and there are no guarantees of success (Hamood 2009). In addition, in the Horn of Africa countries, the outmigrants encounter a lot of hardships and life-threatening situations when dependent on smugglers and traffickers to get them to their destination. As Melanie (2005, pg. 19) pointed out, human trafficking and smuggling are some of the fastest growing areas of international criminal activity in the Horn countries. While there are significant differences between human trafficking and smuggling, the underlying causal issues: extreme poverty, lack of economic opportunities, civil unrest, and political uncertainty all contribute to increased irregular migration. Criminal syndicates actively prospect for clientele among irregular migrants to encourage and facilitate illegal border-crossing s.

Human Smuggling and Trafficking

In some cases, it may be difficult to accurately ascertain whether a case is one of human smuggling or trafficking. The distinction between the two is very subtle, particularly when migrants strategically and rapidly change their statuses to benefit from conditions in migration fields. The key components that distinguish trafficking from smuggling include fraud, force, or coercion (Hughas and Denisova 2001). Smuggling is in most cases not coercive. Some outmigrants in the Horn of Africa facilitate outmigration by seeking a wide range of services ranging from physical transportation and illegal crossing of borders, to the procurement of false

documents (Friedrich 2007). Research suggests that it is not always clear whether a separated young person has been "trafficked" or "smuggled," or whether despite practitioners' distinction, the process of being trafficked might actually involve a conflation of the two. As outlined in Table 1, smuggling refers to moving a person across a border illegally, and is a violation of state sovereignty; trafficking on the other hand, involves the exploitation of a human being for financial gain or other benefits, and tends to involve a violation of that person's human rights. Force, coercion, deception, and being misled are key aspects of trafficking. While smuggling involves facilitating the transportation of an individual with their consent, trafficking involves a person being exploited by the trafficker as a commodity. However, these are not hard and fast distinctions. Any initial consent to being smuggled can be invalidated by coercive or deceptive means, transforming the situation into one of trafficking (Kleemam 2011).

Table 1. Differences between Human Smuggling and Trafficking

Trafficking	Smuggling
Must contain an element of force, fraud, coercion, or commercial sex act.	The person being smuggled is generally cooperating.
Forced labor and/or exploitation.	There is no actual or implied coercion.
Enslaved, subjected to limited movement or isolation, or documents confiscated.	Persons are free to leave, change jobs, etc.
Need not involve the actual movement of the victim.	Facilitates the illegal entry of persons from one country into another.
No requirement to cross an international border.	Smuggling always crosses an international border.

Person must be involved in labor/service or commercial sex acts (i.e., must be working).	Person must only be in country or attempting entry illegally.
Persons trafficked are victims.	Persons smuggled are violating the law. They are not victims.

Source: Global Migration Perspectives, 2007

The social cost is another dimension of the stressors of outmigration, since it might drain local resources, and leave the country of origin and the communities of co-nationals abroad even more impoverished than before. Most migrants depend on the savings of their family and loans from friends to fund their movement, making their migration a long-term collective investment (Liempt 2008). If migrants experience difficulties during the trip, they ask for more money from family and friends, which, when available, is transferred to pay for later stages of the journey. The financial outlay from the migrants' country of origin is often very high, and this sometimes has a negative impact on the economy of the migrant's family for years.

Spatial Perspectives of Outmigration

It is clear that some outmigrants in the Horn can use known spatial patterns of migrants movement in their region, as they usually use routine exit, transit, and entry points to reach their destinations. Outmigrants tend to use alternative routes interchangeably with the major routes to ensure success in evading border patrols. They use all modes of transportation. However, air transport is more difficult to penetrate for people who lack authentic documents. Lack of proper documentation makes migrants from the Horn of Africa more open to seeking the services of smugglers and traffickers who are readily available to facilitate movement, and even seem to dominate the terrain. In some instances, outmigrants move spontaneously without the assistance of smugglers and/or traffickers, when the causes of migration are sudden, and are linked with

natural hazards and wars. Such migrants tend to face weak to no resistance at checkpoints when they cross international borders. They comprise all demographic categories although most are women, the elderly, and children, who need immediate assistance. In the course of the movement, there are regional and sub-regional differences in international migration, as well the constraints that such differences place on the formulation of international migration policies in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. In these countries, international migrants differ greatly from one another in terms of time and circumstances of migration, as well as place of origin (DRC 2011).

Three migration routes that are frequently used by illegal migrants are identifiable in the Horn of Africa (DRC 2011). Although the major routes appear to be permanent, the smugglers and spontaneous migrants use various shortcuts to evade police patrolling borders in transit and destination areas (Fawcett, 1998). See Figure 1.

Figure 1. Main Migration Routes: From the East and Horn of Africa

Source: Migration Data Portal

Route One: Horn of Africa to Europe via Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea

As Figure 2 indicates, this route begins from the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya and heads north to Italy and Malta via Sudan, Libya, and/or Egypt (De Haas 2007). It is the longest and also most difficult to cross because outmigrants from the Horn of Africa, cross the Sahara Desert on foot before they proceed to southern and western Europe via the Mediterranean Sea (Zhang 2007). Nonetheless, there are three basic reasons why outmigrants

choose this route despite the many challenges encountered while crossing it. Firstly, there is no other alternative route on land to Europe and via Europe to other countries. Secondly, the geographic proximity of this route to both Europe and the Horn of Africa may also induce migrants to use it frequently (Hein 2007). Thirdly, the migration hubs are mostly located in Europe and in some countries of the Middle East as well. In other words, border control might not be very tight at check points or officials at checkpoints may be corrupt. Thus, assisted by a network of smugglers, those irregular migrants who can afford to pay or those coerced by traffickers for free labor or commercial sex, start the long and difficult journey from their home country. Once they reach the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea or the Maghreb countries of North Africa, another group of smugglers take over the process until the migrants finally reach European countries as asylum seekers (Coollyer 2006). Recently another route branched off from this route via the Egyptian border to Israel and other Middle East countries (De Haas 2007).

Not all migrants cross harsh deserts, seas, or oceans and safely and successfully reach their destinations. Many die and others disappear without their whereabouts being known. Quite a substantial number abandon their original intentions and decide to permanently reside in transit areas. This scenario questions the validity of the transit migration theory, which says migrants avoid settling at transit points despite many opportunities available at these locations. Many villages in Sudan and the Maghreb countries of North Africa have experienced significant population growth due to migrants beginning new lives there after abandoning their previous intention to use them only as transit points (De Haas 2007).

Route Two: Horn of Africa to Gulf States via the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

The geography of this route as indicated in Figure 2 on page 20 embraces the Horn, including Eritrea and some East African countries, and acted both as origin and transit points.

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The Gulf states are mostly considered migrants' final destinations. On this route, the centers of attraction to migrants are mostly Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and some of the Gulf States.

Outmigration in this route is comprised of refugees who move spontaneously in search of safe havens from natural and manmade hazards. The route includes trafficked people who are coercively trafficked for forced labor and sexual exploitation. War in Somalia and the involvement of neighboring countries has accelerated the flow of irregular migrants like refugees, smuggled and trafficked people from the region.

Route Three: Horn of Africa to South Africa via East African Countries

The third route to South Africa, as Figure 2 shows, starts from the Horn of Africa via East African countries. It involves various categories of irregular migrants, ranging from refugees to trafficked persons. The migrants follow a southbound route from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region into East Africa, notably Kenya or Tanzania, and onward through Southern Africa, including Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, to South Africa (Christopher 2009). Except for Somali refugees who travel on foot over short distances, the majority of migrants from the Horn are always at risk. Many have neither accepted refugee statuses nor have easy access to travel destination areas via transit points. At times, they even choose to stay at transit countries to sustain their livelihoods and save adequate money in order to continue movement until they reach their final destinations. Geographically speaking, the topography of this route is difficult for migrants as it is comprised of tall mountains, extensive valleys and depressions. Besides, the route has swamps and a large number of lakes.

Profile of Outmigrants

One of the general assumptions in population movement is that migration is very selective. In other words, migrants who cross international boundaries without legal and valid documentation do not represent all population categories.

Demographic Attributes

In 2006, the vast majority of migrants around the world were young people, including many underage persons (under 14 years old). Many developing countries have very young populations. In most African countries and many in Asia, about half of the population is under age fourteen (IMO 2006). Severe economic crises cause unemployment and underemployment that is first felt by the young, who are motivated by the international market situation to leave their home countries. In other words, the youth is the group most susceptible to irregular migration (Doomernik and Kyle 2004). Although there is no conclusive data on the age categories of the smuggled migrants and trafficked persons in the Horn of Africa, they are mostly recruited from the youth (Aronowitze 2001). The majority of the migrants making the dangerous voyage are in their mid-twenties, but there are also relatively few older migrants and some young children.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Most trafficked and smuggled people are usually the most disadvantageous, with poor job skills, with little chance of accessing decent jobs at home (Aronowitze, 2001). Further, these outmigrants are mostly women and children. The level of educational attainment of trafficked persons is low, with the majority not having completed high school education. Having low levels of education and also being vulnerable by age and gender, traffickers and criminal gangs easily trap them into forced labor and commercial sex. According to the IMO children and women are

especially vulnerable to danger and exploitation during the smuggling process and after arrival in southern Europe and the Gulf states. Trafficked persons from the Horn of Africa, usually are trafficked to Gulf States, southern Europe and northern Africa countries. In conformity with the IMO reports, Zang (2007) also claims that smugglers take advantage of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of women and children to force them into the clandestine undocumented labor force and commercial sex.

Smuggled people tend to be better educated, skilled, and experienced than trafficked persons. The age range of smuggled people in the Horn countries is typically 18-40, and most are male (Boni 2008). The majority have completed high school education. Those unable to pay enough money to smugglers travel short distances and are usually abandoned in transit countries like Sudan, Yemen, and Uganda. They stay in these countries until adequate money is saved by working there or sent from relatives and friends living in other countries. Asylum seekers and refugees also seek the services of smugglers to reach their preferred destinations. Thus, rarely do irregular migrants reach destinations purely as smuggled, asylum seekers, and trafficked persons.

They frequently change their migration statuses from trafficked persons, smuggled, and asylum seekers. The frequency of status changes of outmigrants in the Horn depends on a number of factors, including: the socioeconomic situation at origin, transit, and destination areas; the strictness of border patrol security officials in enforcing restrictive immigration laws; the demographic and socioeconomic profile of migrants; and the degree to which the migrants are involved in decision-making processes. Trafficked persons usually prevail if recipient regions need child labor and/or the environment is suitable to practice commercial sex. Smuggled migrants on the other hand are attracted to regions where they can develop their professional skills and earn more money than what was possible at home. Recipient regions or transit areas

tend to be more developed than migrants' countries of origin. Loose border security sometimes encourages outmigrants to cross national or international boundaries without the assistance of traffickers and smugglers. Depending on the situation, migrants can claim refugee status to ensure their safety and/or access the protection of humanitarian agencies. To proceed further and access better jobs and educational opportunities, they may become smuggled migrants when they face situations that are tight and hard to negotiate.

Decision of Outmigration

Those who can afford to pay usually seek the assistance of smugglers to reach their desired destinations or transit areas. When migrants have some decision-making power, they are very strategic, and they change their migration statuses frequently to benefit from existing conditions. They may not have much freedom of choice about destination areas and mode of transport. Most of the time migration decisions are made collectively by larger units of related people like families or households in order to maximize expected income and also minimize risks (Stark 1991). At times, some members of the migrants' family who have the upper hand become actively involved in influencing or determining migrants' migration choices. When migration is a measure to maximize family income as a human capital investment, the family of a migrant takes every opportunity to ensure that the entire process of migration is carefully plotted and executed. The problem arises if a potential migrant ignores family counsel. The expectation is that once such migrants settle abroad, they will make remittances that help their family recoup the investment made when they were assisted to facilitate migration. If a migrant does not meet such expectation, the family responds with harsh criticism.

Causes of Migration

Migration is associated human response of s to serious economic, social and political stimuli within their environment (Lewis 1982; Hein 2007). People opt to migrate due to a combination of push and pull forces in origin and destination areas. Intervening obstacles are equally important in stimulating a migrant to stay or leave his/her origin (Lee 1966). Migrants vary greatly by the legality of their movements (either regular or irregular), the nature of reaction to stimuli (either voluntarily or forced), and by spatial configuration (either internal or international migrants) (Skeldon 2000). Thus, it is essential to appraise outmigration as a separate event but within the broader context of the migration phenomenon.

Outmigration has increasingly become a major economic, social, political, and security concern for a number of countries in the Horn. It is one of the most complex, sensitive, and intractable issues affecting global and national governance of labor migration. The causes of irregular migration are varied and also very complex. It is almost impossible to distinguish the proximate from non-proximate causes that induce people to migrate illegally. Institutional theory provides a general outlook on the causes of outmigration. This theory puts more emphasis on the pull factors prevailing at destination areas than on the push factors at points of origin (Massey et al. 1993). The economic imbalance, particularly in labor supply and demand, between developed and developing regions of the world is assumed to be very influential in driving population movement. This disparity encourages those in urgent need of labor to recruit illegal laborers from labor excess regions through agencies working in clandestine markets. These situations create fertile ground to human traffickers and smugglers in the business of assisting or forcing migrants to cross international boundaries illegally. Albeit small in number, some asylum seekers and refugees also seek the services of the illegal syndicates.

The causes of irregular migration in the Horn reflect some of the situations enumerated above. The youth of the sub-region respond equally to the pull and push factors that persuade them to become irregular migrants. The assumption is that the outmigrants from the Horn would be primarily motivated by socioeconomic and political reasons. In reality, as clearly indicated in the reports of UNODC (2011) and other migration studies institutions, the people of the Horn also migrate because of non-economic and non-political reasons. A substantial number of migrants from the Horn are attracted by favorable environmental and living conditions like climate, housing, schools, and other community services available in host countries. At times, pull and intervening obstacles dominate economic and political factors as causes of migration. Quite a few migrants said that family reunification forced them to leave their countries of origin. Spouses and siblings of migrants are always ready to move despite less ideal situations at destination and transit areas. Moreover, pull and push factors may play no roles at all in determining outmigration (UNODC 2011). Some causal factors that cause irregular migration in the Horn include: remittances, networks, geographical proximity, and contiguity of outmigration fields.

Remittances Stimulate Migration

The sending of remittances by migrants is one of the strongest and most pervasive phenomena in the African migration system (Aderanti 1998). Remittance has been practiced in Africa by all forms of migration, perhaps with the exception of refugee movement. Specifically, in the Horn it is considered as one of the long-standing traditions established by migrants of such regions living in various parts of the world. In some countries of these regions, migrant remittances provide foreign exchange, ease balance of payments problems, encourage industrial

development by facilitating the import of capital goods and raw materials, and contribute to employment (Elizabeth 2004).

Remittances sent also directly assist individuals' families, relatives, and/or friends of migrants living at home. The assistance is mostly provided in cash, and rarely in-kind, which include foodstuff, vehicles, electronic products, appliances, etc. The remittance also enables the families to own houses and also to run individual and joint venture businesses. In some families of the Horn, remittances have negative impacts as recipients slowly withdrew from work and remain idle, looking only for assistance from relatives living outside the country.

Remittances, in either cash or in-kind, should be properly handled and utilized, otherwise, they negatively influence the national economy (UNODC 2009). The worst impact of remittances is that more people seek to migrate abroad at whatever cost in order to secure what they believe would be easily accessible resources that would be remitted home to their kinfolk. Families who have no relatives in foreign countries feel unhappy and may become jealous when they see their neighbors receive remittances, some of which is utilized to build houses and purchase highly valued commodities. Thus, non-migrant populations develop a sense of competitiveness and vengefulness toward those who make remittances to their kinfolk. Non-migrants sometimes believe it is possible to actualize their dream of easily accumulating wealth byby leaving their country illegally to seek their fortune elsewhere. Maltoni (2006)

The Horn countries formally or informally receive large sums of money from remittances, yet this promotes competitiveness among the non-migrant population and eventually stimulates more irregular cross-border movements from the regions (IMO 2010). At times, when outmigrants travel back home to visit their non-migrant families and friends, their perceived success prompt non-migrants to begin to search strategies to go abroad (e.g., via smuggling or

trafficking) and attain equal success as outmigrants. In many instances, the influence of remittances is the greatest factor in seducing the non-migrant population to leave their origins, more so than any other problems prevailing at home.

A substantial number of outmigrants in the Horn that left the sub-region confirmed that the major cause of their migration was the change they had observed in fellow migrants and their families as a result of remittances (Christopher, 2009). It is presently a common phenomenon to see people from affluent families, those who work in government institutions, or those with private businesses to migrate simply because they could not bear to witness the changes they saw in the lifestyle of their friends and families who benefitted from remittances. Thus, despite maximizing family incomes and improving the standard of living of members, remittances have some negative repercussions as they encourage more people to leave their home illegally.

Migration Networks

Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect irregular migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination countries through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared national origins (Elizabeth 2004). In the Horn of African countries, migrants can easily share and exchange information and resources with the non-migrant population at home. through networks established between sending and receiving communities. Moreover, migrants' rate of adaptation and assimilation to the destination society is directly affected by the type of networks established (Massey et al. 1998). Massey et al. (1998) further added that established networks increase the likelihood of illegal international cross-border migration because they lower the cost and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration. Slowly, the number of potential outmigrants increases as networks spread and encompass broader segments of the sending society. Potential migrants receive information about transit and

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destination areas through such network systems established with migrants living in receiving communities. An expanding network further increases the likelihood of irregular migration, as the social capital reduces the costs and risks of migration. Hamood (2009) points out that family and friends play an active role not only in the migration decision—in particular through material assistance—but also in integrating the irregular migrant in the destination country.

Networks, Smugglers and Human Traffickers

The role played by the network system in outmigration from the Horn of Africa is indispensable, but in transit areas, smugglers and traffickers replace kinfolk and friends as major actors that link migrants and non-migrant populations between destination and origin areas. In transit areas, the smugglers and traffickers actively engage in assisting migrants to cross borders with demand from irregular migrants' relatives, friends, and acquaintances living in destination countries (UNODC 2010). Thus, at both ends of the irregular migration field (origin and destination), the major actors controlling the networks are potential migrants and their relatives. Between these two ends of the migration field, however, the networks are predominantly controlled by smugglers, traffickers, and their collaborators.

Previously, according to Hamood (2009), clandestine migrants from the Horn and East African countries took most of the risks in transit areas, hoping that their relatives in destination areas might directly assist to facilitate safe passage. Lately, however, the majority of irregular migration fields are dominated by illegal agencies of smugglers who facilitate the process of illegal border crossing. The four outmigration routes mentioned earlier all came into existence as results of extensive network systems established all the way between origin and destination areas of migrants and non-migrant populations. ICMPD (2008), for example, outlined the relevance of

various network hubs established along Route 1 (through the Mediterranean Sea) and Route 2 (through the Red Sea) of outmigration from the Horn of Africa.

The networks established along these routes provide irregular migrants with the necessary infrastructure and services to continue their migration journey. ICMPD (2008) further noted the presence of illegal agencies that professionally sell their services to smuggled people through stages along the East African routes. The outmigration flow should be seen in the context of a larger social framework, of which the smugglers or traffickers form only a part. Relatives, friends, and the Diaspora play an important role in supporting the migrants financially and in providing them with information for the irregular migration process.

Geographical Proximity and Contiguity of Outmigration Fields

The physical distance between sending and receiving countries of outmigrants and their contiguity to landmasses and water bodies greatly affects the flow of outmigrants (Shaw 1975). Migration between or among places diminishes as distance between them increase. Similarly, natural barriers like mountains, deep valleys, and swamps greatly diminish the size of migration. On the contrary, short distances and contiguous migration fields encourage more people to migrate. They sacrifice less human and capital costs to travel, and penetrate natural barriers between sending and receiving countries with greater ease. In addition, potential migrants can easily establish networks with fellow migrants living on the other end of the migration field.

Africa geographically holds a central position in the spatial distribution of the world's continents. The continent has almost contiguous land masses, as it is separated by very narrow water canals from the Middle East and European countries. Thus, reaching the other continents of the world via Middle Eastern and European countries is not as challenging to potential irregular African migrants. Specifically, the flow of outmigrants from the Horn and Eastern

African countries is highly encouraged due to geographical proximity and contiguity of the sub-region to Middle East and European countries. Outmigration routes from the Horn and East African countries are good examples of the relevance of distance and natural barriers in determining the density and direction of flows. Two major hubs that attract the majority of irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa countries are the southern Europe and Gulf states, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. These three hubs are relatively close in spatial proximity with access via the North Africa and Red Sea, and are often utilized by outmigrants originating from the Horn. The density of migration flows, together with the illegal agencies and individuals facilitating the irregular flows, is particularly high between migration fields that link Europe and Gulf States with the Horn (UNODC 2011; Christopher, 2009). Research conducted by the DRC (2011) on the spatial configuration of outmigrants from the Horn disclosed that outmigrant flow is susceptible to the geographical proximity and landmass contiguity of the Horn, to southern Europe and Gulf States.

Outmigration versus Regional Cooperation and Integration

Outmigration has increasingly become a major economic, social, political, and security concern for a number of countries in the Horn. Businesses facilitating human smuggling and human trafficking in the Horn are liable to develop into well-organized internal gangster syndicates (Salt and Stein 1998). Such gangster cells will ultimately increase their size and influence by merging with similar groups of criminals, or they share information and resources, without merging. Eventually, they become major threats to the national sovereignty of many countries in the Horn of Africa. Porous borders not only allow clandestine migrants to sneak through, they also let bandits, criminals, and pirates smuggle arms, drugs, and armed bandits. Inter-border conflicts in the Horn are aggravated by the illegal border movement of migrants.

The problem mostly occurs at borders, transit lines, and destination areas. The problems of repatriation, return, and deportation of irregular migrants, if it is sudden, can also trigger conflicts among countries of the Horn since they aggressively drain the resources of migrants' countries of origin.

Sometimes transit and destination countries hold migrants as hostages illegally, in order to exercise political and economic pressures over the migrants' countries of origin. Similar measures may also be taken by other countries as a revenge, causing conflicts and open wars. Thus, outmigration is one of the triggers of inter- and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. It could also be the source of criminality if left unchecked by either the governments of the region.

Policy of the Horn of Africa

What can the region contribute, to tranquilize the conflicts and promote regional integration? Common strategies and policies that bind expectation in the region should be ratified. Some of the common migration strategies and policies which have commendable influences in the Horn, are:

- Launch awareness and consciousness building campaigns targeting vulnerable groups (especially the youth) of the sub-region, to sensitize them to the problematic and inaccurate aspects of the propaganda of the foreign media, agencies, and internet services, which attempt to seduce them to leave their country.

- Develop a common migration policy among Horn countries through the harmonization of laws, standards, procedures, and information regarding irregular migration scenarios.

- Strengthen and encourage information sharing on border management activities, including sealing porous borders and conducting joint cross-border patrol inspections.

- Ratify and implement strategies aimed at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment opportunities, and developing skills that can contribute to addressing the root causes of migration.

- Develop a common strategic framework for migration policy in the Horn in order to encourage legal migration and also combat the challenges posed by irregular migration to ensure security, stability, development and cooperation.

Conclusion

Outmigration is the most complex type of population movement to handle. It is also difficult to take corrective measures. People in the Horn practicing such movement not only change their statuses frequently, but they also conduct many of their activities in a clandestine manner. Outmigration is a burden to both sending and receiving countries. Outmigrants, particularly smuggled and trafficked persons drain the resources of their families and countries to enable them to cross international boundaries. Upon arrival at their destinations they are mostly not welcomed by the people and government of the alien environment, as they are considered the source of social and political conflicts and economic crises. A complex of causes stimulates the youth of the sub-region to abandon their countries. The majority of the causes are linked with the economic and social factors, including the myth of greener pastures believed to be available to the migrants living abroad. In addition, the geography of the sub-region, in terms of its spatial proximity and ease of travel to migration hubs, contributes to encouraging people to leave their countries of origin.

The youth of the sub-region is the most predisposed to outmigration, being spurred by high levels of precarity and frustration. Public education and awareness campaigns about the problems and dangers of the situation should be directed at the youth. It is also possible to

encourage and support the youth to play a key role in minimizing conflicts. Finally, more efforts should be made by all states in the region to integrate their policies and foster sub-regional cooperation to combat outmigration.

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